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xAbstract
This thesis investigates international capital flows to developing countries for the period
1970-2006. The first chapter introduces the theoretical and empirical framework of the thesis,
motivates it, overviews its building blocks (i.e. the following chapters) and clarifies its
approach to the balance of payments. The second chapter reviews the data and shows the
overall trends and developments in capital flows to the developing world by focusing on the
geographical regions and income groups.
The core of the thesis explores the empirical puzzle that although one would expect
international capital to flow to capital scarce countries where returns are higher, observation
shows that capital flows to richer rather than to poorer countries (the Lucas paradox). To
explore this total capital is measured as the sum of foreign direct investment and portfolio
equity flows. The third chapter addresses the argument, based on cross-section evidence
(Alfaro et al, Rev. Econ. Stats), that including the quality of institutions accounts for the
paradox (because richer countries have better institutions they attract more capital) and finds
that this only holds if developed countries are included; within developing countries,
institutions do not account for the paradox. The fourth chapter extends this by including
institutional quality indicators among determinants of capital inflows and employs a variety
of panel data estimators; the quality of institutions does not resolve the Lucas paradox,
although certain types of institutions are important. The persistence in the paradox and
implied non-convergence could be ascribed to the detrimental impacts of negative shocks and
volatility in global financial markets or to a Linder-type home bias in international finance.
The fifth chapter analyzes volatility, comovement (or contagion risk) and sudden stop
(reversibility) of capital flows (foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity
investment, long-term and short-term debt flows) using time series econometric techniques
for twelve emerging market economies over 1970-2006. This is informative on the pattern
and relationship between capital inflows, with implications for accommodating
macroeconomic policies in countries receiving inflows. The chapter also addresses the
predictions of conventional theory, that differences are associated with the maturity of the
capital (long-term vs. short-term), with the information-based trade-off model of Goldstein
and Razin (2006), that differences are associated with the structure of the capital (equity vs.
debt). In line with the latter, equity flows (FDI and portfolio) are less volatile, more
xi
persistent, more predictable and less susceptible to sudden stops than debt flows. Contrary to
conventional theory, short-term flows are not more volatile, but there is evidence that
correlations and risks of contagion are stronger within the pairs of long-term and equity
capital flows than within the short-term capital flows.
1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PREFACE
In a world of perfect capital mobility and under the assumption of complete arbitrage,
global savings are expected to flow to the economies with the highest rates of return.
However, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) detect very high correlations between long-term
averages of domestic savings and investment in OECD countries over 1960-1974. Based on
this finding, they conclude that additions to the domestic supply of capital do not appear to
move abroad in chase of the maximum return. For a sample of developing countries and with
a different empirical strategy, Aizenman et al. (2007) document that 90 percent of domestic
capital stock is self-financed and this ratio was stable during the 1990s. These findings imply
that capital is not perfectly mobile internationally as incremental savings tend to stay in the
country making the savings. This is the puzzle of imperfect capital mobility, or the so-called
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, that Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) include as one of the six major
puzzles in international macroeconomics.
The limited capital market integration or incompleteness is not the only puzzle in cross-
border capital mobility. There is another related to the direction of the mobility: the Lucas
paradox. It simply refers to the empirical observation that capital does not flow from richer to
poorer countries as one would expect it to. Assuming homogeneous (constant returns to
scale) technology, identical goods and competitively free international trade; neoclassical
theory predicts that international capital will flow from richer to poorer economies. This is
because, by the law of diminishing marginal returns, marginal product of capital is higher and
hence returns to financial investments are larger in the latter. Nevertheless, as Lucas (1990)
observes, capital flows disproportionately to richer economies rather than the poorer. The
macroeconomic implication of this diversion in the direction of capital flows is that it
aggravates sustained cross-country variations in factor prices, returns and real incomes.
Lucas (1990) proposes four hypotheses as potential explanations for the paradox: capital
market frictions (institutions, political risk etc.); barriers to capital mobility (capital controls,
2taxation and similar policies) and monopoly power; differences in relative human capital
stocks; and differences in external benefits of human capital. Lucas (1990) favours the
combination of the last two explanations, arguing that correcting for human capital
differentials reduces the predicted return ratios between very rich and very poor countries.
Several papers provide alternative theoretical explanations that can be divided into two
broad strands. In the first strand, papers attribute the paradox to differences in economic
fundamentals. They propose that financiers will invest more in countries with more human
capital, ample natural resources, better institutions (high quality regulatory and supervisory
environment that confers safety and security for the property) and less distortive government
interventions. Contributions in this strand include Stockman and Hernández (1988), Parente
and Prescott (2000), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Castro et al. (2004), Romer (2006),
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Acemoglu and Dell (2010). The second strand emphasises capital
market frictions associated with asymmetric information and sovereign risk (Gertler and
Rogoff, 1990, Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996, Wright, 2006). We will consider all of these
propositions to some extent in our empirical assessments.
Few empirical studies offer direct evidence on the Lucas paradox. Using annual panel data
for 34 countries, Clemens and Williamson (2004) analyse the wealth bias in the geographical
distribution of British capital exports during 1870-1913. They discover that, although local
fundamentals (schooling, natural resources and demography) and capital market failures
mattered, there was a stronger and persistent wealth bias (or the Lucas paradox) during the
first global capital market boom. On the other hand, using data for a cross-section of 81
countries and over a more recent period 1970-2000, Alfaro et al. (2008) find that including a
composite measure for institutional quality resolves the paradox. This means that foreign
funds favour economies not because they have higher wealth but because the risks are lower
due to better institutions and social infrastructure (Hall and Jones, 1999).
There are more empirical treatments on the general determinants, composition and
behaviours of capital flows. The number of country studies increased significantly following
the resumption and surges in financial flows to developing countries in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Capital flows in the forms of bonds, commercial bank lending and portfolio
equity investments escalated as a result of financial and economic liberalization and
integration policies. Also, resolution of the debt problems of these countries (e.g. Brady
Initiative, 1989) contributed to the restoration of investor confidence and country credibility.
This, in turn, led to the unprecedented build up of external funding. Motivated by these
3developments early empirical studies focus on the determinants of capital flows. They
investigate whether the flows are attracted by the favourable economic and financial
conditions in the recipients (the pull view) or protracted by the unfavourable conditions in the
capital exporting advanced countries (the push view).
Calvo et al. (1993) pioneered the literature on the ‘push vs. pull’ controversy by analysing
monthly data for ten Latin American countries over 1988:1 through 1991:12 in a structural
vector autoregression (SVAR) representation. They show that capital inflows (official
reserves as the proxy) are explained by push factors. Recessionary trends in the US economic
activity and low international interest rates were the main reasons for the recent surges. The
dilemma is modelled by Fernández-Arias (1996) on the basis of the country risk or
creditworthiness that comprises ‘push’ and ‘pull’ components. He also calibrates his model to
empirical specifications (pooled and individual country OLS regressions). Similar to Calvo et
al. (1993), Fernández-Arias (1996) finds that creditworthiness and ensuing portfolio inflows
are pushed up by the external forces (i.e. falls in developed country returns). Results of
Chuhan et al. (1998) and Taylor and Sarno (1997) give credit to both pull and push views.
In recent years, financial movements are increasingly related to the quality of institutions.
The conceptual content of institutions—which could roughly be defined as incentive and
safeguard structures that shape, control and lead economic activity—is vast. Institutional
quality is intended to capture the degree of political risk, country risk, credit risk, domestic
investment climate, capital market imperfections, civil liberties, transparency, contract
enforcement and protection of property rights. Because of this wide scope, the way in which
institutions are measured varies across studies. Some papers try to gauge a specific institution
(such as investment security, corruption, expropriation etc.) or regulation (e.g. accounting
standards), given that it is theoretically relevant to a particular type of capital flow. Although
such an approach is taken in Daude and Fratzscher (2008), the majority of authors use a
composite index. For instance, Edison and Warnock (2008) use the first differenced
composite index of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) political risk. Development of a
country’s institutional framework is captured by an index of civil liberties in De Santis and
Lührmann (2009), while the institutional quality index in Faria and Mauro (2009) is
composed of six world governance indicators.
The nature of linkages between institutional quality and capital flows also varies. Using 5-
year panel data for 130 countries over 1970-2003, De Santis and Lührmann (2009) show that
deteriorating civil liberties have negative impact on net foreign portfolio flows. Faria and
4Mauro (2009) find, for a cross-section of 94 high and low income countries for the period
1996-2004, that institutional quality is the core determinant of external capital structure. The
composition of external liabilities exhibits remarkable tendency towards equity, particularly
FDI, rather than debt as institutional quality improves. To see if there is a pecking order of
cross-border investment, Daude and Fratzscher (2008) employ bilateral capital stock data for
77 countries for the 1999-2003 period. Their seemingly unrelated regressions demonstrate
that there is indeed such a pecking order and that the quality of host country institutions is
one of its key determinants. More specifically, FDI and loans are detected to be less sensitive
to institutional indicators than portfolio debt and equity. Using monthly panel data for 9
emerging markets over the period 1989:1-1999:12, Edison and Warnock (2008) could not
find any significant relationship between institutional quality and US net purchases of
emerging Asian and Latin American equity securities. This implies that when it comes to
developing or emerging countries the quality of institutions seems to lose its explanatory
power.
Some papers examine specific components and patterns of international capital flows.
Using monthly data for 20 emerging economies over 1990s, Bekaert et al. (2002) analyse
endogenous (structural) break points in portfolio equity investment time series. They discover
that foreign participation in domestic stock markets rises promptly after the liberalization
(because of portfolio rebalancing toward newly available emerging market assets) but level
out three years later on. Transition dynamics analysis shows that equity capital leaves an
emerging market much faster than when it enters. SVAR analysis in the same paper reveals
that unexpected (positive) shocks to equity flows are linked to strong short-lived increases in
average returns. The same shocks, however, lead to permanent declines in dividend yields
and the cost of capital. Kalman filter applications of Sarno and Taylor (1999a and b) indicate
that there are low permanent components in portfolio and official flows and high permanent
components in cross-border commercial bank lending. FDI flows are indicated to be almost
entirely permanent. Claessens et al. (1995), using quarterly time series data for five industrial
and five developing countries, find that long-term flows are at least as volatile, transient and
unpredictable as short-term flows. Hence, the data or accounting labels ‘short-term’ and
‘long-term’ do not signal any information about the time series properties of the funding
component in question.
Instead of using individual time series, Levchenko and Mauro (2007) evaluate group
medians and means of capital flow component data for the countries of all income levels.
5They explore limited differences across types of flow with respect to volatility, persistence,
cross-country comovement and correlation with growth. Striking differences, however, are
discovered around the sudden stop episodes: bank loans and trade credits tumble severely and
stay depressed for some time, portfolio flows experience quickly recovering reversals and
FDI remains the most resilient.
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The principal objective of this thesis is to explore explanations for the Lucas paradox. A
specific motivation is that the Alfaro et al. (2008) results may be driven by a ‘capital flow
bias’ for high-income developed countries that have higher institutional qualities compared to
developing countries. We will remove developed countries from the sample and investigate
the role of the quality of institutions in explaining the Lucas paradox within developing
countries. More broadly, the focus of the thesis is to try and identify factors that determine
the patterns of capital flows across developing countries, and to provide an assessment of
how these patterns and trends vary for different types of capital flow (long-term or short-
term, debt or equity).
1.2.1 Chapter 2 Preview
Chapter 2 surveys the data employed in the thesis, providing the definitions and measures
of different types of international financial flows to developing regions since 1970 through
2006. It is a detailed overview of the patterns, volumes, composition and trends.
We derive an expression for the definition of total net capital inflows used in Chapter 2.
From the generic equations between the balance of payments and national income accountsܭܣܤ = െܥܣܤ + οܴܧܵ = ܩܣܲ + οܴܧܵ (1)
where ܭܣܤ denotes financial and capital account balance, ܥܣܤ stands for current account
balance, οܴܧܵ means change in international reserves and ܩܣܲ is the difference between
domestic investment and savings (ܩܣܲ = ܫ െ ܵ). The financial and capital account balance
could also be expressed asܭܣܤ = ܰܨܮ െ ܰܨܣ (2)
where, ܰܨܮ refers to net foreign liabilities and ܰܨܣ denotes net foreign assets. Rearranging
the terms across Equation (1) and (2) we obtainܰܨܮ = െܥܣܤ + οܴܧܵ + ܰܨܣ ؠ ܩܣܲ + οܴܧܵ + ܰܨܣ = ܥܨ (3)
6where ܥܨ represents total net capital inflows that include net liabilities on foreign direct and
portfolio equity investment plus external public and private debt net off foreign aid (i.e.
concessional loans and grants), IMF credits, non-residents’ deposits and interest arrears.
Figure 1.1: Foreign Capital Flows and Adjustments in Developing Countries, 1970-2006
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), Global Development Finance (GDF).
Notes: Bars show the nominal levels of aggregate net capital flows to all developing countries (NCF),
investment-savings gap (NGAP) and current account balance (NCAB) which are in current U.S. dollars (left
axis), whilst lines indicate the percentage amounts for the same variables that are scaled by current GDP (right
axis). The common letters, N and S, at the beginning of the legend labels denote ‘nominal’ and ‘scaled’
respectively. Total capital inflows (CF) are composed of private equity (FDI and portfolio) inflows and public
and private debt (portfolio, short-term and long-term loans) inflows net off foreign aid (i.e. concessional loans
and grants), IMF credits, non-residents’ deposits and interest arrears on foreign debt. The investment-saving gap
(GAP) is the difference between gross domestic investment and gross domestic savings; the former minus the
latter. Gross domestic investment, or gross capital formation as in WDI, consists of outlays on additions to the
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Gross domestic savings are calculated
as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption). Current account balance (CAB) is the sum of
net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current transfers. Only hollow bars (with forest-green
outline) exactly match their legends (both keys and labels), whereas light (maroon) and dim (navy-blue) bars
represent their labels partly. The true NCF for a year is the vertical sum of all the above-zero bars within that
year. Light maroon bars exhibit merely the amount of NGAP in excess of NCAB when both have the same signs
and they show the whole NGAP when the signs are opposite. These could also be made clear from all-exact line
plots.
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of aggregate net capital flows, external and internal
adjustments in developing countries. Total net capital inflows undergo three episodes of
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7surge and two phases of depression. The first surge was during the initial decade 1970s, the
second was seen in the early 1990s and the third came in the last years. The inflows
deteriorated for almost a decade in 1980s due to Latin American debt crisis and for about five
years (1997-2002) as a result of financial crashes in East Asia and in many individual
countries. Albeit incurring deficits all the way through until the late 1990s, current account
balance does not seem to be a cause for concern as its GDP share varies within the band
±3%. Evaluating the GAP, it is either the case that developing countries underinvest or that
they have excess savings because only in 10 years out of 37 investment exceeded savings.
This suggests a potential problem with the economic efficiency in less developed countries.
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Capital Inflows by Income Groups, 1970-2006
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: Income groups refer to the World Bank’s classification of countries according to the level of 2009 GNI
per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. From those mutually exclusive groups; included are
upper middle income countries (UMIC) which are also known as emerging market economies, lower middle
income countries (LMIC) and low income countries (LIC). Component bars indicate the simple arithmetic
averages for the corresponding region or income group. EF denotes equity flows, DF stands for debt flows, FDI
refers to foreign direct investment, FPEI represents foreign portfolio equity investment, LTD denotes long-term
debt and STD stands for short-term debt. See also notes to Figure 1.1.
As Equation (3) and Figure 1.1 reflect the thesis’ approach to the balance of payments,
Figure 1.2 illustrates the distribution of capital inflows among developing country income
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8groups. All the panels in the figure say in chorus that lower income countries receive less
foreign capital in all types. The theme of Chapters 3 and 4 is centred on this paradoxical
pattern.
1.2.2 Chapter 3 Preview
Chapter 3, the first empirical essay, uses cross-section data for a sample of 47 developing
countries over the period 1970-2006 to examine if the Lucas paradox is resolved by including
a measure for institutional quality. Institutional quality is measured by a composite index of
ICRG political risk that consists of twelve components: government stability, socioeconomic
conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in
politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and
bureaucratic quality (see Chapter 3 for details). This is a very broad measure and where
appropriate it is useful to focus on components of this index that may be particularly
important. Cross-section OLS regressions are employed to estimate the long-run responses of
real capital inflows (the sum of foreign direct investment and portfolio equity inflows) per
capita to the proxies of theoretically implied variables. As the cross-section estimates are
based on the data averaged over the decades the results can be interpreted as capturing ‘long-
run’ relationships (Houthakker, 1965; Baltagi and Griffin, 1984; Pesaran and Smith, 1995).
One should be wary of drawing causal inferences as essentially one is identifying covariates
of capital inflows across countries.
1.2.3 Chapter 4 Preview
Cross-section OLS estimators based on long-term averages of the data are criticized as
being predominantly long-run steady state equilibrium models that generally do not
illuminate intertemporal dependence (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Sinn, 1992). As these
estimators are unable to control for country-specific heterogeneity (potentially giving rise to
omitted variables bias), they may not satisfy the unbiasedness and consistency conditions.
They are also unable to explain the true state dependence and the sources of persistence in the
data. Chapter 4 tackles these issues by extending the analysis in Chapter 3. It applies a range
of static (primarily within-group fixed-effects) and dynamic (system GMM) panel data
models on 5-year-averaged panel data for the same group of developing countries and 1980-
2006 period. Chapter 4 additionally considers the testable predictions of Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997)—who propose that under the augmented assumptions of micro-level
9indivisibilities and uncertainty there will be deviation from steady-state growth (i.e. global
income divergence), with more capital flowing to richer countries—in the short-run.
1.2.4 Chapter 5 Preview
As Chapters 3 and 4 show uniformly that the Lucas paradox (or the wealth bias) is a
persistent syndrome in the direction of developing-country capital flows, Chapter 5 considers
if this is related to the composition and behaviour of the flows. Financial liberalization,
capital market integration, capital controls and capital market imperfections may have distinct
effects on different types of capital flow. Ultimately one wants to know if capital flows
function as economic theory implies—that they sponsor productive investment opportunities
and bring convergence in real factor returns, prices and incomes across nations. As the
relevant literature proves inconclusive for virtues and vices of capital flows (Kose et al.,
2009), the best strategy would be to concentrate on specific components and distinguish them
according to their characteristics so as to better guide economic research and policy making.
Chapter 5, therefore, focuses on elucidating the behavioural patterns of foreign direct
investment, foreign portfolio equity investment, long-term debt flows and short-term debt
flows. To address this, the chapter uses time series data on these flow components for 12
emerging market economies from five regions over 1970-2006. It tests the hypotheses
derived from the conventional theory, asserting that maturity (long-term vs. short-term) is the
distinguishing factor in component attributes, and the information-based trade-off model of
Goldstein and Razin (2006), suggesting that structure (debt vs. equity) is the distinguishing
factor. The chapter employs appropriate time series techniques to shed light on volatility,
persistence, predictability, correlation, contagion risk (comovement) and sudden stop
(reversibility) profiles of the financing components.
In brief, the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the aggregate and
component-based capital flow data for different country groups of developing countries. The
third and fourth chapters study the Lucas paradox in the long-run and in the short-run,
respectively. Chapter 5 examines the behavioural patterns of basic capital flow components.
Overall conclusions, limitations and future research possibilities are discussed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
A DATA SURVEY ON INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the data on international capital flows to developing economies.
The overall structure and defining features of the data are discussed with reference to the
main data sources, span of time and cross-section units and the core variables of interest.
The Global Development Finance (GDF) database of the World Bank is the key source for
our data series on capital movements.1 Although there is the word ‘global’ in its name, GDF
covers only developing regions and countries including emerging and less developed. Being
another and yet more extensive World Bank database, World Development Indicators (WDI)
is used to get the indicators—mostly macroeconomic and financial sector—that are not
available from the GDF. Databases such as International Financial Statistics (IFS), Balance of
Payments Statistics (BOPS), World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and
statistics portal of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
are also consulted for comparison and cross checks.
The years of observations range from 1970 to 2006, covering a maximum of 37 annual
data points. This is the general case for the regions and income groups for which the data are
available. The time length, particularly because of the changing initial years, varies
considerably across countries and by different types of capital flow. As we look at the overall
trends and developments in financial movements to developing markets in this chapter, that
should not be a concern for the moment. We assure sample consistency in the analytical
chapters of the thesis. Country groups that are composed of developing countries from
different income classes and geographical regions constitute the spatial domain of the
1 The data is made available through the library and information service facilities of the University of
Nottingham by providing access to Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS) which is an integrated online
data archiving and dissemination service throughout the United Kingdom.
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chapter. Although some data illustrations are based on the income groups for comparison
purposes, the cross-section emphasis is on regions. The two Asian regions, East Asia and
Pacific and South Asia, that are separately identified by the World Bank are combined under
the name of Developing Asia (DA) as in WEO. Europe and Central Asia (ECA) comprises
so-called transitional economies located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as
Turkey.2 The remaining regions, Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are the same as in Word Bank
classifications. The chief grouping is All Developing Countries (ADC) for which the
aggregate data consist of individual sums of regional data. Income groups are based on the
World Bank’s classification of countries according to the level of 2009 GNI per capita,
calculated using the Atlas method: upper middle income countries (UMIC), which are also
known as emerging market economies, lower middle income countries (LMIC) and low
income countries (LIC).
Despite the fact that all capital flow types serve similar economic goals through financing
productive real investment opportunities, smoothing business and consumption cycles and
offering diversification and risk sharing, there are differences in terms of functionality, type
of the security, original contractual maturity, direction of the investment, and other
contractual arrangements. For this study, cross-border capital flow data are collected and
organized under the standard sub-aggregates of equity and debt flows. Figure 2.1 provides a
taxonomic portrayal of the major and minor global funding components covered. Due to
space considerations, seven different data series for which the compositional structures are
shown in the figure are identified for focus: total capital flows, total equity flows, total debt
flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity investment (FPEI), short-term
debt flows and long-term debt flows. The items and information beyond the third level (i.e.
after the node ‘by debtor’) are given for illustrative purposes only.
Aggregate total net capital flows for a country group is the sum of total net equity and debt
flows to that group. International aid allocations (concessional loans and grants), IMF credits,
non-residents’ deposits and interest arrears on external debt are excluded. Total equity
inflows comprise net flows of FDI and FPEI.
2 As a poor transition economy, Mongolia is classed with Central Asia.
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Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of Global Capital Flows Considered throughout the Thesis
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance and author’s depictions.
Notes: FDI denotes foreign direct investment and FPEI refers to foreign portfolio equity investment. Private
nonguaranteed (PNG) debt comprises the external obligations of private debtors that are not guaranteed for
repayment by a public entity of their country. Public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt covers the external
obligations of public and private borrowers that are insured by a public entity. Bilateral creditors are
governments and their agencies, including central banks, official export credit agencies and autonomous
agencies. Multilateral creditors are international financial institutions such as the World Bank, regional
development banks, and other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies whose lending is administered on a
multilateral basis. Commercial bank loans comprise loans from private banks and other private financial
institutions. Bonds include publicly issued or privately placed bonds. Credits from ‘other’ private creditors
contain credits by manufacturers, exporters and other suppliers of goods plus bank credits covered by a
guarantee of an export credit agency. Foreign aid (i.e. concessional loans and grants), credits from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), non-residents’ deposits and interest arrears on all sorts of debt are excluded.
Foreign direct investment refers to the net financial investments that involve acquisition of
a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating
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in an economy other than that of the investor.3 It is the sum of equity capital, reinvested
earnings and other long-term and short-term capital of similar character. FPEI includes net
inflows from equity securities other than those recorded as direct investment, inflows from
traded shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or global) and direct purchases of shares
in local stock markets by foreign investors. Long-term and short-term debt inflows add up to
the total net debt flows. Long-term debt inflows are disbursements minus principal
repayments on private nonguaranteed (PNG) and public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt
securities (e.g. publicly issued and privately placed bonds) and international loans (official
and private non-concessional) with an original or extended maturity of more than one year
and that are repayable in foreign currency, goods or services. Net short-term debt flows
consist of disbursements less principal repayments on loans, trade credits and negotiable
money market debt instruments (such as repos, treasury bills, commercial and financial
papers, bankers’ acceptances, certificates of deposit and other short-term notes issued under
the note issuance facilities that render the bearer the unconditional right to receive a
contractually stipulated, reserved and fixed sum of money on a specified date) with an
original maturity of one year or less.
Following the convention in World Bank (2008), we construct the ‘net’ aggregate capital
flow indicators by summing up net annual credit (if the balance of the flow is positive) or
debit (if it is negative) of the relevant liability accounts in the balance of payments. A
positive numeric figure for a given year, therefore, implies that the financial liability items
end up with a net inflow in that year, while any negative amount would reflect a net outflow
for the year. By this practice, we concentrate on the foreigners’ financial claims on the
country group receiving the funding and ignore those of the domestic residents on foreign
entities.
The data are usually expressed either in nominal billions of US dollars (USD) or as
percent of the group’s gross domestic product (GDP), unless otherwise stated. Nominal
values are reported to show the actual realizations (i.e. the data) as they are. It is crucial to
consider these values, as they are the essential or base data of interest throughout the thesis.
The primary focus is on nominal values because these figures have actual meaning in that
international financial transactions originally bear these monetary values. In contrast to some
3 Both the initial transactions that set up the relationship between the investor and the enterprise and all the
subsequent transactions that take place between them and among affiliated enterprises such as subsidiaries (a
non-resident investor owns more than 50%), associates (an investor owns 50 percent or less) and branches
(entirely or jointly owned unincorporated enterprises) are recorded as FDI.
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economic and financial indicators or accounts (e.g. GDP), these values are not attached or
assigned by statisticians but perpetually reported through the relevant money and capital
market security accounts. The pertinent recordings in the balance of payments follow crude
realizations and market activities which are mostly denominated in US dollars. Furthermore,
it is the standard treatment in the periodic reports of multilateral organizations and in some
academic articles when they review this kind of data (World Bank, 2012, Bosworth and
Collins, 1999).
Wealth or income scaling is performed to take relative economic sizes or masses,
exchange-rate movements and domestic price changes into account, along with real GDP
growth.4 It also improves the accuracy and reliability of the comparisons across country
groups, as the changing number of countries and observations for each group could bias the
comparisons based on nominal values. Hence, GDP-scaled data are preferred in comparing
geographical regions and income groups. Currency conversion, aggregation and gap-filling
procedures of the World Bank are adopted and applied for some years in some cases.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 focuses on trends and developments in
capital flow aggregates, whilst Section 2.3 reviews the level and direction of foreign direct
and portfolio equity investments. The evolution and financial implication of international
lending are covered in Section 2.4 and the key observations are summarized in Section 2.5.
2.2 TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN AGGREGATE CAPITAL FLOWS
We describe the level, composition and direction of global financial flows to developing
countries for the period 1970-2006. The moving averages of total net capital flows and
aggregate components are provided in Table 2.1. For all developing countries, total capital
inflows jumped from about $13 billion a year to the nominal level of $350 billion within
three decades. Modest during the initial years, total net equity flows have experienced the
most outstanding rise by ending up with average annual inflows of almost $262 billion. Debt
flows rose very little and fell below 1% of GDP in the most recent sub-period. Although
capital flows as a share of GDP are variable throughout, in these terms total net capital flows
doubled and total equity inflows rose by more than six times eventually.
4 For more on this, see World Bank (2008). It should be noted, however, that the emphasis in this chapter is on
trends and developments in capital flows that are characterised by the changes in capital flows themselves. For
the GDP-scaled data, changes in percentages over time would also be affected by the changes in GDP.
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Table 2.1: Total Capital Inflows to Developing World by Sub-periods, Billions of USD
Region and Component 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-06
All Developing Countries
Total Capital Inflows 13.42
(2.0)
48.59
(3.9)
64.69
(2.0)
45.11
(1.2)
127.27
(3.1)
236.86
(4.2)
349.02
(4.0)
Total Equity Inflows 3.22
(0.5)
6.03
(0.5)
11.24
(0.3)
15.72
(0.4)
66.82
(1.6)
161.92
(2.8)
261.91
(3.1)
Total Debt Inflows 10.20
(1.5)
42.56
(3.4)
53.45
(1.7)
29.39
(0.8)
60.45
(1.5)
74.94
(1.3)
87.11
(0.9)
Developing Asia
Total Capital Inflows 1.62
(0.6)
6.07
(1.4)
15.98
(2.4)
18.34
(2.0)
56.20
(4.5)
79.89
(4.0)
143.53
(4.0)
Total Equity Inflows 0.35
(0.1)
0.72
(0.2)
2.44
(0.4)
6.00
(0.7)
29.99
(2.3)
63.92
(3.2)
116.33
(3.3)
Total Debt Inflows 1.27
(0.5)
5.35
(1.2)
13.54
(2.0)
12.34
(1.4)
26.20
(2.2)
15.96
(0.8)
27.20
(0.7)
Europe and Central Asia
Total Capital Inflows 1.01
(n/a)
4.88
(n/a)
6.47
(0.5)
7.19
(0.4)
12.29
(1.7)
37.99
(3.6)
108.50
(5.6)
Total Equity Inflows 0.14
(n/a)
0.25
(n/a)
0.52
(0.04)
1.02
(0.1)
5.40
(0.7)
17.56
(1.7)
49.43
(2.6)
Total Debt Inflows 0.87
(n/a)
4.63
(n/a)
5.94
(0.5)
6.17
(0.4)
6.90
(1.1)
20.43
(1.9)
59.07
(3.0)
Latin America and Caribbean
Total Capital Inflows 8.21
(3.3)
27.04
(5.6)
31.60
(4.0)
9.75
(1.2)
51.15
(3.8)
105.27
(5.4)
69.41
(3.2)
Total Equity Inflows 1.50
(0.7)
3.34
(0.7)
6.13
(0.8)
6.07
(0.8)
27.44
(2.0)
65.35
(3.4)
68.90
(3.2)
Total Debt Inflows 6.71
(2.7)
23.70
(4.9)
25.47
(3.2)
3.68
(0.5)
23.70
(1.8)
39.92
(2.1)
0.51
(-0.03)
Middle East and North Africa
Total Capital Inflows 0.93
(1.9)
6.10
(4.5)
4.22
(1.8)
4.87
(1.8)
4.97
(1.9)
1.48
(0.4)
10.78
(2.0)
Total Equity Inflows 0.37
(0.7)
0.95
(0.7)
1.07
(0.5)
1.34
(0.5)
1.91
(0.7)
2.75
(0.7)
10.35
(1.8)
Total Debt Inflows 0.56
(1.2)
5.15
(3.8)
3.16
(1.4)
3.53
(1.3)
3.06
(1.2)
-1.27
(-0.3)
0.43
(0.2)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total Capital Inflows 1.66
(1.9)
4.51
(2.6)
6.43
(2.5)
4.95
(1.8)
2.66
(0.9)
12.24
(3.7)
16.81
(3.1)
Total Equity Inflows 0.85
(1.0)
0.78
(0.5)
1.09
(0.4)
1.28
(0.5)
2.07
(0.7)
12.34
(3.7)
16.91
(3.4)
Total Debt Inflows 0.80
(0.9)
3.73
(2.1)
5.34
(2.1)
3.67
(1.4)
0.58
(0.2)
-0.10
(-0.03)
-0.10
(-0.3)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: Including the numbers in parentheses which are the inflows expressed as percent of regional gross
domestic product (GDP), all nominal figures in the table are averages for the corresponding period and country
group or region. Data for all developing countries consist of the individual sums of regional data. South, East
and Pacific Asian developing countries are combined within Developing Asia, while Europe and Central Asia
covers so-called transition economies in Central Asia and Eastern Europe as well as Mongolia. The remaining
regions are the same as in World Bank classifications. N/A means not available. See also notes to Figure 2.1.
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The period-averages of total capital and equity inflows are always, while those of debt
inflows are almost always, positive (except for MENA during 1995-99 and for SSA during
the last two sub-periods). This shows that external funding is a persistent and prevalent
reality for developing economies and a manifestation of continual investor and creditor
interest in them. The individual sub-periods of 1975-79 and 1990-94 witness remarkably
higher surges that are driven by debt inflows in the former and by equity inflows in the latter.
Economic slowdown in advanced countries could have contributed to both surges, while
surges during the second episode may additionally be linked to concomitant liberalizations in
developing countries. Total capital inflows were dwarfed by paralyzed debt inflows during
1985-89 due most probably to the Latin American debt crisis that had broken out one sub-
period earlier. The effects of 1997 East Asian financial crises are not that visible from this
table. Initially strong in receiving foreign capital, Latin America and Caribbean loses its
position to other regional destinations like Developing Asia and particularly Europe and
Central Asia where debt flows most in the latest sub-periods. Middle East and North Africa
and Sub-Saharan Africa have weak capital flows that remain under $20 billion per year.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution and evolution of aggregate capital inflows over time.
Foreign borrowing and financial investments in developing countries have risen from
relatively low levels to unprecedented amounts within nearly 40 years, approaching to $750
billion in nominal terms. However, this escalation was not monotonic. Lending driven cross-
border financing, displaying largely similar profile across geographical regions, has increased
rather gradually until 1980s. It is depressed throughout this decade because of debt problems
and international credit dry-up in some LAC countries (i.e. Latin American debt crisis that
started in 1982). Financial integration, capital account liberalization and privatization of the
late 1980s have facilitated and accelerated the international investment process that has led
net capital flows to escalate. Exceeding aggregate net debt flows from early 1990s onwards,
aggregate net equity flows have acted as a lean-against-the-wind in keeping total capital
inflows uninhibited from devastating impacts (visible in this figure) of the contagious East
Asian financial crises that started in 1997 and resulted in lingering debt overhangs in most of
the regions.5 Relative to GDP however, the rise is less impressive and regular, given growth
of GDP and depreciation of the US dollar against some developing country currencies.
5 Contagion in 1990s with special emphasis on East Asian financial crisis is documented in Fratzscher (2003)
and Caramazza et al. (2004).
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate Net Capital Flows to Developing World by Regions, 1970-2006
(continued on next page)
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Figure 2.2 (continued)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: Bars show the nominal levels of aggregate net capital flows which are in current U.S. dollars (left axis),
whilst lines indicate the percentage amounts for the same flows that are scaled by current GDP (right axis). The
common letters, N and S, at the beginning of the legend labels denote ‘nominal’ and ‘scaled’ respectively. CF
refers to (aggregate) capital flows, EF is equity flows and DF stands for debt flows. Only hollow bars (with
forest-green outline) exactly match their legends (both keys and labels), whereas light (maroon) and dark (navy-
blue) bars represent their labels partly. The true NCF for a year is the vertical sum of all the bars within that year
and the true NEF is what remains from the hollow bar (NDF) in a certain year. Light maroon bars exhibit merely
the amount of NEF in excess of NDF when both have the same signs and they show the whole NEF when the
signs are opposite. These could also be made obvious from all-exact line plots. See notes to Table 2.1 as well.
Aggregate debt flows are more volatile than aggregate equity flows, making the former
responsible for much of the fluctuations in total capital flows.6 Regarding the individual
regions, note that total debt inflows to DA have never been more than 3% of GDP. This low
level of dynamic external leverage of the region coincides with the conventional view that
economic and financial fundamentals of the Developing Asian countries had not, in fact,
deteriorated to the extent of giving rise to a crash, which happened nonetheless. Second and
third generation models of financial crises have, therefore, been devised to address this sort of
anomaly by incorporating the investor behaviour, capital market imperfections and systemic
inefficiencies (balance sheet distortions, deposit insurance schemes etc.) into their
6 Including the volatility, Chapter 5 analyzes the behavioural patterns of the main capital flow components.
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formulations.7 Europe and Central Asia is the region where debt flows shape the total capital
flows—that ultimately achieve a high GDP share, being over 10% as of 2006—for the
majority of years. As most of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) are in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the apparent downward course of the region’s SDF over time mirrors the effects of
debt reduction and restructuring policies in these countries. International equity flows to SSA,
albeit quite unstable, increasingly compensate for any possible shortfall in foreign financing
due to borrowing constraints in the region. Following the new millennium, Middle East and
North African capital flows in the last year and Latin American and Caribbean capital flows
for a couple of years has diminished.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Capital Inflows by Geographic Regions and Income Groups
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: Geographical regions are Developing Asia (DA), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and
Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Income groups refer
to the World Bank’s classification of countries according to the level of 2009 GNI per capita, calculated using
the World Bank Atlas method. From those mutually exclusive groups; included are upper middle income
countries (UMIC) which are also known as emerging market economies, lower middle income countries
(LMIC) and low income countries (LIC). Component bars indicate the simple arithmetic averages for the
corresponding region or income group. See also notes to Figure 2.2.
7 See Frankel and Wei (2005), Burnside et al. (2008).
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To enable more explicit comparisons among different country groups, four panels of bar
graphs of the aggregate capital flow component averages are presented in Figure 2.3.
According to nominal evaluations, Developing Asia, followed by LAC and ECA, ranks the
first among five geographical regions in getting total capital and equity flows. Most of the
aggregate debt inflows go to Europe and Central Asia. However, Latin America and
Caribbean has the highest GDP shares in all categories. The other difference is that equity
flows stand out to be the dominant aggregate component in Panel (a), whereas they are
slightly superseded by debt flows in (b). These differences are most probably due to the
valuation effects (exchange rate and price level changes) that are uncontrolled in Panel (a).
As the exchange rate movements and price level changes may cause the later or recent period
data to dominate the averages in nominal panels, GDP-scaled panels are believed to provide
more accurate and consistent comparisons. Nonetheless, there is a common aspect of both
panels in that the positions of MENA and SSA as being the least popular foreign capital
destinations remain unaltered. The plain truth discernible from the lower half of the figure is
that the global funds are lower in lower income countries. Cross-border capital moving to
developing world, which is already meagre as most of the average GDP shares are well below
3%, seems to be channelled mainly to the upper middle income county (emerging or richer
developing) markets.8
Growth rates and cyclicality measures of capital flows to developing countries are
reported in Table 2.2. For the purpose of assessing relative growth performances, Panel (a)
gives average and median annual percentage changes in aggregate real capital flows, real
GDP, international reserves (RES) and total external debt (TED) stocks (all in fixed 2005 US
dollars). As capital flows are year-on-year changing net foreign liabilities, they are more
dynamic and have higher growth rates than memorandum items (i.e. the stock variables of
GDP, RES and TED that are inherently static). Setting total capital flows to LIC and total
debt flows to LAC, MENA and LIC aside, all of the real capital flow aggregates grow. Real
debt inflows to low income countries and to Middle East and North Africa are shrinking.
Reading negative medians and positive means respectively, we notice that total capital
inflows to low income countries and total debt inflows to Latin America and Caribbean are
characterized by weak but frequent ebbs and intermittent but torrential flows, so that whether
they are actually growing or contracting is difficult to tell.
8 The wealth bias in international capital flows, their role in global macroeconomic (non)convergence and
interactions with institutional quality levels are exclusively studied in third and fourth chapters of the thesis.
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Table 2.2: Growth and Cyclicality of Total Capital Flows in Comparative Perspective
ADC
Geographical Regions Income Groups
DA ECA LAC MENA SSA UMIC LMIC LIC
(a) Average and Median Annual Growths (Percent)
Means
RCF 12.58 21.68 174.14 24.51 945.40 30.11 17.12 69.22 220.01
REF 14.34 19.30 55.74 15.58 28.56 90.44 21.47 18.87 86.17
RDF 40.88 35.97 67.95 170.00 -8.23 42.35 178.85 37.91 -64.20
GDP 5.42 4.34 2.39 3.89 4.83 2.57 4.12 3.42 0.84
RES 13.28 11.99 8594.84 8.41 12.72 9.07 9.36 9.96 4.80
TED 6.07 6.13 10.84 4.45 5.74 5.00 6.62 4.54 5.38
Medians
RCF 15.03 18.75 30.02 14.78 9.20 7.47 12.48 11.88 -6.09
REF 7.63 11.68 18.27 14.36 0.54 7.77 10.50 20.22 6.45
RDF 9.36 14.93 35.12 -0.50 -7.31 7.98 7.65 11.00 -11.37
GDP 3.98 3.38 3.73 5.33 4.57 1.15 3.33 3.56 1.14
RES 9.96 9.92 20.66 12.05 13.18 6.99 9.56 8.52 3.99
TED 6.50 6.57 7.28 3.94 3.06 3.94 6.10 4.11 4.49
(b) Correlations with Real GDP Growth (Coefficient)
RCF 0.18
(0.30)
0.27
(0.11)
0.15
(0.46)
0.19
(0.27)
-0.06
(0.73)
0.27
(0.11)
0.37
(0.02)
0.22
(0.20)
0.07
(0.69)
REF 0.06
(0.74)
0.24
(0.16)
-0.01
(0.95)
0.42
(0.01)
0.15
(0.37)
0.16
(0.36)
0.46
(0.00)
-0.04
(0.82)
0.01
(0.94)
RDF 0.01
(0.94)
0.34
(0.04)
-0.24
(0.23)
0.35
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.68)
0.25
(0.15)
-0.13
(0.45)
0.35
(0.04)
0.06
(0.74)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: Compound growth rates are computed over 1971-2006 for the variables that are expressed in real terms
(constant 2005 US dollars). An R in front of the acronyms of capital flow aggregates signifies this reality. ADC
denotes all developing countries, RES stands for total international reserves that comprise holdings of monetary
gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under
the control of monetary authorities and TED refers to total external debt outstanding and disbursed. TED is
essentially a stock variable (so are GDP and RES) that covers the accumulated sum of public, publicly
guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit and short-term debt. The correlation
between annual percentage changes in a flow aggregate and in the real GDP measures the cyclicality of that
aggregate. Associated significance levels (p-values) are in parentheses. See notes to Figure 2.3 also.
While the growth in equity flows is more regular and steady, in debt flows, by and large, it
is bulky and lumpy. All memorandum items, even cumulative external debt stocks, grow
everywhere. The positive growth of TED in LIC and MENA—where the mostly private debt
inflows were dwindling—is perhaps because of undisbursed credit commitments,
concessional loans, interest arrears and IMF credits. Faster accumulation of total external
debt than real output is likely to be accommodated by even faster build-up of external
22
reserves, which are in turn fed by capital inflows. Considering the means and medians, all
forms of capital flows to developing economies in Europe and Central Asia appear to have
the highest compound growth rates.
The correlations between annual percentage changes in the capital flow aggregates and in
the real GDP that are used to measure the cyclicality of these real aggregates are provided in
Panel (b) of the table. In general, total capital flows and its aggregate components are
acyclical with a few exceptions; total net capital flows to upper middle income countries,
aggregate equity inflows to UMIC and Latin America and Caribbean and aggregate net debt
flows to lower middle income countries, LAC and Developing Asia are procyclical. Two
implications are worth to mention. First, no countercyclicality is observed in capital flows.
Second, of the detected procyclicality the most is in the total debt flows.
2.3 TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN EQUITY FLOWS
A data summary on total net, direct and portfolio equity flows to developing countries is
given in Table 2.3. As reasonably expected, a quick scan of the entire table indicates that
aggregate equity inflows and FDI are all, and FPEI is mostly, positive. In case of all
developing countries, we see a virtually exponential increase in aggregate equity inflows as
they are up from 0.5% of GDP per year to 3.1% over the 1970-2006 period. The yearly
average inflows of FDI reached nearly to $225 billion, whilst the equity funds that have been
created by share purchases of foreign portfolio investors soared from almost nil levels (e.g.
$400,000) to $37 billion a year.
Although every type of nominal equity inflows goes up continuously (even more rapidly
after 1980s as a result of economic and financial liberalization, integration, capital market
establishment and privatization), their GDP proportions do not always follow an increasing
pattern—they were smaller than or equal to 0.5% during the pre-1990s and showed
consecutive increases only in case of total and direct equity flows thereafter. Average annual
GDP share of foreign portfolio equity investments in developing markets has never
transcended 0.4%. As a matter of compositional evaluation, total equity flows have been
shaped almost completely by FDI throughout the initial two decades and still FDI has
wheeled them over the remaining years.
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Table 2.3: Equity Inflows to Developing World by Sub-periods, Billions of USD
Region and Component 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-06
All Developing Countries
Total Equity Inflows 3.22
(0.5)
6.03
(0.5)
11.24
(0.3)
15.72
(0.4)
66.82
(1.6)
161.92
(2.8)
261.91
(3.1)
Direct Equity 3.22
(0.5)
6.01
(0.5)
11.14
(0.3)
15.26
(0.4)
51.14
(1.2)
144.72
(2.5)
224.72
(2.7)
Portfolio Equity 0.004
(0.0)
0.02
(0.0)
0.10
(0.0)
0.46
(0.0)
15.68
(0.4)
17.21
(0.3)
37.19
(0.4)
Developing Asia
Total Equity Inflows 0.35
(0.1)
0.72
(0.2)
2.44
(0.4)
6.00
(0.7)
29.99
(2.3)
63.92
(3.2)
116.33
(3.3)
Direct Equity 0.35
(0.1)
0.72
(0.2)
2.41
(0.4)
5.49
(0.6)
26.80
(2.1)
59.63
(3.0)
91.74
(2.7)
Portfolio Equity n/a
(n/a)
0.002
(0.0)
0.03
(0.0)
0.51
(0.1)
3.19
(0.2)
4.29
(0.2)
24.59
(0.7)
Europe and Central Asia
Total Equity Inflows 0.14
(n/a)
0.25
(n/a)
0.52
(0.04)
1.02
(0.1)
5.40
(0.7)
17.56
(1.7)
49.43
(2.6)
Direct Equity 0.14
(n/a)
0.25
(n/a)
0.52
(0.04)
1.02
(0.1)
4.95
(0.6)
15.81
(1.5)
46.36
(2.5)
Portfolio Equity n/a
(n/a)
n/a
(n/a)
n/a
(n/a)
0.02
(0.0)
0.44
(0.1)
1.75
(0.2)
3.06
(0.1)
Latin America and Caribbean
Total Equity Inflows 1.50
(0.7)
3.34
(0.7)
6.13
(0.8)
6.07
(0.8)
27.44
(2.0)
65.35
(3.4)
68.90
(3.2)
Direct Equity 1.50
(0.7)
3.34
(0.7)
6.13
(0.8)
5.92
(0.7)
15.44
(1.1)
60.19
(3.1)
64.61
(3.0)
Portfolio Equity n/a
(n/a)
0.00
(0.0)
0.003
(0.0)
0.15
(0.02)
12.00
(0.9)
5.16
(0.3)
4.28
(0.2)
Middle East and North Africa
Total Equity Inflows 0.37
(0.7)
0.95
(0.7)
1.07
(0.5)
1.34
(0.5)
1.91
(0.7)
2.75
(0.7)
10.35
(1.8)
Direct Equity 0.37
(0.7)
0.94
(0.7)
1.00
(0.4)
1.32
(0.5)
1.84
(0.7)
2.47
(0.7)
9.77
(1.7)
Portfolio Equity n/a
(n/a)
0.001
(0.0)
0.07
(0.03)
0.02
(0.01)
0.07
(0.03)
0.28
(0.1)
0.58
(0.1)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total Equity Inflows 0.85
(1.0)
0.78
(0.5)
1.09
(0.4)
1.28
(0.5)
2.07
(0.7)
12.34
(3.7)
16.91
(3.4)
Direct Equity 0.85
(1.0)
0.76
(0.5)
1.08
(0.4)
1.52
(0.6)
2.11
(0.7)
6.61
(2.0)
12.23
(2.6)
Portfolio Equity 0.004
(0.0)
0.02
(0.01)
0.003
(0.0)
-0.23
(-0.1)
-0.04
(-0.01)
5.72
(1.7)
4.68
(0.8)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: See notes to Table 2.1.
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The equity inflows, again in nominal terms, to MENA and SSA that have been getting
smaller in volume due to the lower velocity made these regions the ultimate losers against the
other two such as DA and ECA whose performances in attracting foreign equity capital have
been overwhelming, particularly in the post-1980s. The competitive allocation among regions
would then translate into ‘who gets more’ instead of ‘who loses more’. For instance, Latin
America and Caribbean (Europe and Central Asia) that was getting largest (smallest) volumes
for the first fifteen years has seen its position changed afterwards. It is noteworthy that Sub-
Saharan Africa is not only the region which had available FPEI data at the outset but also it is
the one that has the highest GDP shares for total and portfolio equity inflows (in the most
recent decade). The drastic variations in nominal and scaled FPEI flows—having the only
negative figures in the table—might be taken as a clue for the sheer speculative activity in
SSA stock markets.
On an annual basis, the net foreign direct and portfolio equity flows to developing
countries that were on an upward trajectory after the early 2000s have finally arrived at about
$400 billion and $100 billion respectively (Figure 2.4). Nominal inflows follow such a rising
trend towards the end of the period in all regions but Latin America and Caribbean, albeit
with varying sizes. To rephrase the FDI dominance in total equity flows, FPEI is greater than
FDI in just two instances; in LAC, 1993 and in SSA, 1998. The adverse effects of currency
and banking crises on global equity flows are also traceable in this figure. Although total and
direct equity flows never fall below zero and hence do not pose any outflow, they are reduced
by the Latin American debt crisis in early 1980s (distinguishable in ADC and LAC graphs)
and by other regional or country level crashes in certain years from the mid-1990s onwards
(Mexican, East Asian, Russian, Brazilian, Turkish and Argentine financial mayhems in 1994,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002 respectively).
Net outflows on foreign equity investments, however, can only be seen in FPEI for at least
a year in any geographical region (SSA has the most of such cases, for example).
Furthermore, it seems that FPEI flows deteriorate concurrently with the beginning of the
crisis, whereas deterioration in FDI flows comes with some lag following the crisis.
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Figure 2.4: Net Equity Flows to Developing World by Regions, 1970-2006
(continued on next page)
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Figure 2.4 (continued)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: FDI refers to foreign direct investment and FPEI stands for foreign portfolio equity investment. The true
NEF for a year is the vertical sum of all the bars within that year, while the true NFDI is what remains from the
hollow bar (NFPEI) in a certain year. Light maroon bars exhibit merely the amount of NFDI in excess of NFPEI
when both have the same signs and they show the whole NFDI when the signs are opposite. Also see notes to
Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.5 shows how the aggregates and components of cross-border equity flows are
distributed among different country groups. According to Panel (a), Developing Asia has the
largest share in nominal FDI and portfolio equity flows as well as in aggregate equity flows.
As in Figure 2.3, GDP scaling changes the order of distribution and pulls Latin America and
Caribbean up to the highest echelon in SEF and SFDI and to the second highest in SFPEI,
after Sub-Saharan Africa. Panel (b) also demonstrates that developing regions have more
evenly distributed foreign equity investments relative to their output. The only regularity
observed across the top panels of the figure is that Middle East and North Africa has the
lowest shares in all three categories. The panels at the bottom, again similar to Figure 2.3,
uniformly indicate the existence of income bias in international portfolio and direct equity
investments in developing countries. Moreover, we see from the percentage averages (being
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as little as around 1.5 or less) in the right panels of the figure that these investments are still
well under the economic potential of the countries at the periphery.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Equity Inflows by Geographical Regions and Income Groups
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: See notes to Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
The compound growth rates of and cyclicality statistics for real equity inflows are reported
in Table 2.4. On average, aggregate net equity flows have an annual growth rate of about
10% or more in every country group. Real portfolio equity and FDI flows to all country
groups but Sub-Saharan Africa are growing positively, and the former has much faster
growth. Since foreign direct and portfolio equity investments tend to fluctuate in SSA, the
trends are ambiguous. Europe and Central Asia (among the regions) and lower middle
income countries (from the income groups) appear to have the most buoyant equity finance.
Correlations between yearly growth rates of real GDP and equity flows reveal that, as for
aggregates above, all types of external equity flows are generally acyclical. As there is no
significantly countercyclical flow, real equity inflows (all three) to Latin America and
Caribbean and direct and total equity inflows to upper middle income countries are the only
procyclical flows.
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Table 2.4: Growth and Cyclicality of Equity Flows in Comparative Perspective
ADC
Geographical Regions Income Groups
DA ECA LAC MENA SSA UMIC LMIC LIC
(a) Average and Median Annual Growths (Percent)
Means
REF 14.34 19.30 55.74 15.58 28.56 90.44 21.47 18.87 86.17
RFDI 13.25 18.19 55.59 15.22 28.43 24.80 20.15 17.31 71.66
RFPEI 587.63 377.06 75.53 112.79 140.21
-
73.69
146.53 865.43 1256.51
Medians
REF 7.63 11.68 18.27 14.36 0.54 7.77 10.50 20.22 6.45
RFDI 7.30 10.63 16.38 5.58 3.83 -4.54 10.37 16.96 8.90
RFPEI 58.72 34.31 58.74 15.13 6.65 13.74 61.60 69.31 13.73
(b) Pairwise Correlations with Real GDP Growth
REF 0.06
(0.74)
0.24
(0.16)
-0.01
(0.95)
0.42
(0.01)
0.15
(0.37)
0.16
(0.36)
0.46
(0.00)
-0.04
(0.82)
0.01
(0.94)
RFDI 0.06
(0.74)
0.19
(0.27)
-0.02
(0.94)
0.43
(0.01)
0.15
(0.38)
-0.18
(0.30)
0.46
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.68)
0.02
(0.90)
RFPEI 0.00
(0.99)
-0.24
(0.19)
-0.01
(0.96)
0.38
(0.04)
0.09
(0.65)
0.30
(0.10)
-0.04
(0.82)
-0.14
(0.44)
-0.27
(0.14)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: See notes to Table 2.2.
Foreign contribution to gross domestic investment (GDI) in developing countries was, on
average, around 5.5% a year within the period 1970-2006 (Figure 2.6). This implies that the
extent of multinational involvement in domestic capital formation at the periphery has been
limited.9 Among the three regions with above average shares, Europe and Central Asia
achieves the highest involvement at nearly 10%, being roughly three percentage points above
the next region (Latin America and Caribbean). It is surprising that Developing Asia comes
out to be the least popular investment location for foreigners and that even Middle East and
North Africa outstrips it in this regard. Notwithstanding the fact that differences among
income groups are less pronounced, the FDI portion of GDI is biggest in emerging market
economies and, peculiarly, it is bigger in low income countries than the countries of the
income group in the middle. Except for the second sub-period, the ratio is increasing over
time, with a marked acceleration in the post-1980s.
9 In a partially similar vein, Aizenman et al. (2007) find that just 10% of the domestic capital stock in
developing countries has been externally financed throughout the 1990s.
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Figure 2.6: FDI Share of Gross Domestic Investment at the Periphery, 1970-2006
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) and author’s calculations.
Notes: Gross domestic investment (GDI), or gross capital formation as in WDI, consists of outlays on additions
to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on), plant, machinery, and equipment purchases and the
construction of roads, railways and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings,
and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or
unexpected fluctuations in production or sales and work in progress. According to the United Nations’ (UN)
System of National Accounts (SNA) in 1993, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation.
Bars show arithmetic averages for the corresponding period or country group. See also notes to Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.7 compares the non-resident participation in developing-country domestic stock
markets across the regions and over time. Apart from the Middle East and North Africa
which has the lowest share, foreign participation has been relatively balanced throughout the
regions. Taking the rate of participation for ADC as an indicator and bearing the definitions
of foreign portfolio equity inflows and domestic stock market capitalization in mind (such as
that the former additionally includes depository receipts), we estimate that international
investors would have weighted developing country assets in their portfolio at an average rate
of about 1%. This confirms the common view that developing and emerging market equities
are underweighted in global portfolios as a result of home bias and lack of diversification.10
10 See Chan et al. (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Tesar (1999), Stulz (1999), Baxter and Jermann (1997).
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Because there was no stock exchange in every country until the late 1980s we could not
depict the proportions for the first 15 years. Once the bourses are properly established, the
non-resident engagement began to materialize and stood above 1.5% per year during the
initial episode (which is very close to the estimate of Bekaert et al. (2002) who find that, after
the liberalization, foreign portfolio equity flows increase by 1.4% of market capitalization);
overshooting by 2% in the first half of 1990s has subsequently declined.
Figure 2.7: Foreign Participation in Stock Markets at the Periphery, 1985-2006
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) and author’s calculations.
Notes: Market capitalization (also known as market value) of domestically listed companies is the share price
times the number of shares outstanding as of the yearend. Listed domestic companies are the domestically
incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges. Excluded are investment companies, mutual
funds or other collective investment vehicles. The figure does not show the plots for income groups and some
earlier sub-periods due to data unavailability. Bars demonstrate country group and period averages of FPEI that
is expressed as percent of domestic stock market capitalization. See notes to Figure 2.6 as well.
2.4 TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN DEBT FLOWS
External debt inflows to developing countries have been more variable than equity inflows
over the period 1970-2006. The episodes of upward surges have been interrupted by the next
episodes of slumps or decelerations because of either financial crises or voluntary and
discretionary debt reduction policies in different countries. Although these structural break-
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like episodes were transitory in some countries, they could have been rather prolonged in
others. The overall observation is that the volumes of cross-border lending have recorded
higher amounts at the end of the period than at the beginning, although this is not the case
when expressed relative to income.
A factual synopsis of the total, long-term and short-term debt movements is provided in
Table 2.5. Within about four decades, average annual short-term debt inflows soared from $2
billion to $46 billion—a 23-times increase that ultimately put the short-term debt flows ahead
of the long-term debt flows in the last sub-period. The enlargement in total and long-term
debt inflows has been relatively smaller, even though they had no outflows (i.e. always being
positive, on average and for all developing countries) unlike short-term debt inflows.
Aggregate nominal foreign borrowing has risen in all sub-periods but 1985-89 when it
decreased as a result of Latin American debt crisis. In US dollar denominations, long-term
foreign borrowing has behaved similarly but it decreased in the last sub-period, reflecting the
adverse effects of financial crises in East Asia and in some other developing countries that
had taken place earlier. Voluntary debt restructuring and reduction operations might also
have contributed to this diminution. The declines in nominal short-term net foreign
borrowing have occurred during the same sub-periods when the crises erupted. To stylize the
fact that has become clear so far, we note that the deterioration in short-term debt inflows
goes along with the advent of the crisis whilst long-term debt inflows degenerate with some
lag after the crisis. This sequential process, which is similar to the one in equity flows
described before, largely continues during the recovery phase after the crisis. Following the
peak in the second half of the 1970s, all forms of debt flows as a percentage of GDP have
fluctuated but never attained their pre-1980 levels, even below 1% in the most recent sub-
period.
Net outflows are detected in some regions. As the table shows the rolling averages but not
the exact yearly realizations, the negative incidences are quite few. The clustering of outflows
in the last decade could be explained by the debt reduction decisions (more repayment and
less new borrowing) rather than contagious currency and banking crises. There are two
reasons behind this argument; the first is that the most numerous outflows occurred in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Middle East and North Africa which are the regions without any
notorious financial crashes, and the second is that the number of outflows is the same across
the two sub-periods of which the latter does not include as many crises as does the former.
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Table 2.5: Debt Inflows to Developing World by Sub-periods, Billions of USD
Region and Component 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-06
All Developing Countries
Total Debt Inflows 10.20
(1.5)
42.56
(3.4)
53.45
(1.7)
29.39
(0.8)
60.45
(1.5)
74.94
(1.3)
87.11
(0.9)
Long-term Debt 8.52
(1.3)
31.35
(2.5)
46.71
(1.5)
21.50
(0.6)
38.06
(0.9)
64.41
(1.1)
40.85
(0.4)
Short-term Debt 2.10
(0.3)
11.21
(0.9)
6.74
(0.2)
7.89
(0.2)
22.39
(0.5)
10.53
(0.2)
46.26
(0.5)
Developing Asia
Total Debt Inflows 1.27
(0.5)
5.35
(1.2)
13.54
(2.0)
12.34
(1.4)
26.20
(2.2)
15.96
(0.8)
27.20
(0.7)
Long-term Debt 1.00
(0.4)
3.57
(0.8)
10.09
(1.5)
9.97
(1.1)
16.77
(1.4)
17.28
(0.9)
-0.62
(-0.1)
Short-term Debt 0.34
(0.1)
1.78
(0.4)
3.45
(0.5)
2.37
(0.3)
9.43
(0.8)
-1.32
(-0.03)
27.82
(0.8)
Europe and Central Asia
Total Debt Inflows 0.87
(n/a)
4.63
(n/a)
5.94
(0.5)
6.17
(0.4)
6.90
(1.1)
20.43
(1.9)
59.07
(3.0)
Long-term Debt 0.70
(n/a)
3.92
(n/a)
6.31
(0.5)
3.45
(0.2)
8.42
(1.1)
14.01
(1.3)
40.62
(2.0)
Short-term Debt 0.21
(n/a)
0.71
(n/a)
-0.37
(-0.03)
2.72
(0.2)
-1.52
(-0.04)
6.42
(0.6)
18.45
(1.0)
Latin America and Caribbean
Total Debt Inflows 6.71
(2.7)
23.70
(4.9)
25.47
(3.2)
3.68
(0.5)
23.70
(1.8)
39.92
(2.1)
0.51
(-0.03)
Long-term Debt 5.72
(2.3)
16.77
(3.5)
22.87
(3.0)
3.29
(0.5)
11.94
(0.9)
37.52
(1.9)
2.39
(0.1)
Short-term Debt 1.24
(0.5)
6.94
(1.4)
2.60
(0.2)
0.39
(0.01)
11.77
(0.9)
2.40
(0.1)
-1.87
(-0.14)
Middle East and North Africa
Total Debt Inflows 0.56
(1.2)
5.15
(3.8)
3.16
(1.4)
3.53
(1.3)
3.06
(1.2)
-1.27
(-0.3)
0.43
(0.2)
Long-term Debt 0.50
(1.1)
4.28
(3.2)
3.15
(1.3)
3.06
(1.1)
0.48
(0.2)
-2.72
(-0.7)
-0.49
(0.02)
Short-term Debt 0.07
(0.1)
0.87
(0.7)
0.01
(0.03)
0.47
(0.2)
2.58
(1.0)
1.44
(0.4)
0.92
(0.2)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total Debt Inflows 0.80
(0.9)
3.73
(2.1)
5.34
(2.1)
3.67
(1.4)
0.58
(0.2)
-0.10
(-0.03)
-0.10
(-0.3)
Long-term Debt 0.62
(0.7)
2.81
(1.6)
4.29
(1.6)
1.73
(0.6)
0.46
(0.2)
-1.69
(-0.5)
-1.05
(-0.3)
Short-term Debt 0.23
(0.3)
0.92
(0.5)
1.05
(0.4)
1.94
(0.8)
0.13
(0.03)
1.59
(0.5)
0.95
(0.0)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: See notes to Table 2.1.
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Only in Developing Asia are short-term debt outflows during a crisis period (1995-99)
succeeded by long-term debt outflows in the next period. Being the most active region that
has got ever-increasing external debt funding, Europe and Central Asia saw outflows on its
short-term debt twice. First was during the Latin American debt crisis and the second was
during the sub-period 1990-94 that includes several prominent transformations and upheavals
like the dissolution of the USSR, the Gulf War and the 1994 Turkish currency crisis.11 The
retardation processes in Latin America and Caribbean have been symmetrical in the sense
that block declines in all types of debt inflows have been preceded by the initial drops in
short-term debt inflows (disrupted by the corresponding crisis) that eventually turned out to
be net outflows. Being always positive and driving the flow of external lending after 1980s,
short-term debt inflows to Africa and Middle East did not contribute to total debt outflows
which are rather produced by consecutive plummets in long-term debt flows to these regions.
Figure 2.8 shows the 37-year progression of foreign borrowing in developing countries.
Within this period, total debt inflows have risen to about $225 billion—which is less than
even half of the same-year value of total equity inflows in Figure 2.4 and just equal to the
seventh sub-period average of FDI in Table 2.3. This implies that the pace of increase in debt
flows has been much slower than equity flows. There are many factors that might have badly
influenced the influx of international debt capital to a developing economy. Deteriorating
macroeconomic fundamentals (like chronically high inflation rates, unsustainable internal and
external balances, inadequate foreign reserves etc.), debt overhang, credit rationing and
negative investor sentiments that either lead to financial crises or urge the economic agents to
reduce their indebtedness could be identified as the main factors.
Besides these structural failures, factors like asymmetric information, moral hazard and
costly state verification that are nearly intrinsic to the real functioning of international capital
markets may create systemic failures (or risks) that ultimately result in credit crunches.12 The
effects of such factors could be traced explicitly in Figure 2.8. The steady increase in all types
of external borrowing of developing countries during 1970s has been depressed by the Latin
American debt crisis at the beginning of the next decade. Despite the fact that only short-term
debt gave outflows, the depression in every component lingered for almost a decade.
11 The fact that capital flows to Turkey constitute almost one fifth of the aggregate capital flows to Europe and
Central Asia (not explicitly reported) shows the determining role of that country for the whole region.
12 The second line of factors, for instance, is thought to be the major trigger behind the financial crisis of the late
2000s in advanced economies.
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Figure 2.8: Net Debt Flows to Developing World by Regions, 1970-2006
(continued on next page)
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Figure 2.8 (continued)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: LTD refers to long-term debt and STD stands for short-term debt. The true NDF for a year is the vertical
sum of all the bars within that year, while the true NLTD is what remains from the hollow bar (NSTD) in a
certain year. Light maroon bars exhibit merely the amount of NLTD in excess of NSTD when both have the
same signs and they show the whole NLTD when the signs are opposite. Also see notes to Figure 2.2.
Apart from the curtailing in 1994 due to Mexican and Turkish currency crises, the
resumption in late 1980s has continued until the 1997 East Asian financial turmoil. The
outflows on short-term debt that approximately amounted to $45 billion in the following year
showed the first severe sign of the turmoil. As a result of the periodic and spatial contagion,
the net foreign borrowings (which have already been hampered) stopped completely and
recorded net reimbursements as of 2002. Thereafter, the final rebound came in and pushed
them to successively higher levels. Output shares of debt inflows have never repeated their
previous gains and levels and stayed below 3% in the majority of years. This is because the
valuation effects put a wedge between the nominal and scaled flows. It is clearer from the
line plots of the GDP proportioned series that short-term debt inflows go first in worsening-
recovery cycle around the crisis periods and long-term debt inflows engage in the cycle later.
They also indicate that long-term debt flows are at least as volatile as short-term debt flows.
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of Debt Inflows by Geographical Regions and Income Groups
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: See notes to Figures 2.3 and 2.8.
The allocation of international lending among the developing country groups is presented
in Figure 2.9. Rankings with respect to the nominal components shift within the top
recipients. Once the economic mass is taken into consideration, LAC outperforms the other
regions in receiving total and long-term debt. The SSTD bars which are nearly at the same
length indicate that developing countries weight short-term foreign borrowing by their wealth
at around 0.4. Overall, Sub-Saharan Africa has had the lowest share in global (private and
non-concessional) debt allocation. The larger the size of the economy the greater is the
external debt capital it raises. As a structural matter, long-term debt flows dominate short-
term debt flows and the latter is relatively closer to the former in SSA.
In general, real debt inflows are growing (Table 2.6). Europe and Central Asia has the
highest compound growth rates, whereas Middle East and North Africa has the lowest. In
income groups, upper middle income countries have the most firmly growing debt inflows.
Total debt flows to low income countries, and long-term debt flows to lower middle income
countries, shrink.
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Table 2.6: Growth and Cyclicality of Debt Flows in Comparative Perspective
ADC
Geographical Regions Income Groups
DA ECA LAC MENA SSA UMIC LMIC LIC
(a) Average and Median Annual Growths (Percent)
Means
RDF 40.88 35.97 67.95 170.00 -8.23 42.35 178.85 37.91 -64.20
RLTD -9.22 9.15 52.17 12.49 -33.31 48.65 44.21 -1.23 10.03
RSTD 75.03 -8.36 415.78 -20.29 257.10 6.61 56.43 115.26 2050.81
Medians
RDF 9.36 14.93 35.12 -0.50 -7.31 7.98 7.65 11.00 -11.37
RLTD 7.17 7.75 22.09 -2.28 -15.79 -5.41 7.38 -6.67 5.77
RSTD 21.02 1.62 46.82 43.43 20.85 3.89 33.84 32.22 19.08
(b) Pairwise Correlations with Real GDP Growth
RDF 0.01
(0.94)
0.34
(0.04)
-0.24
(0.23)
0.35
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.68)
0.25
(0.15)
-0.13
(0.45)
0.35
(0.04)
0.06
(0.74)
RLTD 0.10
(0.56)
0.19
(0.26)
-0.19
(0.36)
0.30
(0.07)
-0.04
(0.83)
0.26
(0.12)
0.26
(0.12)
0.37
(0.03)
0.05
(0.78)
RSTD 0.12
(0.49)
0.32
(0.06)
-0.40
(0.04)
0.34
(0.05)
0.03
(0.85)
0.30
(0.08)
0.15
(0.38)
0.38
(0.02)
0.03
(0.88)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Global Development Finance.
Notes: See notes to Table 2.2.
As per components, short-term debt grows more rapidly than long-term debt. Comparing
Panel (b) in this table and in Table 2.4, acyclicality is less prevalent in debt flows than it was
in equity flows. The most striking observation is that Europe and Central Asian debt flows
(particularly short-term debt, at 5% significance level) are countercyclical. This may
safeguard the economic entities in the region from the harms of excessive leverage that they
tend to have. Real debt flows to DA, LAC and LMIC are procyclical. Of the significant cases,
short-term debt flows are more (pro)cyclical than long-term debt flows.
To give an idea about the cost and maturity structure of external borrowing in developing
countries, Figure 2.10 demonstrates the time series plots and comparative graphs of weighted
average interest rates and years to maturity on new external debt commitments. Over 1970-
2006, the global averages of annual interest rate on and maturity of a public or publicly
guaranteed loan have been about 6% and 18 years respectively. These figures, being
relatively worse than they were at the beginning, clue tightened international lending
conditions for developing countries over time.
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Figure 2.10: Cost and Maturity Structure of External Borrowing in Developing Markets
(continued on next page)
14
16
18
20
22
Y
ea
rs
4
6
8
10
12
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
All Developing Countries
10
11
12
13
14
15
Y
ea
rs
6
8
10
12
14
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
Upper Middle Income Countries
18
20
22
24
26
28
Y
ea
rs
2
4
6
8
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
Lower Middle Income Countries
20
25
30
35
40
45
Y
ea
rs
1
2
3
4
5
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
Low Income Countries
(a) Income Groups
10
15
20
25
Y
e
a
rs
4
6
8
10
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
EAP
10
20
30
40
Y
e
a
rs
2
3
4
5
6
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
SA
10
15
20
25
Y
e
a
rs
4
6
8
10
12
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
ECA
10
12
14
16
Y
e
a
rs
6
8
10
12
14
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
LAC
12
14
16
18
20
Y
e
a
rs
2
4
6
8
10
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
MENA
15
20
25
30
35
Y
e
a
rs
2
4
6
8
P
er
ce
n
t
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Interest Maturity
SSA
(b) Geographical Regions
39
Figure 2.10 (continued)
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance (GDF) and author’s calculations.
Notes: Interest is the GDF’s ‘average interest on new external debt commitments’ that represents the weighted
average percentage interest rate on all new public and publicly guaranteed loans contracted during the year. To
obtain the average, the interest rates for all public and publicly guaranteed loans are weighted by the amounts of
the loans. Maturity refers to the GDF’s ‘average maturity on new external debt commitments’ that is the
weighted average number of years (i.e. the sum of grace and repayment periods) to original maturity dates of all
new public and publicly guaranteed loans contracted during the year. Grace period for principal is the period
from the date of signature of the loan or the issue of the financial instrument to the first repayment of principal.
The repayment period is the period from the first to last repayment of principal. To obtain the average, the
maturities of all public and publicly guaranteed loans are weighted by the amounts of the loans. Because we do
not have access to all the loan data (amount, maturity and interest) that precludes us to follow our own previous
conventions, we use the regional data on interest rates and maturities exactly as given by the GDF. Hence,
unlike before, all developing countries (ADC) here is the ‘low and middle income countries’ of the GDF and not
composed of the individual sums of regional data. The geographical regions of East Asia and Pacific (EAP) and
South Asia (SA) replace their conglomerate region of Developing Asia (DA) in this figure. In Panels (a) and (b),
vertical lines mark 1982 Latin American and 1997 East Asian financial crises. See also notes to Figures 2.3.
The main distinction between interest and maturities is that they move in opposite
directions for the majority of years. The gap widens particularly around the crises in such a
way that as the interest rates hike years to maturity fall, putting the developing economy in
further jeopardy. This opposite movement implies an inverted (i.e. quasi-convex) yield curve
for the public or publicly guaranteed foreign credits. The higher growth rates of short-term
debt flows corroborate this inference because an inverted yield curve exists when the demand
for short-term funds (or the incentive to hold short-maturity securities) is greater than the
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demand for long-term funds (or the incentive to hold long-maturity securities).13 The inverted
yield curve may also portend the rigidity in international money markets and the economic
recession in developing markets, which were all witnessed during or in the aftermath of the
Latin American and East Asian financial crises. The reversion of interest rates, but not
maturities (except for Latin America and Caribbean), to their pre-1975 levels in the final
years constitutes the other distinction. This is also discernible in the lower half of Panel (c)
where the interest rate actively rises throughout the first three sub-periods, peaks during the
Latin American debt crisis and declines thereafter. Maturity, however, shows limited changes
after the initial drop. The variation of maturities and interest rates across country groups
mirrors the development objective behind the global lending (the upper part of Panel (c)).
2.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter surveys the data on international capital flows to developing countries for the
period 1970-2006. Developing countries are represented by either the most aggregate group
of ‘all developing countries’, five geographical regions (Developing Asia, Europe and
Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan
Africa) or three income groups (upper middle income countries, lower middle income
countries and low income countries). Trends and developments in seven fundamental capital
flow aggregates (total capital flows, total debt flows, total equity flows, foreign direct
investment flows, foreign portfolio equity investment flows, long-term debt flows and short-
term debt flows) are discussed under different settings of these country groups. Because it is a
review chapter that uses alternative measures to present and discuss the data for several
spatial groups and types of capital flow, it has a lengthy exposition.
Total net capital flows denominated in nominal US dollars have surged within about four
decades. They were driven by total debt inflows in 1970s and by total equity inflows from
1990s onwards. Rising gradually before 1990s, FDI-shaped total equity inflows have soared
thereafter due to financial globalization and liberalization. The overall increase in long-term
debt-driven total debt inflows has been less impressive, because not only the financial crises
outburst during the period (i.e. 1982 Latin American debt crisis, 1997 East Asian financial
crash and many other country crises) severely hit them but they were also decreased as a
result of voluntary and discretionary debt reduction policies. These crises dwarfed total
13 See Turner (2002), Min et al. (2003).
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capital inflows and depressed total equity inflows as well. Increases in capital inflows as a
share of GDP have been more variable and modest. Nevertheless, the similar episodes of ebb
and flow as well as the compositional features are observed (though less evidently) in GDP-
scaled data.
Among the regions, Latin America and Caribbean got the highest amount of foreign
capital relative to its wealth during the last four decades. Africa and the Middle East were the
least popular developing market destinations. The other regions, Developing Asia and
particularly Europe and Central Asia, have been the growing external fund recipients.
There was a strong wealth bias in foreign capital flows to developing economies as the
lower income countries have always received less external debt and equity capital. This
persistent observation is the core subject of the next two chapters. In Chapter 3, we test
whether the poorer countries receive lower international capital than expected (i.e. the Lucas
paradox) in the long-run.
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CHAPTER 3
LUCAS PARADOX IN THE LONG-RUN
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) include limited international capital mobility as one of the six
major puzzles in international macroeconomics. The stickiness in cross border capital
transfers was first documented by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) who found very high
correlations between domestic savings and investments in OECD countries for the 1960-1974
period. Since incremental savings tend to stay in the country making the savings it is hard to
assert that foreign capital has been perfectly mobile. Using the self-financing ratio of
cumulative discounted gross national savings and gross national investment, Aizenman et al.
(2007) demonstrated that 90 percent of domestic capital stock, on average, in developing
countries is self financed and this fraction was stable during the 1990s.
Under homogeneous technology with constant returns to scale, identical goods, and
competitively free international trade, conventional neoclassical growth and trade theory
predicts that factor price equalizing (Samuelson, 1948) investments will accrue to the capital
scarce less developed economies, i.e. capital will tend to flow to poorer countries. Via this
mechanism international convergence in economic growth and consumption would be
accomplished in a transition period during which cross-country differences in levels of
economic development will fade away. This has evidently not happened.
The Lucas paradox refers to the observation of rich-to-poor capital flows falling far short
of the flows predicted by the neoclassical growth and trade theory, as systematically observed
in Lucas (1990). In fact, capital flows tend to move disproportionately to richer countries, if
not from poorer to richer countries. In the same vein and with reference to endogenous
growth theory (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), King and Rebelo (1993) conclude that under such
conventional assumptions about preferences it is hard to rely on the neoclassical model to
explain sustained variations in growth rates across countries. Accounting for this paradox
would also help explain the more general puzzle of relatively immobile international capital
flows.
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Lucas (1990) provided four possible hypotheses to account for that puzzling patterns of
international capital flows: differences in relative human capital stocks; variations in external
benefits of human capital; capital market imperfections (political risk, institutions etc.); and
restrictions on capital flows (taxation, capital controls and similar policies) and monopolistic
power (Parente and Prescott, 1999) of either the imperial colonizer or of the national
sovereign government. Reasoning that adjusting for human capital differentials eliminates the
return differentials between poorer and wealthier countries, he favours the combination of the
first two explanations.
Theoretical approaches to the Lucas paradox can be categorized into two major groups.
Papers in the first group try to explain the puzzle through domestic economic fundamentals
such as omitted factors of production, disruptive government policies in forms of taxation,
direct controls and restrictions, institutional establishments (incentive and safeguard
structures) and total factor productivity differences.14 International capital market
imperfections constitute the conceptual stance on which the second approach favours
asymmetric information and sovereign risk explanations.15 Both approaches are inevitably
interlinked and some recent papers (e.g. Goldstein and Razin, 2006; Kraay et al., 2005) take a
mixed position between fundamentals and financial market inefficiencies in modelling
private foreign equity and portfolio flows.
Although empirical literature focusing directly on the Lucas paradox is limited (e.g.
Clemens and Williamson, 2004, Alfaro et al., 2008), there is extensive applied work on the
realization of capital flows. Financial and banking crises, capital flight, and rapid capital flow
resumptions stimulated economists to analyse the main determinants and properties of flows
through empirical research. Some studies have concentrated on the topic of whether external
financing is driven by domestic or foreign factors—the push versus pull controversy.16 Time
series properties of cross border fund movements have also been analyzed.17 Other papers
have provided evidence on compositional dynamics and differentiation of various types of
financial transfers according to their build-up and determination.18
14 See Martin and Rey (2004), Razin and Yuen (1994), Gomme (1993), Tornell and Velasco (1992).
15 See Albuquerque (2003), Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), Gertler and Rogoff (1990).
16 See Calvo et al. (1993), Fernández-Arias (1996), Chuhan et al. (1998), Taylor and Sarno (1997).
17 Claessens et al. (1995), Sarno and Taylor (1999a, 1999b), Levchenko and Mauro (2007).
18 See, for instance, Lane (2004).
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Specifically for institutions, several studies document that institutional quality is important
in explaining capital flows. Employing world governance indicators of the World Bank as
proxy for institutions Faria and Mauro (2009) find that institutional quality index is positively
significant in explaining the share of direct and portfolio equity stocks in total external
liabilities. De Santis and Lührmann (2009) show the negative impact of deteriorating civil
liberties on income scaled foreign portfolio equity flows. Daude and Fratzscher (2008)
demonstrate that component based institutional quality in terms of corruption, expropriation
risk, repudiation costs, and days of enforcement for business contracts has differing influence
on capital stock compositions. Institutions, for instance, have not been detected to be
effective on FDI unlike the situation for international portfolio equity investments. Edison
and Warnock (2008) could not discover any meaningful association between first differenced
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite index and US net monthly purchases of
emerging Asian and Latin American portfolio equity securities.
Figure 3.1: Equity Capital Inflows to Developing Countries by Sub-periods, 1970-2006
Notes: Data averaged over both sub periods and across countries deliver per capita real foreign portfolio and
direct equity inflows to a typical developing country.
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In order to give a general idea about the realization of capital flows, Figure 3.1 shows
partitioned trends of per capita equity capital flows to a typical developing country.19 The
figure shows a steady small decrease in foreign direct and portfolio equity investments in
developing countries for the first two decades of the sample. This corresponds to the oil price
shocks in the early and late 1970s and the dramatic (Latin American) debt crisis of the early
1980s which seem to have reduced capital flows over the period. After debt restructuring and
relief (e.g. Brady Plan), and widespread liberalization policies in most of the developing
countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, capital inflows have grown and reached
unprecedented per capita levels of nearly 120 USD during the initial six years of the new
millennium. This amounts to more than doubling of the international financial allocations to
developing economies within seventeen years. Nevertheless, capital flows to developing
countries do not support the predictions of the neoclassical theory; the volume and magnitude
of capital flows to less developed countries are not just well behind the expectations but
capital is attracted to the wealthier economies where the capital already is.
Using cross-section data for countries from all income levels (both industrialized and
unindustrialized), Alfaro et al. (2008) find that the problem of ‘lower-than expected capital
flows to poorer economies’ (the Lucas paradox) is resolved by including a measure for
institutional quality. For a sample of 47 developing countries over the 1970-2006 period, this
study tests if their findings hold up when advanced countries—that consistently have higher
levels of institutional quality—are excluded. Employing simple cross-section OLS estimators
and using real capital flows (the sum of foreign direct and portfolio equity investment) per
capita as the dependent variable (as in Alfaro et al., 2008), the chapter provides evidence for
the Lucas paradox within developing countries. Following Houthakker (1965), Baltagi and
Griffin (1984), Pesaran and Smith (1995), we interpret the estimation results from cross-
section OLS as capturing long-run relationships.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses theoretical
background and Section 3.3 specifies econometric methodology. Section 3.4 defines the data
and main variables. Section 3.5 describes the data and overviews the evolution of selected
data over time. Core regression results are given in Section 3.6 and concluding remarks are in
Section 3.7.
19 This figure is a more accurate version of the figure in Appendix 4.3 (Figure A4.1, among the Chapter 4
appendices) which portrays values on the vertical axis computed exactly similar to Alfaro et al. (2008).
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3.2 THEORETICAL MOTIVATION
We follow the expositions of Alfaro et al. (2008). In the context of economic growth,
assume a small open economy operating with explicit production factors capital, ܭ, and
labour, ܮ, through a constant returns to scale (CRS) production function of the form:
௧ܻ = ܣ௧F(ܭ௧, ܮ௧) ܨ௄(ȉ) > 0,ܨ௅(ȉ) > 0; ܨ௄௄(ȉ) < 0,ܨ௅௅(ȉ) < 0 (1)
where ܻ represents output, ܣ stands for total factor productivity (TFP), and ݐ subscript
denotes time. In such an open economy agents can lend and borrow capital globally. Hence,
if all countries are endowed with identical technology with homogeneous capital and labour
inputs the instantaneous convergence of the returns to capital would be accomplished via free
and competitive international trade so as to get;ܣ௧f ᇱ(݇௜௧) = ݎ௧ = ܣ௧f ᇱ൫ ௝݇௧൯ (2)
where f(ȉ) denotes the net of depreciation production function in per capita terms and ݇ refers
to capital input per capita in country ݅ or ݆. Diminishing returns, identically endowed constant
TFP, free and competitive trade, and international arbitrage imply that financial resources
will move from capital-abundant countries of low returns to capital-scant countries of high
returns. As noted, however, this is not observed; giving rise to the Lucas paradox. Theoretical
approaches to account for this paradox can be categorized as cross country variations in
economic fundamentals versus international capital market imperfections.
3.2.1 Economic Fundamentals
3.2.1.1 Omitted Factors of Production
One conjecture is that the conventional neoclassical theory disregards other factors
potentially influencing production. Natural resources and human capital (Lucas, 1990;
Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) may have positive externalities on productivity ultimately
leading to increased returns to capital. Incorporating these factors under a new term, ܼ௧,
yields
௧ܻ = ܣ௧F(ܭ௧, ܼ௧ , ܮ௧) (3)
Thus, we now obtain the true returns equated asܣ௧f ᇱ(݇௜௧, ݖ௜௧) = ݎ௧ = ܣ௧f ᇱ൫ ௝݇௧ , ݖ௝௧൯ (4)
The implication being that lower ݖ reduces relative returns in poorer countries.
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3.2.1.2 Government Policies
Fiscal policy by means of taxation, monetary policy via inflation targeting, and policies
directly imposing capital controls may interrupt capital flows (Stockman and Hernández,
1988). The distortive effects of these government policies can be inserted into the model by
supposing that governments levy tax on capital returns at varying rates of ɒ. The equivalent
returns are given in the form ofܣ௧f ᇱ(݇௜௧)(1െ ɒ௜௧) = ݎ௧ = ܣ௧f ᇱ൫ ௝݇௧൯(1െ ɒ௝௧) (5)
3.2.1.3 Institutions and TFP
Consisting of both culture shaped informal codes of conduct like social norms, customs,
traditions, ethical and moral values; and formal rules such as laws, decrees, statutes,
communiqués, and similar regulations institutions are the constraints that structure political,
economic, and social interactions. Weak property rights, fear of expropriation, low
enforcement of legal contracts, and other weak socio-political and socioeconomic conditions
due to poor institutions may leave productive capacities unexploited and may create a wedge
between ex ante and ex post financial investment returns in that economy (Parente and
Prescott, 1994).20 Being unable to explicitly distinguish among the reflections of
heterogeneous incentive structure, innovation opportunities, and technological efficiency both
TFP and institutional quality originated factors are attributed to ܣ௧. The return differentials
are expressed asܣ௜௧f ᇱ(݇௜௧) = ݎ௧ = ܣ௝௧f ᇱ൫ ௝݇௧൯ (6)
3.2.2 International Capital Market Imperfections
3.2.2.1 Asymmetric Information
Both national and international financial markets are subject to either adverse selection,
moral hazard, costly state verification, or all of these to a certain extent. In general, laissez-
faire market conditions may be paralyzed through the distortions caused by this sort of
informational asymmetries among the participants. Furthermore, as Gertler and Rogoff
(1990) notes, North-South capital flows are dampened and possibly reversed relative to the
perfect-information benchmark. Eventually, the lack of international portfolio diversification
20 See Acemoglu and Dell (2010), and Castro et al. (2004) for institutions; Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and
Parente and Prescott (2000) for TFP differences.
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and home bias can come into play in the forms of disinvestment, divestment, and under
investment particularly in less developed poor countries (Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996).
3.2.2.2 Sovereign Risk
Bearing an overlapping relationship with political risk and institutions, sovereign risk
exclusively embraces credit risk, the probability that a sovereign will default on servicing its
debt, as well as the risk of expropriation and repudiation. It also refers to the policies by
which a government can discourage domestic residents in fulfilling their obligations to
foreign contracts. In his recent theoretical paper Wright (2006) argues that due to default risk
only smaller levels of capital flows can be supported in equilibrium. By means of the
example of colonial India which was exposed to the same rules as imperial Great Britain,
Lucas (1990) argued that sovereign risk could not solve his puzzle. Conversely, recalling
several rebellions in India, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) maintained that sovereign risk might
well account for the paradox: “As long as the odds of non-repayment are as high as 65
percent for some low-income countries, credit risk seems like a far more compelling reason
for the paucity of rich-poor capital flows.”
The empirical methodology for testing some premises of the theoretical postulations
discussed so far is given as the underlying population model in the following subsection.
3.3 METHODOLOGY
The cross section ordinary least squares (OLS) specification for the long run averages over
time can be characterized as:ܨ௜ = ߤ + ߙ ௜ܻ + ܠ௜ࢼ+ ߝ௜ (7)
where ܨ௜ is average inflows of portfolio equity and direct investment per capita to country݅ (݅ = 1, 2,  ,ܰ), ߤ is a constant or the intercept, ௜ܻ is the log per capita initial wealth, ܠ௜ is a
1 × (ܭ െ 1) row vector of any additional covariates or control variables included
sequentially either in a way of ‘one at a time’ or in a multivariate regression framework, andߝ௜ is the usual disturbance term. The coefficients of interest are ߙ and (ܭ െ 1) × 1 column
vector ࢼ, where ܭ is the number of regressors and ܭ ൒ 1. The former will be capturing the
presence of the Lucas paradox while the latter will be offering quantitative insight about the
ability of corresponding regressor in accounting for, i.e. resolving, the paradox.
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3.4 THE DATA AND VARIABLES
3.4.1 The Dependent Variable
The idea of using alternative capital flows data motivated Alfaro et al. (2008) to employ
three different samples including both developing and developed countries. In the first IMF-
IFS sample, spanning over 1970-2000 for 81 counties, capital flows data defined as inflows
of portfolio equity and direct foreign investment (i.e. total equity flows) per capita expressed
in constant 1996 $US. Adjusted foreign capital stock data taken from Kraay et al. (2005)
(KLSV) and from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) (LM) were used to account for potential
valuation effects (capital gains and losses, defaults, and price and exchange rate fluctuations)
on the cross border capital transactions that are not incorporated in the IFS. The second and
third samples have been composed using the first-differenced per capita constant forms of
those equity stock estimates so as to get flow data. Instead of the valuation of stocks using
stock market prices which may not fully represent the stock of capital in especially a
developing country, unlike LM, KLSV use the price of investment goods in local currency
(the investment deflator) for their valuation of the stocks of capital. The KLSV data set
covers 1970-1997 period and 58 countries whilst the latter comprises 1970-1998 time interval
for 56 countries. In our replication study capital flows also refer to total equity inflows that
are similarly constructed from the sum of FDI and foreign portfolio equity investments
(FPEI) in 47 developing (emerging and lower (middle) income) countries between 1970 and
2006. The data as net liability balances of both series compiled via WDI of the World Bank
which essentially transmits the IFS data on that sort of accounts. Hence, the notion of our net
liability balances is parallel to 78bed (FDI in recipient economy, not included elsewhere
(n.i.e.)) and 78bmd (portfolio investment equity securities, liabilities) lines used by Alfaro et
al. (2008). The only difference is that we take 2005 as the base year to obtain constant values
of per capita equity flows (scaled through dividing by 100).21
3.4.2 Key Independent Variables
To substantiate whether there is indeed a paradox as claimed by Lucas (1990), Alfaro et
al. (2008) uses the logarithm of 1996-PPP adjusted per capita GDP in 1970 as one of the
main regressors. A positive significance of that right hand side variable would indicate the
21 We conjecture that the same scaling has actually been done in the paper despite the absence of such an
explicit statement therein. Because the parameters would not appear as they are unless the dependent variable is
scaled by 100. For more detailed definitions of FDI and portfolio equity flows see the relevant sections of
Chapter 2.
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presence of the paradox. Because we need to conduct econometric analyses to serve
replication purposes we employ similarly constructed initial income variable adjusted by
Penn World Tables (PWT), mark 6.3 with PPP in USD (Heston et al., 2009).
Explanatory variables other than the initial GDP are included sequentially to see which, if
any, accounts for the Lucas paradox by rendering the log initial output insignificant. The
institutional quality variable to capture possible repercussions of the domestic capital market
inefficiencies, creditworthiness, and political risk factors is one of those fundamental
covariates. It is a yearly composite index, over 1984-2006 in our study and 1984-2000 in
theirs, constructed by adding up annual scores of twelve sub indices (11 in the paper) from
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of Political Risk Services Group (PRS, 2007).
These indices are government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile,
internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and
order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality. Unlike other
ratings of institutional attributes, opinion surveys are not the basis for ICRG data which
depend rather on risk assessments of experts who subjectively manipulate gathered political
and institutional information by converting them into risk points for each individual risk
component.22 Each component is allotted a maximum numerical value as risk points where
the highest score means the lowest potential risk for that component, and vice versa.
Following Alfaro et al. (2008) we have rescaled the composite political risk or institutional
quality index by dividing the row totals by 10 so that the variable range is 0-10 not 0-100.
The proposition is that institutional structure and functioning in a country may influence
economic growth, marginal productivity of capital and investment conditions; a positive
association between per capita equity inflows and the level of institutional quality is
expected.
Average years of schooling, the human capital proxy, is from the Barro and Lee (2001)
international data on educational attainment for five-year intervals between 1970 and 2000.
Average years of schooling is defined as educational attainment of total population aged 25
and over in some levels (primary, secondary, or tertiary) for some years. Although Alfaro et
al. (2008) have retrieved their data from the same source, they have not clearly mentioned
whether it is the educational attainment of population aged 15 years and over or 25 years and
over. Human capital in general and schooling in particular is expected to have significant
22 Extensive descriptions of these twelve sub indices can be found in Chapter 4 appendix (Appendix 4.2).
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impact on economic growth, investment, and development conditions and prospects in a
country.23 Therefore, we anticipate a nonnegative relationship between foreign equity
investment and average years of schooling.
Inspired by gravity models of trade, distance is the third independent variable to test
whether transaction costs, international capital market imperfections and information frictions
impinge on foreign direct and portfolio equity inflows. The unilateral distance variable has
been constructed as a GDP weighted average of the distances between capital city of a
country and capital cities of all the other countries in the world. Namely, denoting the
kilometres distance from country ݅’s capital city to country ݆’s capital city by ݀௜௝; weighted
average distance of country ݅ at year ݐ is formulated as݀௜௧ = ቂσ ௗ೔ೕீ஽௉ೕ೟ಿషభೕసభ ቃீ஽௉ೢ೟ (8)
where the denominator, ܩܦ ௪ܲ௧, is the year ݐ world GDP. A negative coefficient is expected
on the distance. 24
‘Capital mobility restrictions’ is the last explanatory variable that enters the main
specifications, as a measure of a government’s official constraints on free capital movements.
Taking values between 0 and 1, it is the mean of four dummy variables (multiple exchange
rate practices, restrictions on current account transactions, barriers on capital account
dealings, and surrender and repatriation requirements for export proceeds) created by
exploiting the information and notices in the various issues of the IMF’s Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). A ‘1’ indicates the
existence of controls, restrictions, or policies while a ‘0’ refers to the absence thereof.
Periodic coverage corresponds to 1970-2000 in Alfaro et al. (2008), and to 1970-2005 in this
investigation. Since those restrictions are regarded as premeditated measures against cross-
border free fund transfers, we expect the parameter on capital mobility restrictions to be
negative.
23 See Barro (1991), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Bils and Klenow (2000),
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), and Chapter 5 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003).
24 Distance data in kilometres are from Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII); a
leading French research centre in international economics. Geodesic distances are calculated following the great
circle formula which uses the geographic coordinates (latitudes and longitudes) of the capital cities. Data for
nominal GDP in current $US are taken from the WDI and we impute zeros for any missing GDP data. ݆ =
1,2, . . . ,ܰ; where ܰ (= 197) is the number of countries for which both GDP and geographic distance data are
simultaneously available.
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3.4.3 Additional Regressors for Sensitivity Analyses
For distortive government policies, corporate tax from the KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect
Tax Rate Survey for various years (1999-2006) is used. Taxation may deter foreign investors
from allocating increased amount of funds so that it is predicted this variable to have
reducing effect on equity capital inflows. It is not uncommon that trade openness (exports
plus imports expressed as a percentage of GDP, data for all three variables are from the
World Bank’s WDI) is used as a proxy for the extent of economic liberalization and
integration of a country. The predicted impact of those attributes on cross border capital
investments is positive. To represent another aspect of domestic economic climate GDP
scaled deposit money bank assets as one of the several measures of the level of credit market
development is employed. Theoretically, improvements in financial sector lead to enhanced
productivity of capital which, in turn, results in higher returns on capital attracting more
investments.
In the conceptual issues section, Alfaro et al. (2008) have specified the production
function that incorporates institutional structure and technological efficiency within the termܣ௧, standing for total factor productivity (TFP). Thereby institutional quality variable has
been imagined to affect production and investment opportunities under the TFP process.
While using it previously as a proxy for cross country TFP differences also, in robustness
checking section they have attempted to distinguish incentive (institutional) structure and
technological efficiency effects by additionally employing TFP variable per se. Taken from
Kraay et al. (2005) for 1970-1997, the level of TFP growth is an estimated Solow residual
from the neoclassical production function, ݕ = ܣ݇ఈ, as ݕ ݇ఈ/ , where ݕ is GDP per capita, ݇
is domestic capital stock per capita, and ߙ = 0.3. Hence, it does not take into account labour
input. In our case, on the other hand, TFP growth is from Total Economy Database of the
Conference Board (2010) where it is defined as the effect of technological change, efficiency
improvements, and immeasurable contribution of all inputs other than capital and labour. It is
estimated as the residual by subtracting the sum of two-period average compensation share of
capital and labour inputs weighted by their respective growth rates from the output growth
rate. Usage of log level differences delivers the logarithmic annual TFP growth rates as
Tornqvist indexes throughout 1982-2006. The expected sign of the link between capital
inflows and TFP growth is positive.
Initial per capita domestic capital stock in 1970 substitutes for per capita initial GDP as the
new wealth control. Acquired from version 5.6 of PWT, domestic capital stock is capital
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reserves per capita including gold in 1970 expressed at 1990 PPP equivalents. Because this
data is no longer available in PWT we use gross capital formation (GCF) from WDI which
refers to outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level
of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on);
plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the
like; including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and
industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or
unforeseen fluctuations in production or sales, and work-in-progress. Data are in constant
2005 US dollars.
To represent socioeconomic conditions, infrastructure, environmental sustainability, and
the level of economic development from a different angle we employ malaria in 1994 from
Sachs (2003) who describes it as the proportion of a country’s population at risk of
falciparum malaria infection. Per capita foreign equity investments are expected to be
negatively influenced by the malaria incidence.
The potential effects of asymmetric information on the behaviours of international
financial investors are controlled for through three different measures: country
creditworthiness, foreign bank penetration, and global awareness about local conditions. To
capture credibility OECD’s (2010) country risk classifications are used. In accordance with
the OECD Knaepen Package, which came into effect in 1999, country credit risks are
assessed and countries are classified into eight numerical categories between 0 and 7 on the
basis of valid country risk elements by a consensus decision of the sub-group of country risk
experts. It involves both quantitative evaluation through the Country Risk Assessment Model
(CRAM) and qualitative country-by-country expert appraisal of the model results to integrate
political risk and other risk factors not considered by the model. Since a lower category
number means lower country credit risk, an increase in this variable is conjectured to
decrease capital inflows. Taken from WDI, international per person voice traffic (the sum of
international incoming and outgoing telephone calls in minutes divided by the total
population) is another proxy for cross country information spillovers. More informed
investors via increased telephone communications are likely to invest more in familiar
markets. Standing for the share of assets of foreign-owned banks in total domestic bank
assets, foreign bank asset share emerges as the final proxy for the degree of global
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information asymmetries.25 Enhanced international awareness due to foreign bank
participation in the domestic financial system of a country may stimulate foreign direct and
portfolio equity investments.
3.4.4 Instrumental Variables
The threats of probable endogeneity and attenuation bias due to measurement error in the
indexation of the institutional quality or political risk give rise to utilization of instrumental
variable methods such as two-stage least squares (2SLS). Log European settler mortality is
one variable that instruments institutional quality. Acemoglu et al. (2001) define it as
historical European colonizers’ mortality rates measured in terms of annual death per 1,000.
British legal origin dummy, whether the origin of the current formal legal code of a country is
British common law (La Porta et al., 1997), and English language, fraction of the population
speaking English as mother tongue (Hall and Jones, 1999), are the other variables that
implicitly instrument institutional quality.
3.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND TRENDS
Alfaro et al. (2008) argued that it is more appropriate to use time averaged variables for
elucidating the long run relationships. Figure 3.2 shows the trends of twelve components of
the composite index for the quality of institutions. The scores of each component are the
annual mean values across all sample countries for which the data are available. Because
institutional quality is one of the core variables it has been conjectured that a breakdown of
its components would demonstrate the profile of their time variation, thus giving an idea
about the composite index too. Indeed, as can be seen from the figure all the components but
four display a relatively stationary pattern and those four are mostly stable throughout the
1980s and since 2001. The coefficient of variation statistics of both per capita equity inflows
and institutional quality averaged across counties are less than of those averaged across
years.26
25 Deposit money bank assets as percentages of GDP and foreign bank asset shares are from Beck et al. (2005).
26 The within coefficient of variation is 0.65 for per capita equity flows, and 0.10 for institutional quality
whereas the between coefficient of variation reads 1.40 for the former, and 0.11 for the latter.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of the Institutional Quality Index Components, 1984–2006
Notes: A higher score which is the average across 53 countries for each year implies lower risk for every
component. Detailed definitions of all sub-indices relegated to the Chapter 4 appendix (Appendix 4.4).
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for time averaged cross section data on the main
variables in our analysis. On average, a typical developing country attracts per capita foreign
portfolio equity plus direct investment around $48. Ranging between $1 and $202 average
capital flows per capita also has high variation across countries. Less variation in initial
income reflects the fact that the sample is composed of countries from similar income levels.
With a mean value of 5.9 out of 10 the index of quality of institutions has the lowest cross
country variation; a parallel and more pronounced less spatial (country) heterogeneity
indication. In a slight contrast, average years of education attainment shows a wide array
from about five months to 8 years which demonstrates the disparity in human capital
formation across unlucky developing countries. The negative mean growth rate of the most
volatile variable of average total factor productivity might be a sign for declining efficiency
in production processes and technologies of those countries. Finally, it is important to note
that the mean value of the composite variable of restrictions on capital mobility (taking
values between 0 and 1) reads as 0.60 which is well above 0.50. This reveals how strongly
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countries themselves de-jure constrain and control the flow of funds albeit all financial
liberalizations they pass through and economic globalizations they become a part.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average per capita equity flows, 1970-06 47 47.964 48.692 1.189 202.261
Per capita GDP (PPP $US) in 1970 47 0.881 0.588 0.175 2.838
Average institutional quality, 1984-06 47 5.901 0.688 4.539 7.238
Average years of schooling, 1970-00 47 3.932 1.693 0.477 8.209
Average distance, 1970-06 47 8.842 1.657 5.903 12.312
Average capital mobility barriers, 1970-05 47 0.600 0.202 0.000 0.910
Average corporate tax rate, 1999-06 36 29.872 5.422 15.000 38.240
Average trade openness, 1970-06 47 63.162 31.823 16.924 155.182
Average bank assets, 1970-06 46 0.344 0.198 0.118 0.990
Average TFP growth, 1982-06 39 -0.277 1.448 -3.934 1.909
Per capita GCF (2005 $US) in 1970 44 0.401 0.411 0.057 2.005
Malaria contagion risk as of 1994 47 0.418 0.400 0.000 1.000
Average risk level, OECD, 1999-06 47 5.145 1.582 2.000 7.000
Average Int'l voice traffic, 1970-06 46 30.523 39.074 0.785 165.678
Average foreign bank asset share, 1990-97 41 0.229 0.208 0.006 0.852
Notes: Though it may change as a result of data availability, the overall sample period is 1970-2006 in our case
whereas it is either 1970-2000 or 1970-1997 in Alfaro et al. (2008). All selected variables expressed as
monetary values are either in current PPP $US or in 2005 constant $US. Distance, gross capital formation
(GCF), and GDP are in thousands of $US. Due to data unavailability, unlikely Alfaro et al. (2008), we used
GCF rather than domestic capital stock and OECD risk classification level in lieu of Moody’s sovereign risk and
international per person voice traffic instead of Reuters. Moreover, in their TFP growth calculation only capital
input has been subtracted from the total output whereas in ours both capital and labor inputs deducted so as to
yield more accurate TFP estimation.
Pairwise correlations between the core independent variables and alternative robustness
covariates are presented in Table 3.2. Most Pearson correlation coefficients are either around
0.5 or lower in absolute terms. The foremost difference between this table and Tables 3 and 4
in Alfaro et al. (2005) is that main explanatory variables are more highly correlated in their
case. In particular, the correlation of 0.84 between initial income and institutional quality
might drive their regression results (so that developed countries steer the higher correlation of
institutions with capital flows). Correlations of log distance and TFP with the remaining
variables also show dramatic difference between samples. In Alfaro et al. (2005), for
example, distance is negatively and significantly correlated with most of the other
explanatory variables whereas as seen from the above table correlation coefficients of that
variable are insignificantly positive for the matching pairs. Structural difference between our
TFP growth variable and their estimated log TFP level propagates itself in pairwise
correlations as well as in descriptive statistics. Unlike Alfaro et al. (2005) TFP growth has
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negative, though insignificant, correlations with institutional quality and log average years of
schooling, and significantly negative with initial income per capita according to Table 3.2.
This implies that less wealthy countries have faster total factor productivity growth despite
having lower levels. The profound problem, however, is that the correlation coefficient
should be much more negative than -0.329 to satisfy the predictions of neoclassical growth
and trade theories.
Table 3.2: Correlations between Main Explanatory and Other Control Variables
L. pc IGDP Institutions L. Schooling L. Distance Restrictions
Institutions 0.398 (0.00)
Log schooling 0.626 (0.00) 0.496 (0.00)
Log distance 0.064 (0.62) 0.107 (0.44) 0.275 (0.04)
Restrictions -0.202 (0.12) -0.175 (0.21) -0.244 (0.08) -0.224 (0.08)
Corporate tax 0.071 (0.67) -0.221 (0.19) -0.142 (0.40) 0.122 (0.46) 0.068 (0.68)
Log openness 0.133 (0.30) 0.242 (0.08) 0.193 (0.16) -0.020 (0.88) -0.406 (0.00)
L. Bank assets 0.366 (0.00) 0.323 (0.02) 0.483 (0.00) -0.041 (0.75) -0.211 (0.10)
L. TFP growth -0.329 (0.03) -0.140 (0.36) -0.115 (0.49) 0.118 (0.45) 0.005 (0.98)
Log pc IGCF 0.802 (0.00) 0.530 (0.00) 0.598 (0.00) 0.095 (0.50) -0.084 (0.55)
Malaria -0.584 (0.00) -0.502 (0.00) -0.554 (0.00) 0.028 (0.83) 0.050 (0.71)
Country risk -0.216 (0.10) -0.588 (0.00) -0.390 (0.01) -0.085 (0.53) -0.003 (0.98)
L. Voice traffic 0.555 (0.00) 0.398 (0.00) 0.520 (0.00) -0.161 (0.21) -0.248 (0.05)
Foreign banks -0.354 (0.02) -0.169 (0.27) -0.250 (0.11) 0.132 (0.38) -0.021 (0.89)
Notes: All the variables are those as in Table 3.1 except the logarithmic forms of some of them. The
abbreviations L, I, and pc refer to ‘logs’, ‘initial’ and ‘per capita’ respectively. Country observations change
from pair to pair adjusting to data availability. P-values are in italics and in parentheses.
3.6 THE UNDERLYING REGRESSION RESULTS
This section concentrates on the actual models fitted to the data by replicating key aspects
of the analysis in Alfaro et al. (2008) first, laying down the estimation outputs in the
subsequent tables for the sample of developing countries second, carrying out sensitivity
checks third and finally dealing with potential endogeneity issues through instrumental
variable regressions.
3.6.1 Replication of Alfaro et al. (2008)
Using data for the same sample of 98 developed and developing countries, we first
replicate the main estimates of Alfaro et al. (2008). Panel A in Table 3.3 provides the cross-
section OLS regression results following the approach of the original paper.
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Table 3.3: Replication of Core Specifications in Alfaro et al. (2008)
A. 1970-2000 Period
Base Year 1996 Base Year 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log per capita initial
GDP (1996 PPP$)
1.20***
(0.18)
-0.02
(0.30)
1.36***
(0.19)
-0.08
(0.43)
0.07
(0.26)
Log per capita initial
GDP (2005 PPP$)
1.39***
(0.20)
0.18
(0.27)
0.46**
(0.23)
Average institutional
quality, 1984-2000
1.22***
(0.35)
1.31***
(0.43)
1.18***
(0.41)
1.43***
(0.41)
1.37***
(0.41)
Log average years of
schooling, 1970-2000
-0.38
(0.35)
-0.78
(0.58)
Log average
distance, 1970-2000
1.02
(1.26)
1.60
(1.71)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-2.27**
(0.90)
-2.60**
(1.04)
Countries 98 98 81 81 81 81 81 81
R
2 0.27 0.43 0.29 0.44 0.50 0.30 0.44 0.50
B. 1970-2006 Period
Base Year 2005 Base Year 1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log per capita initial
GDP (2005 PPP$)
1.65***
(0.22)
0.09
(0.33)
1.79***
(0.24)
0.08
(0.40)
0.31
(0.29)
Log per capita initial
GDP (1996 PPP$)
1.74***
(0.22)
-0.27
(0.57)
-0.12
(0.35)
Average institutional
quality, 1984-2006
1.82***
(0.48)
1.92***
(0.55)
1.80***
(0.55)
1.75***
(0.54)
1.56***
(0.53)
Log average years of
schooling, 1970-2005
-0.81
(0.72)
-0.39
(0.44)
Log average
distance, 1970-2006
1.07
(2.14)
0.61
(1.59)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-2.80**
(1.31)
-2.40**
(1.09)
Countries 98 98 81 81 81 81 81 81
R
2 0.32 0.49 0.33 0.49 0.53 0.31 0.50 0.53
Notes: Dependent variable is average capital flows (the sum of FDI and foreign portfolio equity inflows,
wherever the data are available for at least one of them) per capita expressed either in 1996 or in 2005 US
dollars. Initial GDP is the first-observed GDP of a country within the corresponding sample period. The
dependent variable and log per capita initial GDP consistently accord with the relevant base year. As the most
part of Panel A (especially the first five models) is an exact replication of Alfaro et al. (2008), institutional
quality considered in this panel is composed of eleven components out of twelve ICRG political risk indicators.
The remaining ‘socioeconomic conditions’ component is also incorporated in Panel B as in the thesis. The
‘years of schooling’ variable refers to average years of school attainment (at all levels) of the total population
aged 25 and over and not 15 and over. The results are robust to either measure of institutional quality and years
of schooling. The base sample of 81 countries excludes any country that does not have data for all variables of
interest. Heteroscedasticity robust (White-corrected) standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant included in all
estimations.
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Models (1), (3) and (6) show that the Lucas paradox exists for both samples of countries
from all income levels as the log per capita initial GDP (a proxy for the level of initial capital
stock in an economy) is positively significant in explaining the inflow of new foreign capital.
The inclusion of institutional quality ‘resolves’ the paradox in all models except (8) which, in
contrast, demonstrates that the results for the original period 1970-2000 are sensitive to base
year adjustment. Nevertheless, our data reaffirm the findings of Alfaro et al. (2008) with the
same base year. Panel B reports estimation results from the replications that consider slight
modifications (e.g., extending the sample period to 2006, taking 2005 as the base year and
additionally incorporating the ‘socioeconomic conditions’ component in the composite
institutional quality variable). The estimates in this lower panel corroborate those of Alfaro et
al. (2008) more strongly than the upper panel.
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we focus on the subset of developing countries
and investigate the empirical implications of the Lucas paradox and related theories within
that particular country group. More specifically, we explore if the above findings hold when
industrialised (developed) countries are removed from the sample.
3.6.2 Central Cross-Section OLS Results
Table 3.4 reports the main estimation results for the sample of developing countries. The
preliminary cross section OLS regressions of per capita foreign portfolio equity and direct
investment inflows on initial GDP and composite institutional quality index are given in the
first three models. Model (1) in the table corroborates that the Lucas paradox indeed exists;
i.e. capital moves to wealthier markets in contrast to the expectations of neoclassical growth
and trade theory. Looking at Model (2), log initial GDP per capita remains significant. With
an alternative income measure, Model (3) supports the previous model that quality of
institutions is not able to resolve the paradox for a sample of only developing countries. The
last three models in the same table portray additional and augmented multivariate estimation
results. This part encompasses regressions testing all four hypotheses proposed by Lucas
(1990). From these explanations Lucas (1990) had preferred the stock differences in and
positive externalities of human capital interpretations over the remaining. Model (4)
challenges this as the inclusion of average years of schooling as human capital proxy does not
remove the paradox for developing countries. Similarly, Model (5) shows that initial GDP
still preserves its statistical significance (at 10%) despite controlling for distance, restrictions
on capital market transactions and years of schooling. With a slightly different initial wealth
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measure, Model (6) also corroborates the persistence of the paradox within developing
economies.
Table 3.4: Cross-Section OLS Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 1970-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log per capita GDP
(PPP$) in 1970
0.372***
(0.077)
0.187***
(0.060)
0.225**
(0.089)
0.137*
(0.073)
Average institutional
quality, 1984-2006
0.446***
(0.062)
0.348***
(0.060)
0.410***
(0.065)
0.366***
(0.060)
Log average per capita GDP
(PPP$), 1970-2006
0.276***
(0.071)
Log average years of
schooling, 1970-2000
0.288**
(0.134)
0.060
(0.079)
0.007
(0.056)
Log average distance,
1970-2006
-0.050
(0.265)
0.078
(0.250)
Average capital mobility
restrictions, 1970-2005
-0.665
(0.429)
-0.625
(0.395)
Log per capita GDP
(2005 US$) in 1970
0.220***
(0.072)
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47
R
2 0.259 0.592 0.620 0.335 0.669 0.707
Notes: Dependent variable is average capital (foreign direct and portfolio equity) flows per capita.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant included in all estimations.
To address potential endogeneity, cross feedback, and collinearity issues Figure 3.3
illustrates the conditional correlation plots between the residuals from core specifications.
Panel A plots the data pointed residuals from the regression of average capital inflows on
average institutional quality index against the residuals from the regression of log initial GDP
again on institutional quality variable.
Panel B, likewise, sketches the data pointed residuals from the regression of average
equity investment on log initial GDP against the residuals from the regression of institutional
quality on log GDP in 1970. It is clear that institutional quality abstracted initial GDP and
initial GDP-free institutional quality are both positively related to capital flows, visualizing
the persistence of the Lucas paradox within developing countries.
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Figure 3.3: Conditional Correlation Plots of the Residuals
Note: Panel A abstracts from the effects of institutional quality while Panel B does from those of log initial GDP
in shaping the mutual associations in question.
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3.6.3 Robustness Checks
A variety of alternative specifications and variable measures show our main results to be
robust. 27 Table 3.5 provides six different models fitted. With the same periodic focus as in
Table 3.4 and by controlling for additional proxies of economic fundamentals, each of the
first mid three regressions substantiate that the quality of institutions does not fully answer
the question; why does capital not flow to poorer countries? Meanwhile, all the parameters on
those covariates carry expected signs despite some being insignificant. Model (5) switches
initial wealth measure, the paradox proxy, from GDP to gross capital formation per capita
(domestic capital stock) and verifies the settled outcomes of the second and third models in
the previous table. The two remaining estimations, one on the far left and the other on the far
right of the table, fit the data averaged over two different sub-periods without breaking the
robustness of our key findings.
Table 3.5: Robustness Cross-Section OLS Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita
(1)
1990–06
(2)
1970–06
(3)
1970–06
(4)
1970–06
(5)
1970–06
(6)
1994–06
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.593***
(0.100)
0.204***
(0.059)
0.139**
(0.057)
0.177**
(0.072)
0.643***
(0.122)
Average institutional
quality
0.508***
(0.126)
0.404***
(0.064)
0.423***
(0.050)
0.448***
(0.084)
0.410***
(0.073)
0.563***
(0.133)
Average corporate tax
rate, 1999-06
-0.010
(0.022)
Log average trade
openness, 1970-06
0.204
(0.136)
Log average bank
assets, 1970-06
0.220**
(0.103)
Log average TFP
growth, 1982-06
0.001
(0.025)
Log per capita GCF
(2005 $US) in 1970
0.143***
(0.051)
Malaria contagion risk
in 1994
0.112
(0.232)
Countries 36 47 46 39 44 47
R
2 0.611 0.634 0.650 0.739 0.721 0.657
Notes: Dependent variable is average capital (foreign direct and portfolio equity) flows per capita.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant included in all estimations. Although the
same restrictions imposed throughout all the estimations to ensure sample consistency, sample size may still
vary due to data availability for some control variables.
27 Outliers detecting added variable plots (available upon request) indicate that Chile and Panama may have
influential observations. Our key results are left unaltered, however, when we drop either of them in turn or
suppress both at once.
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Asymmetric information and sovereign risk explanations are considered in Table 3.6.
Models from (1) to (3) testify that none of the additional covariates is significant and our
basic results are insensitive to allowing for them. Specification (4) regresses average capital
inflows over 1985-2006 on initial levels of institutional quality (in 1984). The positively
significant impact of pre-sample institutions on the subsequent capital inflows wanes when
per capita GDP in 1984 enters in the last model. This is just the opposite of the corresponding
estimates in Alfaro et al. (2008).28
Table 3.6: Robustness Cross-Section OLS Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita
(1)
1990–06
(2)
1970–06
(3)
1990–06
(4)
1984–06
(5)
1984–06
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.437***
(0.092)
0.148**
(0.066)
0.429***
(0.114)
Average institutional
quality
0.562***
(0.106)
0.425***
(0.067)
0.603***
(0.154)
Average risk level,
OECD, 1999-06
-0.014
(0.057)
Log average Int'l
voice traffic
0.047
(0.032)
Average foreign bank
asset share, 1990-97
-0.124
(0.511)
Average institutional
quality in 1984
0.226***
(0.058)
0.098*
(0.058)
Log per capita GDP
(PPP$) in 1984
0.550***
(0.114)
Countries 47 46 41 45 45
R
2 0.640 0.603 0.613 0.177 0.449
Notes: See notes to Table 3.5.
28 For robustness purposes, taking the fifth model in Table 3.4 as benchmark, we also run the regressions
involving real capital flows per capita as the dependent variable including debt and aid flows besides direct and
portfolio equity flows under a more composite capital flow measure; and regressions containing real per capita
capital flows as another dependent variable excluding only aid allocations. Alternatively we have incorporated
population, savings and income growth under the same specification as Mankiw et al. (1992) suggests that those
factors affect marginal product of capital according to their augmented Solow growth model. In addition to
savings and growth, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2011) argue that the allocation puzzle in capital flows to
developing countries is also related to the pattern of accumulation of international reserves. All of the
reassurance checks with these alternative dependent and independent variables deliver results (available upon
request) very similar to Model (5) of Table 3.4. Using the first two and the fifth specifications from the same
table, we conduct cross-section OLS estimations for the main capital flow components (FDI, portfolio equity,
long-term debt and short-term debt) and provide the results in the chapter appendix. Decomposition leads to
radically different results. Institutional quality resolves the Lucas paradox in FDI only when more controls (e.g.
capital mobility restrictions) are included. For FPEI, institutions explain the paradox. Although the quality of
institutions has positive impact on debt inflows in the long-run, the paradox remains.
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3.6.4 Instrumental Variable Estimations
Taking into account possible endogeneity of institutional quality variable because of
different factors like measurement error and attenuation bias, we conduct instrumental
variable (IV) estimations as the final stage of analysis. The index of institutional quality is
sequentially instrumented by European settler mortality variable (in logs), British legal origin
dummy, and the variable of English language.
Table 3.7: Instrumental Variable Regressions of Capital Inflows Per Capita
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
Average institutional
quality, 1984-2006
0.849***
(0.285)
2.377
(21.261)
0.935**
(0.453)
Log per capita GDP
(PPP$) in 1970
-0.854
(11.525)
Log European
settler mortality
0.016
(0.117)
Hausman RE Test (࢖-value) 0.397 0.996 0.649
Hansen J-Test (࢖-value) 0.898
Panel B: First Stage for Average Institutional Quality in 1984-2006
Log European
settler mortality
-0.189**
(0.089)
-0.010
(0.122)
-0.202*
(0.102)
Log per capita GDP
(PPP$) in 1970
0.529***
(0.193)
British legal origin -0.275
(0.289)
English language 0.720
(0.633)
R
2 0.061 0.284 0.111
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares
Average institutional
quality, 1984-2006
0.528***
(0.072)
0.428***
(0.086)
0.507***
(0.069)
Log per capita GDP
(PPP$) in 1970
0.188**
(0.076)
Log European
settler mortality
-0.065
(0.050)
Countries 39 39 39
Notes: In Panels A and C the response variable is average capital (foreign direct and portfolio equity) flows per
capita whereas in B it is the composite index of institutional quality. Hausman regressor endogeneity (RE) test
compares each model between Panels A and C whilst Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions –feasible
only under (3)– assesses the validity of model instruments. For both tests given are ݌-values. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Unreported constant included in all estimations. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Under Model (1) in Table 3.7, negative significance of the settler mortality variable at the
first stage regression (in Panel B) corroborates the assertion of Acemoglu et al. (2001) that if
the European settlement was discouraged by diseases or when they could not settle the
colonizers created worse institutions. In Panel A under the same model, second stage
regression of the two stage least squares (2SLS) indicates that the portion of the average
institutional quality index that is explained by the log European settler mortality has a
significantly positive impact on capital flows. Under (2B), however, log European settler
mortality is no longer significant once initial income enters into the specification. And under
(2A), neither log initial GDP nor instrumented institutional quality is statistically different
from zero. Therefore, settler mortality appears to be an imperfect or weak instrument. Very
large standard errors of the 2SLS estimates in 2A (see below) and specification-sensitive
results support this surmise. Hence, we cannot assert that European settler mortality resolves
our question (the Lucas paradox) despite its common use as an effective instrument for
institutions in the literature.
The last IV estimation is given under Model (3) where institutional quality is now
instrumented by the British legal origin dummy and the English language variable. Extremely
weak coefficient on log colonizer mortality verifies the excludability (strict exogeneity) of
that variable. Moreover, the ݌-value of the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions
ascertains that all instruments are valid. Contrary to our results, highly significant English
language seems to be crucial in accounting for institutional differences across countries in
Alfaro et al. (2008). This might be due to the fact that their sample contains currently
advanced large countries like the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia which were the former British colonies.
The IV (2SLS) estimator is less efficient (has larger standard errors) than OLS when the
explanatory variables are exogenous (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 527). Therefore it would be
useful to test whether the institutional quality variable is in fact endogenous. One way to do
this is to conduct a Hausman test to compare the IV and the OLS estimates. According to
Hausman specification tests on the non-robust versions we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis that the difference between IV and OLS are not systematic. Hence, endogeneity
does not appear to be a critical problem.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
This essay empirically examines whether the results of Alfaro et al. (2008) are robust to a
sample that excludes developed countries. Using cross-section data averaged over the period
1970-2006 for up to 47 developing countries, it tests the sensitivity of the Lucas paradox to a
measure for institutional quality, given control variables.
We discover that, within developing economies, the puzzle of rich-to-poor capital flows
persists, despite allowing for the quality of institutions, in the long-run. In most of the cross-
section OLS estimations, the real per capita initial GDP (the paradox proxy) and the
composite index of institutional quality have positive impacts on real capital inflows (the sum
of foreign direct and portfolio equity inflows) per capita.
Our analysis suggests that the approach of Alfaro et al. (2008) only appears to explain the
Lucas paradox because of the driving effects of developed countries. Relative to developing
countries, advanced countries attract higher volumes of capital inflows and have significantly
higher institutional quality. These are supported by the larger variable variances across
countries and very high correlations between main explanatory variables in their sample
(Tables 1-4 in Alfaro et al., 2005). Another explanation for the persistence of the wealth bias
(the Lucas paradox) within developing countries could be that either underdeveloped
economies do not actually have higher returns or international investors and creditors are not
satisfactorily convinced that they are higher.
Chapter 4 extends the analysis in this essay by allowing for time series variation through
static and dynamic linear panel data methods.
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APPENDIX 3.1: REPLICATION SAMPLES
Table A3.1: Replication Samples
Whole World Sample of 98 Countries Base Sample of 81 Countries
Albania Gabon Nicaragua Argentina India Slovenia
Algeria Gambia Niger Australia Indonesia South Africa
Angola Germany Nigeria Austria Iran Spain
Argentina Ghana Norway Bangladesh Israel Sweden
Armenia Greece Oman Bolivia Italy T. Tobago
Australia Guatemala Pakistan Brazil Jamaica Tunisia
Austria Guinea Panama Bulgaria Japan Turkey
Azerbaijan Guyana P. N. Guinea Cameroon Jordan Uganda
Bangladesh Haiti Paraguay Canada Kenya Ukraine
Belarus Honduras Peru Chile Korea Rep. UK
Bolivia Hungary Philippines Colombia Latvia US
Brazil India Portugal Congo Rep. Lithuania Uruguay
Bulgaria Indonesia Russian Fed. Costa Rica Malaysia Vietnam
Burkina Faso Iran Saudi Arabia Croatia Mali Zambia
Cameroon Israel Senegal Cyprus Mexico Zimbabwe
Canada Italy Sierra Leone Czech Rep. Morocco
Chile Jamaica Singapore Denmark Mozambique
Colombia Japan Slovenia Dominican Rep. Netherlands
Congo Rep. Jordan South Africa Ecuador New Zealand
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Spain Egypt Nicaragua
Côte d’Ivoire Kenya Sweden El Salvador Niger
Croatia Korea Rep. T. Tobago Estonia Norway
Cyprus Latvia Tunisia Finland Pakistan
Czech Rep. Lithuania Turkey France Panama
Denmark Madagascar Uganda Gambia P. N. Guinea
Dominican Rep. Malaysia Ukraine Germany Paraguay
Ecuador Mali UK Ghana Peru
Egypt Mexico US Greece Philippines
El Salvador Morocco Uruguay Guatemala Portugal
Estonia Mozambique Vietnam Guyana Russian Fed.
Ethiopia Namibia Zambia Haiti Senegal
Finland Netherlands Zimbabwe Honduras Sierra Leone
France New Zealand Hungary Singapore
Note: Unlike what Alfaro et al. (2008) report in their Appendix B, Belarus drops from the base sample due to
schooling data unavailability but Vietnam remains instead.
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APPENDIX 3.2: CROSS-SECTION OLS ESTIMATIONS FOR THE MAIN CAPITAL
FLOW COMPONENTS
Table A3.2: Cross-Section OLS Regressions of Capital Flow Components, 1970-2006
A. Equity Components
FDI FPEI
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log per capita GDP
(PPP$) in 1970
0.345***
(0.076)
0.173***
(0.062)
0.121
(0.074)
0.034**
(0.017)
0.020
(0.015)
0.026
(0.018)
Average institutional
quality, 1984-2006
0.415***
(0.060)
0.379***
(0.064)
0.033***
(0.010)
0.034***
(0.012)
Log average years of
schooling, 1970-2000
0.059
(0.078)
-0.006
(0.011)
Log average distance,
1970-2006
-0.136
(0.262)
0.086
(0.057)
Average capital mobility
restrictions, 1970-2005
-0.736*
(0.429)
0.075
(0.057)
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47
R
2 0.238 0.545 0.643 0.108 0.199 0.284
B. Debt Components
LTDEBT STDEBT
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log per capita GDP
(PPP$) in 1970
0.406***
(0.059)
0.324***
(0.058)
0.288***
(0.070)
0.144***
(0.034)
0.115***
(0.038)
0.084*
(0.044)
Average institutional
quality, 1984-2006
0.197***
(0.053)
0.176***
(0.059)
0.068***
(0.023)
0.051**
(0.021)
Log average years of
schooling, 1970-2000
0.034
(0.074)
0.057
(0.038)
Log average distance,
1970-2006
-0.193
(0.265)
-0.122
(0.079)
Average capital mobility
restrictions, 1970-2005
-0.568
(0.340)
-0.189***
(0.057)
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47
R
2 0.448 0.543 0.622 0.374 0.449 0.540
Notes: Dependent variable is average FDI (foreign direct investment), FPEI (foreign portfolio equity
investment), LTDEBT (long-term debt) and STDEBT (short-term debt) flows in per capita 2005 USD for each
respective model-triplet. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and ***
p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant included in all estimations.
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CHAPTER 4
LUCAS PARADOX IN THE SHORT-RUN
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators using time-aggregated (long-term averaged) data
for cross-sections are charged not to take the intertemporal dependence into account but fit
mainly long-run steady-state equilibrium models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Sinn, 1992).
In such cross-section models, the unobservable country-specific fixed effects that are
correlated with the observed characteristics (i.e. explicitly controlled variables) included in
the model can cause statistical difficulties in estimation: potential aggregation bias, loss of
information (due to absorbed time variation), inconsistency and inefficiency. Neither can they
account for the causes of behavioural persistence since they are unable to control for true
state dependence (autoregressivity, especially in the dependent variable).29
Drawing largely on the theoretical considerations of the previous chapter, this chapter
addresses the methodological and measurement issues discussed above. It is concerned with
the question: Is it (the persistence of the Lucas paradox within developing countries, as
documented in Chapter 3) because of the unobservable county-specific effects or is it actually
due to the persistence of the capital in flowing to a certain market but appears as if its initial
abundance in that market spurs further inflows? In other words, perhaps capital has been
flowing to where it has already flowed and not necessarily where it had already been. Using
five-year (rolling-averaged) panel data for up to 47 developing countries over the period
1980-2006, it examines if including the institutional quality index removes the Lucas paradox
intertemporally (i.e. in the short-run). The ‘short-run’ relationships are captured by
employing linear static (principally within-group fixed effects) and dynamic (system GMM)
panel data methods (Pesaran and Smith, 1995, Houthakker, 1965, Baltagi and Griffin,
1984).30
29 In a time series context, state dependence means that state at a given moment depends on the previous state(s)
of the system.
30 Baltagi (2005) states that the Between estimator (pooled OLS or equivalently cross-section OLS, which are
based on the cross-section component of the data) tends to give long-run estimates while the Within estimator
(which is based on the time-series component of the data) tends to give short-run estimates.
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In this chapter, we additionally investigate the short-run prognoses of Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997) who, in contrast to Lucas (1988, 1990), argue that economic growth,
development and capital flow patterns are predicted by a neoclassical growth model
augmented with assumptions of micro-level indivisibilities and uncertainty. According to
their overlapping generations model of optimal portfolio choice, it is not a paradox at all (as it
is already expected) that more foreign capital will flow to richer economies in the short-run.
The data and methodology of the chapter enable such an empirical verification. Capital
inflows per capita (the dependent variable as the sum of foreign direct and portfolio equity
investment) represent the cross-border risky financial investments in Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997). The initial endowments were captured by the initial GDP per capita while the risk-
return trade-off (insurance, investment security or risk conditions) is embodied in the
institutional quality variable. Static and dynamic panel estimators that fit to ‘time ݐ’ notion let
us analyse the short-run or dynamic implications of their model. Comprehensive review of
the derivation of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) results that are particularly considered here is
in the chapter appendix (Appendix 4.1).
Table 4.1: Standard Deviation Decompositions and Coefficients of Variation of the Data
Proportional Deviations CV
Variables Annual Sample 5-Year Sample Annual Sample
Between Within Between Within Between Within
Per capita equity flows 46.81 53.19 51.92 48.08 1.40 0.65
Per capita initial GDP 100 0 49.41 50.59 0.67 —
Institutional quality 43.84 56.16 46.42 53.58 0.11 0.10
Average years of schooling 64.55 35.45 64.55 35.45 0.45 0.23
Weighted-average remoteness 86.43 13.57 87.89 12.11 0.19 0.01
Capital mobility barriers 44.49 55.51 48.35 51.65 0.31 0.16
Corporate tax rate 70.39 29.61 79.90 20.10 0.18 0.02
Trade openness 66.29 33.71 69.66 30.34 0.49 0.12
Deposit money bank assets 58.32 41.68 59.12 40.88 0.56 0.21
TFP growth 26.26 73.74 38.26 61.74 -6.81 -4.38
Per capita initial GCF 100 0 55.84 44.16 1.04 —
Malaria contagion risk 100 0 100 0 0.87 —
Risk level, OECD 78.93 21.07 81.81 18.19 0.30 0.02
International voice traffic 73.46 26.54 75.37 24.63 1.85 1.11
Foreign bank asset share 77.77 22.23 84.62 15.38 0.93 0.12
Notes: Percentage proportions for standard deviations of each variable across countries, between, versus over
time, within, under annually observed and five-year averaged samples. Cross country (time averaged data) and
over time (country averaged data) coefficient of variations (CV) are calculated for annual sample only.
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To compare space (between) and time (within) variations in our data, coefficients of
variation and percentage proportions for standard deviations of over-time and cross-country
averaged data are given in Table 4.1. Notwithstanding the fact that between coefficients of
variation are larger for all variables, standard deviation proportions are either relatively close
to each other or even higher in within cases for, at least, the first three most important
variables. All in all, the figures in the table imply that time variation should not be ignored as
incorporating time dimension through appropriate model specifications would not only
alleviate aggregation bias but would also yield significant information and efficiency gains.
Furthermore, we want to examine how this information enhancement impinges on the Lucas
paradox and whether it makes any difference to the irresolution in Chapter 3.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Econometric methodology is devised in
section 4.2. Section 4.3 reviews the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. Results
from static panel estimators are examined in section 4.4, while dynamic panel regressions
discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 METHODOLOGY
Given small ܶ, relative to ܰ, we avail of cross-section asymptotics in building up the
following sections.31
4.2.1 Specification for Static Panel Estimators
The static two-way error components population regression function for our sample
estimations can be written as:ܨ௜௧ = ߤ + ߙ ௜ܻ௧ + ܠ௜௧ࢼ+ ߴ௜௧ ݅ = 1, ,ܰ; ݐ = 1, ,ܶ (1)
where ܨ௜௧ is the dependent variable (five-year averaged inflows of portfolio equity and
foreign direct investment expressed as capital inflows per capita) for country ݅ and time
period ݐ, ߤ is a constant, ௜ܻ௧ is the main regressor (the natural log of GDP per capita at first
years of each panels), ܠ௜௧ is a 1 × (ܭ െ 1) row vector of any additional explanatory
variables. The estimators of interest are the scalar ߙ and (ܭ െ 1) × 1 column vector ࢼ;ܭ ൒ 1 being the number of covariates. Similar to cross section OLS case, ߙො will be capturing
the Lucas paradox and ࢼ෡ the influence of the other regressors on capital inflows (and whether
31 ܰ ՜ λ asymptotics are more appropriate than ܶ՜ λ asymptotics, even though ܰ is practically fixed while ܶ
can grow (Wooldridge, 2002). This is in fact the case in our country panel study. Nonetheless, if ܰ is
sufficiently large relative to ܶ and we can assume rough independence in the cross section or make sure it to be
so by introducing cluster robust estimators then the suitable approximations warranted (Ibid.).
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they account for, that is remove, the paradox). Assuming ߴ௜௧, the composite disturbances,
follow a generalized two-way error components structureߴ௜௧ = ݑ௜ + ߜ௧ + ߝ௜௧ ݅ = 1, ,ܰ; ݐ = 1, ,ܶ (2)
where ݑ௜ refers to country specific unobservable fixed effects, ߜ௧ denotes period-specific
effects which are assumed to have fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time
dummies, and ߝ௜௧ denotes idiosyncratic errors.
Each of the three static panel data models (pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects)
we apply specifies different orthogonality, rank, and efficiency assumptions about the
elements of ߴ௜௧ and ܠ௜௧ in terms of conditional expectations, invertibility, and variances.
Pooled OLS (POLS) assumes that ݑ௜ is fixed over time and has a constant partial impact on
the mean response in each time period. If ݑ௜ is correlated with any element of ܠ௜௧, then POLS
estimator is biased and inconsistent. Because POLS does not offer any solution for potential
cross section heterogeneity we consider two other estimators. Fixed effects model (FEM)
allows for arbitrary correlation between ݑ௜ and ܠ௜௧ by relaxing the orthogonality assumption
and deals with this through within transformation; time demeaning of Equation (1) removes
observed and unobserved fixed effects. More intuitively, FEM accounts for unobserved
country effects that are correlated with ܠ௜௧ but ‘sweeps up’ time-invariant variables. On the
other hand, random effects model (REM) involves generalized least squares (GLS)
transformation under stricter orthogonality assumptions. REM estimator is obtained by quasi
time demeaning which implies the removal of only a pre-estimated fraction of the time
averages. Having the advantage of explicitly allowing for time-invariant variables REM
favoured over FEM if country effects are uncorrelated with ܠ௜௧ but is inconsistent if FEM is
the ‘true’ model. It is standard to choose between FEM and REM using a cross section-time
series adapted version of the Hausman specification test. To avoid heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation in ߝ௜௧ we employ the Huber/White/sandwich cluster robust estimator.
4.2.2 Representation of Dynamic Panel Estimators
As many economic relationships are inherently dynamic (Nerlove, 2002), the dynamics of
adjustment can be represented by a dynamic two-way error components population
regression:ܨ௜௧ = ߤ + ܎௜௧ି௦ࢽ+ ߙ ௜ܻ௧ + ܠ௜௧ࢼ+ ߴ௜௧ ݅ = 1, ,ܰ; ݐ = 1, ,ܶ; ݏ = 1, 2 (3)
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where ܎௜௧ି௦ is the vector containing the lags of the dependent variable (capital inflows per
capita) as regressors rendering (3) to include an autoregressive process. The parameter vectorࢽ involves the scalars measuring the extent of state dependence (inertia), and the composite
disturbance term is similarly specified as a two-way error components mechanismߴ௜௧ = ݑ௜ + ߜ௧ + ߝ௜௧ ݅ = 1, ,ܰ; ݐ = 1, ,ܶ (4)
where ݑ௜ represents, as before, state-specific effects, and ߜ௧ denotes period-specific effects
which are assumed to have fixed parameters to be estimated as coefficients of time dummies.
In a dynamic specification of the kind in (3) POLS, within-group FEM, and REM do not
take the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable into consideration and produce biased
and inconsistent estimates. Therefore, a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach is
required. Because our short time panel data are highly persistent we use the Blundell and
Bond (1998) system GMM estimator which entails contemporaneous first differences to
instrument the levels of the endogenous variables and past (two-period or earlier) lagged
levels to instrument the first differences of the same variables simultaneously.32 Because we
conjecture that only the lags of the dependent variable are structurally endogenous in our
framework and the Hausman regressor endogeneity tests corroborate this we assume all the
remaining explanatory variables to be strictly exogenous throughout the entire dynamic
model estimations.33 As a result, the composite instrument matrix with varying dimensions
according to the relevant specification is composed of two blocks: GMM-style instruments
for the lagged dependent variables and conventional IV-style instruments (essentially the rest
of the covariates instrument themselves). We prefer the GMM instruments to be collapsed to
create one instrument for each variable and lag distance rather than one for each time period,
variable, and lag distance since GMM estimators, including 2SLS and 3SLS, using too many
over-identifying restrictions are known to have poor finite sample properties and to decrease
32 Blundell and Bond (1998) show that as the concentration parameter approaches to zero, i.e. the data series
becomes more persistent, the conventional instrumental variable estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991) difference
GMM) performs poorly. They attribute the bias and the poor precision of the first-difference GMM estimator to
the problem of weak instruments. Under the extra moment conditions of Ahn and Schmidt (1995) and Arellano
and Bover (1995), with short T and persistent series Blundell and Bond (1998) also show that an additional mild
stationarity restriction on the initial conditions process allows the use of an extended system GMM estimator
that has dramatic efficiency gains over the basic first-difference GMM. These results are reviewed and
empirically verified by Blundell and Bond (2000). In our study the time length is quite short as ܶ = 5 most of
the cases. In each of the simple autoregressive POLS with no exogenous regressors (results from which are
available upon request) the positively significant (all at 1%) coefficients on the first lags of capital inflows per
capita, real per capita initial output and institutional quality are respectively around 0.765, 0.912 and 0.698.
33 Endogeneity issues are exclusively examined in the static panel instrumental variable regressions section.
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the test powers.34 Small-sample adjustment, two-step estimator optimization, and Windmeijer
(2005)’s finite-sample corrected cluster-robust standard errors used in all GMM applications.
4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS
All data are the same as in Chapter 3 except that they are now organized as five-year sub-
period moving averages (1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-2006; the last
interval comprises seven years to encompass the whole of the available time domain) over
1980-2006 for up to 47 developing countries. Data availability may limit the number of
countries or periods for some variables. Given the panel structure, data in the first year of
each sub-period are used as initial values for per capita GDP and GCF, so some time
variation is incorporated in addition to the variation across countries.
Table 4.2 shows summary statistics for the fie-year panel sample. The increased sample
size compared to Chapter 3 should enable potential degrees of freedom and efficiency gains
in estimation provided that there is sufficient variation over time.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics, Five-Year Panel Data
Variables Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per capita equity flows 231 51.047 78.533 -147.875 482.952
Per capita initial GDP ($PPP) 231 3.439 2.303 0.406 11.647
Institutional quality 231 5.733 1.103 3.168 7.804
Average years of schooling 231 4.352 1.887 0.370 9.740
GDP- weighted average remoteness 231 8.913 1.617 5.840 12.501
Average capital mobility barriers 231 0.585 0.303 0.000 1.000
Corporate tax rate 68 30.118 5.542 15.000 42.220
Trade openness 231 64.961 35.735 12.146 207.290
Deposit money bank assets 212 0.355 0.251 0.040 1.526
TFP growth 180 -0.422 2.675 -8.390 5.166
Per capita initial GCF (2005 $US) 230 0.524 0.482 0.019 2.783
Malaria contagion risk as of 1994 141 0.418 0.398 0.000 1.000
Risk level, OECD 94 5.106 1.542 2.000 7.000
International voice traffic 160 27.011 42.203 0.066 289.080
Foreign bank asset share 77 0.224 0.202 0.006 0.900
Notes: All the variables are those as defined in Chapter 3.
Although the data are identical to Chapter 3 in terms of definition and measurement,
inserting time series information via sub-period averaging has clearly increased sample sizes,
mean realizations, overall variations and ranges of almost all variables. Estimation efficiency
34 See Tauchen (1986), Altonji and Segal (1996), Ziliak (1997), Sargan (1958), Bowsher (2002), and Roodman
(2009).
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and precision in short-run regressions are expected to improve due to degrees-of-freedom
gains as a result of that disaggregation.
Table 4.3: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients, Five-Year Panel Data
Equity
Flows pc
Log pc
IGDP
Quality of
Institutions
Log
Schooling
Log
Distance
Barriers to
Cap. Mob.
L. pc IGDP
p-value
0.444
0.000
Institutions
p-value
0.508
0.000
0.496
0.000
Log schooling
p-value
0.367
0.000
0.707
0.000
0.424
0.000
Log distance
p-value
0.103
0.033
0.101
0.036
0.090
0.146
0.273
0.000
Restrictions
p-value
-0.307
0.000
-0.258
0.000
-0.385
0.000
-0.208
0.000
-0.172
0.000
Corporate tax
p-value
-0.236
0.043
-0.082
0.487
-0.197
0.102
-0.069
0.565
0.033
0.782
0.099
0.400
Log openness
p-value
0.359
0.000
0.287
0.000
0.261
0.000
0.180
0.001
-0.020
0.675
-0.329
0.000
L. Bank assets
p-value
0.373
0.000
0.527
0.000
0.339
0.000
0.378
0.000
-0.020
0.706
-0.265
0.000
TFP growth
p-value
0.107
0.125
-0.062
0.373
0.106
0.129
-0.003
0.968
0.057
0.410
-0.175
0.012
Log pc IGCF
p-value
0.454
0.000
0.687
0.000
0.368
0.000
0.514
0.000
0.046
0.359
-0.187
0.000
Malaria
p-value
-0.250
0.000
-0.539
0.000
-0.295
0.000
-0.461
0.000
0.029
0.563
0.018
0.728
Country risk
p-value
-0.237
0.010
-0.578
0.000
-0.553
0.000
-0.449
0.000
-0.113
0.229
0.090
0.336
Voice traffic
p-value
0.626
0.000
0.374
0.000
0.379
0.000
0.286
0.000
-0.120
0.081
-0.187
0.006
Foreign bank
p-value
-0.218
0.043
-0.348
0.001
-0.067
0.544
-0.195
0.083
0.215
0.045
-0.121
0.266
Notes: Equity flows are the sum of international portfolio equity and direct investment inflows expressed in
constant 2005 US dollars divided by the total population. Barriers-to-Capital and Restrictions are
interchangeably used terms for the same variable of average restrictions to and controls on capital mobility
imposed by a country. The abbreviations L, I, and pc refer to ‘logs’, ‘initial’ and ‘per capita’ respectively.
Country observations change from pair to pair adjusting to data availability. See notes to Table 4.2 as well.
Table 4.3 reports pairwise correlations for the variables using the Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficients for the equity flows per capita. This dependent variable is highly
correlated with all the other variables (in the expected direction) except for total factor
productivity growth. Initial per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP has the
highest positive correlation, with average years of schooling (0.707), the highest negative
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correlation, with country risk. This is unsurprising to the extent that relatively wealthier
countries at the outset have better schooling and creditworthiness in subsequent years. In
contrast to Table 3.2, log initial GDP, log remoteness and average restrictions on capital
mobility exhibit higher correlations, suggesting that some of their time variation is greater
than their cross-section variation.
4.4 STATIC PANEL ESTIMATIONS
Three static panel data estimators are employed (using the same specifications and
following the order of variable inclusion as in Chapter 3): pooled ordinary least squares
(POLS), within-group fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM). In order
to save space results of all these models are reported for only one specification in each table.
For the other specifications, either FEM or REM results are given. To choose between FEM
and REM, we first estimate the model with cluster-robust random effects. Then, we apply a
panel data-adjusted version of the Sargan-Hansen over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test
using the Stata® command ‘xtoverid’ (Schaffer and Stillman, 2010).35 Based on the test
results, we finally choose fixed effects if the ݌-value is smaller than 0.10; and random effects
otherwise. As economic theory suggests (that unobserved country-specific effects are likely
to be correlated with the observable characteristics in ܠ, see above) and econometric tests
mostly confirm, FEM is the preferred estimator.
4.4.1 Baseline Results
Table 4.4 reports the basic static panel data regression results. Since the Sargan-Hansen
OIR test implies that REM is inconsistent only FEM estimates are given under the first
specification. Controlling for time invariant country-specific heterogeneity, fixed effects
estimation shows once again that capital moves to relatively wealthier economies; allowing
for within-group variation the Lucas paradox exists. Under (2) and (3), fixed effects (likewise
POLS and REM) estimates for initial income and institutions are positive and highly
significant (at 1% and 5% respectively). Hence, the quality of institutions still cannot explain
the paradox for developing countries even in the short-run when time series variations are
also taken into account.
35 Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002, pp. 290-91) propose more technical approaches for this test.
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Table 4.4: Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3)
FEM POLS FEM REM FEM
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.658***
(0.168)
0.415***
(0.063)
0.443***
(0.128)
0.426***
(0.064)
Average institutional quality 0.226***
(0.043)
0.173**
(0.065)
0.207***
(0.047)
0.142**
(0.063)
Log average per capita
GDP (PPP$)
0.592***
(0.147)
Observations 231 231 231 231 231
Countries 47 47 47 47 47
R
2 0.236 0.424 0.276 0.300
R
2
_Overall 0.358 0.421 0.423 0.428
ȡ 0.313 0.279 0.157 0.295
Sargan-Hansen OIR
Test (࢖-value) 0.000 0.028 0.015
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant and time dummies included in all estimations. POLS,
FEM, REM, and OIR are standing for pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects model, random effects model,
and over-identifying restrictions respectively. ȡis known either as the fraction of the variance due to unobserved
country-specific effects or as interclass correlation of the country-specific error.
Table 4.5 includes additional covariates. The fraction of the composite error variance due
to unobservable country-specific fixed effects (ȡ) is very high leading the Sargan-Hansen
OIR test to always reject the asymptotic appropriateness of the REM. Following the practices
in some empirical papers testing the postulations of gravity models of trade we include both
fixed distance and time varying remoteness variables simultaneously under the remaining
regressions.36 In line with the models under (2) and (3) in the previous table, all of the Table
4.5 estimations demonstrate that within developing countries the paradox prevails, not only
across countries but also over time no matter how significant are the additional explanatory
variables.
36 See Brun et al. (2005), Guttmann and Richards (2006), and Coe et al. (2007) for empirical; and Deardorff
(1998), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for theoretical treatments.
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Table 4.5: Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3)
FEM POLS FEM REM FEM
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.592**
(0.240)
0.375***
(0.089)
0.531***
(0.194)
0.400***
(0.096)
Log average years
of schooling
0.161
(0.310)
0.0478
(0.107)
-0.199
(0.309)
0.0357
(0.111)
0.573**
(0.225)
Average institutional
quality
0.180***
(0.044)
0.0785
(0.082)
0.147***
(0.050)
0.124
(0.091)
Log average
distance
-3.332
(2.399)
– -3.736*
(2.040)
–
Log average
remoteness
3.571
(2.489)
5.278***
(1.734)
3.975*
(2.112)
5.977***
(2.032)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.313
(0.233)
-0.398
(0.269)
-0.323
(0.205)
-0.368
(0.277)
Log per capita initial
GDP (2005 US$)
0.379**
(0.178)
Observations 231 231 231 231 231
Countries 47 47 47 47 47
R
2 0.237 0.451 0.318 0.309
R
2
_Overall 0.361 0.147 0.450 0.174
ȡ 0.313 0.774 0.167 0.839
Sargan-Hansen OIR
Test (࢖-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denotes significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant and time dummies included in all estimations. POLS, FEM,
REM, and OIR are standing for pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects model, random effects model, and
over-identifying restrictions respectively. ȡ is known either as the fraction of the variance due to unobserved
country-specific effects or as interclass correlation of the country specific error. The dash “–” signifies
automatic drop of corresponding regressor because of collinearity or model algorithm.
4.4.2 Sensitivity Analyses
Through a number of alternative specifications with different proxy variables and sub-
periods we document that all of the static panel within-group fixed effects, pooled OLS and
random effects GLS techniques consistently deliver similar estimates that are implicationally
robust. 37 Regressions reported in Table 4.6 include some aspects of the host country
economic fundamentals alongside initial GDP per capita and institutional quality. Validated
by the pertinent OIR tests, REM under (1) and (3) and FEM under (2) show that the paradox
is still left unexplained despite controlling for corporate tax, trade openness and deposit
money bank assets as well as institutions.
37 Outliers detecting added variable plots (available upon request) indicate that Chile and Panama may have
influential observations. Our key results are left unaltered, however, when we drop either of them in turn or
suppress both at once.
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Table 4.6: Robustness Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3)
REM POLS FEM REM REM
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.712***
(0.126)
0.410***
(0.063)
0.475***
(0.155)
0.417***
(0.065)
0.457***
(0.073)
Average institutional
quality
0.550***
(0.111)
0.212***
(0.042)
0.176**
(0.067)
0.199***
(0.048)
0.229***
(0.050)
Average corporate
tax rate
-0.0190
(0.030)
Log average trade
openness
0.131
(0.102)
-0.104
(0.184)
0.111
(0.101)
Log average deposit
money bank assets
0.0222
(0.081)
Observations 68 231 231 231 212
Countries 36 47 47 47 46
R
2 0.431 0.277
R
2
_Overall 0.552 0.401 0.431 0.448
ȡ 0.603 0.298 0.149 0.123
Sargan-Hansen OIR
Test (࢖-value) 0.169 0.004 0.179
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denotes significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant and time dummies (none in (1)) included in all estimations.
POLS, FEM, REM, and OIR are standing for pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects model, random effects
model, and over-identifying restrictions respectively. ȡ is known either as the fraction of the variance due to
unobserved country-specific effects or as interclass correlation of the country specific error. The number of
observations may change due to data availability.
From Table 4.7 it seems as if institutional quality accounts for the capital flows and the
Lucas paradox under FEM (2) but when we replace initial income with initial GCF in FEM
(2) of Table 4.5 the quality of institutions variable is not significant whilst initial capital stock
is. Albeit not equivalently consistent, POLS and REM yield the results (unreported) that they
both are significant under (2). All the other regressions maintain the finding that the paradox
unresolved for developing countries.
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Table 4.7: Robustness Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3)
POLS FEM REM FEM REM
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.496***
(0.072)
0.495***
(0.139)
0.516***
(0.068)
0.617***
(0.117)
Average institutional
quality
0.229***
(0.059)
0.0916
(0.094)
0.187***
(0.066)
0.251***
(0.075)
0.326***
(0.062)
Log average
TFP growth
0.0305*
(0.018)
0.0377
(0.024)
0.0313*
(0.019)
Log per capita initial
GCF (2005 $US)
0.0291
(0.108)
Malaria contagion
risk
0.134
(0.166)
Observations 180 180 180 230 141
Countries 39 39 39 47 47
R
2 0.501 0.293 0.237
R
2
_Overall 0.485 0.499 0.330 0.480
ȡ 0.348 0.153 0.356 0.297
Sargan-Hansen OIR
Test (࢖-value) 0.006 0.000 0.174
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denotes significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant and time dummies (none in (3)) included in all estimations.
POLS, FEM, REM, and OIR are standing for pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects model, random effects
model, and over-identifying restrictions respectively. ȡ is known either as the fraction of the variance due to
unobserved country-specific effects or as interclass correlation of the country specific error. The number of
observations may change due to data availability.
Table 4.8 reports the results considering proxy variables for asymmetric information,
sovereign risk, and international knowledge spillovers. The relevant estimations throughout
the table reassure that including country risk, global phone traffic and foreign bank
penetration have no influence at all on the prevalence of the paradox.
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Table 4.8: Robustness Static Panel Regressions of Capital Inflows, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3)
POLS FEM REM FEM REM
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.660***
(0.090)
0.421
(0.485)
0.648***
(0.089)
0.288*
(0.166)
0.598***
(0.169)
Average institutional
quality
0.503***
(0.078)
0.159
(0.193)
0.447***
(0.074)
0.186
(0.132)
0.306***
(0.086)
Average risk level,
OECD taxonomy
0.0108
(0.062)
-0.290
(0.244)
-0.0201
(0.066)
Average Int'l voice
traffic
0.0030
(0.002)
Average foreign
bank asset share
-0.434
(0.476)
Observations 94 94 94 160 77
Countries 47 47 47 46 41
R
2 0.555 0.125 0.273
R
2
_Overall 0.427 0.553 0.431 0.409
ȡ 0.627 0.406 0.372 0.431
Sargan-Hansen OIR
Test (࢖-value) 0.440 0.011 0.116
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 denotes significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Unreported constant included in all estimations. Time dummies considered only
under (2) but not reported. POLS, FEM, REM, and OIR are standing for pooled ordinary least squares, fixed
effects model, random effects model, and over-identifying restrictions respectively. ȡ is known either as the
fraction of the variance due to unobserved country-specific effects or as interclass correlation of the country
specific error. The number of observations may change due to data availability.
4.4.3 Static Panel Instrumental Variable Regressions
It might be the case that there is a feedback from capital inflows per capita (the dependent
variable) to the quality of institutions (one of the key regressors). More generally, there may
be an omitted variable that influences both of these. Thus, we cannot discount the possibility
of endogeneity of the institutional quality variable. To address this we adopt a panel
instrumental variables approach.
Table 4.9 below gives the linear cross section-time series instrumental variable (IV)
regressions in addition to the first stage and primary panel data estimations throughout Panels
A, B and C.
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Table 4.9: Static Panel IV Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3)
POLS REM POLS REM POLS REM
Panel A: Instrumental Variable Estimations
Average institutional
quality
1.009***
(0.352)
1.007
(0.620)
0.318
(0.342)
0.286
(0.361)
1.212*
(0.734)
1.212
(1.556)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.355
(0.284)
0.370
(0.324)
Log European
settler mortality
0.0427
(0.177)
0.0434
(0.376)
Hausman RE (࢖) 0.374 0.756 0.999 0.999 0.859 0.988
Sargan OIR (࢖) 0.812
Panel B: First Stage for Average Institutional Quality
Log European settler
mortality
-0.210**
(0.084)
-0.212*
(0.128)
0.166**
(0.082)
0.212*
(0.114)
-0.221**
(0.085)
-0.222*
(0.133)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.918***
(0.102)
1.023***
(0.123)
British legal origin -0.200
(0.175)
-0.199
(0.274)
English language 0.473
(0.408)
0.473
(0.639)
R
2 0.137 0.137 0.397 0.396 0.146 0.146
Panel C: Primary POLS and REM Regressions
Average institutional
quality
0.392***
(0.045)
0.333***
(0.046)
0.230***
(0.050)
0.210***
(0.050)
0.371***
(0.045)
0.323***
(0.046)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.426***
(0.072)
0.434***
(0.086)
Log European
settler mortality
-0.134**
(0.052)
-0.145*
(0.074)
Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194
Countries 39 39 39 39 39 39
Notes: In Panels A and C the response variable is average capital (foreign direct and portfolio equity) flows per
capita whereas in B it is the composite index of institutional quality. Hausman regressor endogeneity (RE) test
compares each model between Panels A and C whilst Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test assesses the
validity of model instruments. For both tests given are ݌-values. Standard errors are in parentheses. Consult also
notes to Table 4.2.
Under (1) and (2) institutional quality is instrumented solely by the time invariant variable
of log European settler mortality. Since this implicit instrument does not change over time
FEM estimators do not work properly so that we are unable to report any within-group
estimate. Considering all the other two-stage least squares (2SLS) for POLS and generalized
two-stage least squares (G2SLS) for REM results, Hausman RE tests suggest that the
corresponding models in Panels A and C are asymptotically equivalent. Excessively larger
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standard errors in Panel A reinforces this also that institutional quality is actually exogenous
to the conventional static panel specifications. As a last remark, the second part of Panel C
shows that the Lucas paradox persists even within the adjusted sample.
To see whether the colonizer mortality (main instrument) is excludable in the second stage
and to test the validity of all the instruments we run further two-way error components IV
regressions and provide the results under specification (3) in Table 4.9. Here we additionally
employ again fixed but observable variables of British legal origin and English language as
implicit instruments besides explicitly controlling for European settler mortality as another
instrument for the quality of institutions. Albeit Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions
validates those instruments, the Hausman regressor endogeneity test and very high standard
errors (Panel A) imply that institutional quality is independent from the idiosyncratic errors
(i.e. exogenous).
4.5 DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATIONS
As noted above, to capture dynamic relationships consistently we employ two-way error
components models of generalized method of moments (GMM). We report results from the
Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator as the main variables of interest are quite
persistent over time.38
4.5.1 Fundamental Results
Through six dynamic model settings Table 4.10 provides the system GMM results testing
the presence of the Lucas paradox and looking whether it disappears when allowing for
institutional quality and other control variables. Specification fitted under (1) once again
shows that the paradox indeed exists within this autoregressive dynamic panel framework.
Inclusion of the quality of institutions leaves the paradox unresolved as in the pure cross
section and static panel cases. In parallel with these, estimations controlling for human
capital, unilateral distance, capital controls and remoteness in addition to initial income and
institutions demonstrate that the Lucas paradox persists when the autoregressivity in the
dependent variable is allowed for. Also there is positively significant (one period) state
dependence under all specifications in the table.
38 Arellano-Bond difference GMM results are demoted to the chapter appendix.
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Table 4.10: System GMM Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average per capita
equity flows, ݐ െ 1 0.606***(0.123) 0.564***(0.133) 0.536***(0.138) 0.598***(0.125) 0.531***(0.150) 0.541***(0.135)
Average per capita
equity flows, ݐ െ 2 -0.257(0.196) -0.215(0.178) -0.218(0.177) -0.252(0.196) -0.189(0.160) -0.227(0.168)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.348***
(0.059)
0.190***
(0.048)
0.310***
(0.072)
0.161**
(0.073)
Average institutional
quality
0.185***
(0.035)
0.171***
(0.033)
0.157***
(0.033)
0.171***
(0.033)
Log average per capita
GDP (PPP$)
0.247***
(0.054)
Log average years
of schooling
0.0779
(0.111)
0.0645
(0.096)
0.0926
(0.077)
Log average
distance
-1.328
(1.457)
-2.175
(1.437)
Log average
remoteness
1.292
(1.486)
2.161
(1.493)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.184
(0.249)
-0.175
(0.235)
Log per capita initial
GDP (2005 US$)
0.153***
(0.050)
Observations 229 229 229 229 229 229
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47࢓૚ (࢖-value) 0.021 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.026 0.025࢓૛ (࢖-value) 0.624 0.527 0.516 0.610 0.474 0.636ࡴࢇ࢔࢙ࢋ࢔ ࡶ (࢖-value) 0.803 0.740 0.739 0.800 0.735 0.736
Notes: All specifications comprise finite-sample adjustment, two-step estimator optimization, and collapsed
GMM-style instruments. Unreported constant and time dummies included in all estimations. ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ are the
Arellano-Bond tests for first order and second order autocorrelations in the residuals whilst ܪܽ݊ݏ݁݊ ܬ is the test
of over-identifying restrictions for all the model instruments. Because sample size is not an entirely well-defined
concept in system GMM which effectively runs on two samples (in levels and in first-differences)
simultaneously, we report the size of the untransformed (level) sample. Windmeijer’s finite-sample corrected
cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively.
4.5.2 Robustness Checks
Controlling for trade openness, level of financial sector development, total factor
productivity growth, initial capital stock per capita, malaria incidence and international
communication traffic in Table 4.11 do not alter the mainstay of the dynamics characterized
above. Coefficients on the lags of the dependent variable give a monotonic adjustment to a
shock that is over after two 5-year periods. The positive significance of the first lag
effectively narrows this decay to a 5-year period. This is consistent with our interpretation of
the estimates from the five-year panel data as the short-run parameters in that it takes five
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years for an impact on the contemporaneous capital flows (i.e. ܨ௜௧) to die out, after which ܨ௜௧
reverts to its long-run level.39
Table 4.11: System GMM Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average per capita
equity flows, ݐ െ 1 0.566***(0.128) 0.548***(0.134) 0.552***(0.144) 0.599***(0.121) 0.511***(0.110) 0.539***(0.124)
Average per capita
equity flows, ݐ െ 2 -0.205(0.180) -0.192(0.178) -0.0391(0.252) -0.249(0.178) -0.259(0.295) -0.355(0.280)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.191***
(0.050)
0.247***
(0.050)
0.225**
(0.086)
0.306**
(0.115)
0.279***
(0.089)
Average institutional
quality
0.182***
(0.035)
0.211***
(0.037)
0.156***
(0.044)
0.209***
(0.037)
0.260***
(0.055)
0.250***
(0.064)
Log average trade
openness
0.0149
(0.070)
Log average deposit
money bank assets
-0.0441
(0.050)
Log average
TFP growth
0.0175
(0.015)
Log per capita initial
GCF (2005 $US)
0.0878**
(0.036)
Malaria contagion
risk
-0.0686
(0.153)
Log average Int'l
voice traffic
0.0029
(0.034)
Observations 229 212 178 228 141 160
Countries 47 46 39 47 47 46࢓૚ (࢖-value) 0.026 0.034 0.057 0.026 0.043 0.047࢓૛ (࢖-value) 0.504 0.372 0.482 0.674 0.257 0.442ࡴࢇ࢔࢙ࢋ࢔ ࡶ (࢖-value) 0.744 0.750 0.626 0.778 0.584 0.743
Notes: See notes to Table 4.10.
39 Because ܶ ൑ 2 for corporate tax, country risk and foreign bank penetration the dynamic models including
them are unspecified. Hence, we are unable to report robustness checks for those extra explanatory variables.
We also fit the first two models from Table 4.4, the second model from Table 4.5 and the fifth model from
Table 4.10 to the data for main capital flow components (FDI, portfolio equity, long-term debt and short-term
debt) and report the results in the chapter appendix. Changing the data and methodology also changes the
estimates. FEM and system GMM estimations for FDI show that the Lucas paradox (or the positive wealth
effect as Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) predict) prevails in the short-run. The case for FPEI is less robust, as
neither initial income nor institutional quality is significant when the dynamics are considered. There is some
(little for short-term debt) evidence in favour of the presence and persistence of the paradox in debt flows.
Finally, capital controls and similar restrictive policies deter short-term external borrowing and induce portfolio
equity financing in the short-run.
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4.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter augments the analysis in Chapter 3 by implementing static (including within-
group fixed effects) and dynamic (system GMM) panel estimators. These estimators are used
to capture short-run dynamic relationships and to deal with any possible omitted variables
problem. For a panel of five-year moving averages over 1980-2006 and for 47 developing
countries, the chapter probes whether the wealth bias in international financial flows (the
Lucas paradox) is resolved in the short-run. It also tests if the short-run predictions of
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) hold. Insofar as our dynamic and static panel estimations are
accurate and reliable, we reach conclusions broadly similar to the previous chapter. We
demonstrate that the persistence in the Lucas paradox within developing countries is so
entrenched that allowing for unobserved country-specific effects, within-group (time series)
variation and autoregressive dynamics do not make any radical difference.
The results are identical within and across static panel data methods. Within-group fixed
effects regressions imply (as equivalently consistent random effects GLS regressions do in
some cases) that the paradox remains in the short-run for developing economies. Although
institutional quality has positive impact on capital flows to these economies, it is unable to
resolve the wealth bias. Capturing the dynamics and controlling for endogeneity, Blundell-
Bond style system GMM estimations indicate that the existence and persistence of the Lucas
paradox is an intertemporal phenomenon within developing countries. They also show that
real capital flows per capita have positive, one five-year period state dependence or inertia.
This additionally justifies the short-run interpretation throughout the chapter.
The persistence in the Lucas paradox and associated non-convergence in real incomes,
factor prices and returns could be attributed to a Linder-type home bias in international
finance. It may also be the case that excessive volatility in financial markets and related
behavioural anomalies in certain types of external funding breed the negative shocks that
cancel out the effects of positive shocks. This may eventually give rise to a permanent
diversion in the direction of funding. Hence, it is crucial to disentangle total capital flows into
appropriate components in undertaking a rather conclusive study on financial globalization,
capital controls and capital market integration, as well as the Lucas paradox. To that end,
Chapter 5 concentrates on the major flow components and analyzes their behavioural
characteristics by distinguishing them with respect to maturity and structure.
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APPENDIX 4.1: CAPITAL FLOWS IN ACEMOGLU AND ZILIBOTTI (1997)
International capital flows are modelled through a problem of optimal portfolio choice in a
two-country world. The model assumptions are: (i) free international trade in final goods and
financial instruments, (ii) intermediate goods cannot be traded internationally, (iii) both
countries face identical constant returns to scale (CRS) technologies, micro-level
indivisibilities (nonconvexities or inefficiencies implying that a certain minimum size
investment or start-up cost is required to be productive) and uncertainty, (iv) there are two
countries such that Country 1 is richer (has higher initial endowments) while Country 2 is
poorer. Under these assumptions, there are two forces to be taken into account when
comparing the profitability of investments in two different countries: risk diversification
(larger stock of savings ՜ more open or operating sectors ՜ larger amount of intermediate
goods ؠ more diversification opportunities in Country 1) and differential prices for
intermediate goods (higher in Country 2, hence marginal product of capital is higher there).
The risk-return trade-off that an agent faces is determined by these two forces.
Because all agents can run any of the intermediate sector firms, can buy any security
issued in either country and are equally distributed between the two countries; an agent݄ א πଵ ׫ πଶ is allowed to invest her funds in any combination of the two safe assets and
2 × [0, 1] risky assets, where π௜ is the set of young agents in Country ݅ = 1,2 and [0, 1] is the
unit interval. Uncertainty is considered by a continuum of equally likely states of nature such
that an intermediate sector ݆ א [0,݊௜ , 1] pays a positive return only in state ݆ and nothing
otherwise. In each country, larger sectors will open after smaller ones and, presumably, the
number of open projects in Country 1 is at least the same as in Country 2 (i.e. ݊ଵ ൒ ݊ଶ).
Since investing in a sector is equivalent to buying a basic Arrow security that pays in only
one state of nature, dropping ݐ (the time subscript) and ݄ (the agent indicator) for notational
convenience, the optimal portfolio problem of the agent ݄ is written as
maxிభ,ிమ,ீ,థభ,థమ ݊ଶ log ቂߩଵ(௤భ)(ܴܨଵ + ݎ߶ଵ) + ߩଶ(௤భ)(ܴܨଶ + ݎ߶ଶ)ቃ
+(݊ଵ െ ݊ଶ) log ቂߩଵ(௤మ)(ܴܩ + ݎ߶ଵ) + ߩଶ(௤మ)(ݎ߶ଶ)ቃ (A4.1)
+(1െ ݊ଵ) log ቂߩଵ(௤య)(ݎ߶ଵ) + ߩଶ(௤య)(ݎ߶ଶ)ቃ
subject to ݊ଶ(ܨଵ + ܨଶ) + (݊ଵ െ ݊ଶ)ܩ + ߶ଵ + ߶ଶ = ݏכ (A4.2)
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ܨ is the amount of savings invested in risky asset and ܨ௝ ൒ ܯ௝ = max ቄ0, ஽ଵିఊ (݆ െ ߛ)ቅ, whereܯ௝ is the minimum investment to ensure productivity or positive return and the expression on
the right hand side (RHS) is its distribution function. There is no minimum investment
requirement for the sectors to be open if they satisfy ݆ ൑ ߛ. For the rest of the sectors, the
minimum investment requirement increases linearly in ܦ (> 0), which captures the presence
of nonconvexities or indivisibilities that in turn shape the trade-off between insurance and
productivity or risk and return. ߶ is the amount of savings invested in safe asset that has a
nonstochastic gross rate of return ݎ (< ܴ), where ܴ is the rate of return on or payoff from the
investment in risky security. ߩ refers interchangeably to the price of intermediate goods, the
aggregate rate of return on safe and risky financial investments and the marginal product of
capital. As intermediate goods are nontradable (Asmp. ii), ߩଵ௝ ് ߩଶ௝ . Given that ݊ଵ ൒ ݊ଶ; if
the realized state of nature is ݆ א ݍଵ ؠ [0,݊ଶ], a risky investment in both countries will have
a positive payoff. If ݆ א ݍଶ ؠ [݊ଶ,݊ଵ], however, only risky investments in Country 1 will
have a positive payoff. Finally, if ݆ א ݍଷ ؠ [݊ଵ, 1], no risky projects will be successful. ܩ is
the amount of investment in risky assets of Country 1 such that ׊݄ and ׊݆, ݆ᇱ א [݊ଶ,݊ଵ],
there exists ܨଵ௝ = ܨଵ௝ᇲ ؠ ܩ. From the constraint, ݏכ is the optimal savings of the agent.
The equilibrium solutions can be characterized from the first order conditions of the form
௡మఘభ(೜భ)ோఘభ(೜భ)(ோிభା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜భ)(ோிమା௥థమ) = ߣ݊ଶ (A4.3)௡మఘమ(೜భ)ோఘభ(೜భ)(ோிభା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜భ)(ோிమା௥థమ) = ߣ݊ଶ (A4.4)
(௡భି௡మ)ఘభ(೜మ)ோఘభ(೜మ)(ோீା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜మ)(௥థమ) = ߣ(݊ଵ െ ݊ଶ) (A4.5)௡మఘభ(೜భ)௥ఘభ(೜భ)(ோிభା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜భ)(ோிమା௥థమ)+ (௡భି௡మ)ఘభ(೜మ)௥ఘభ(೜మ)(ோீା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜మ)(௥థమ)+ (ଵି௡భ)ఘభ(೜య)௥ఘభ(೜య)(௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜య)(௥థమ) = ߣ (A4.6)௡మఘమ(೜భ)௥ఘభ(೜భ)(ோிభା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜భ)(ோிమା௥థమ)+ (௡భି௡మ)ఘమ(೜మ)௥ఘభ(೜మ)(ோீା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜మ)(௥థమ)+ (ଵି௡భ)ఘమ(೜య)௥ఘభ(೜య)(௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜య)(௥థమ) = ߣ (A4.7)
Given that ݊ଶכ < 1, from (A4.3) and (A4.4) it follows that ߩଵ(௤భ) = ߩଶ(௤భ), henceܴܨଵ + ݎ߶ଵ = ܴܨଶ + ݎ߶ଶ (A4.8)
Using (A4.3)—(A4.5) to obtain the ratio
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ఘభ(೜భ)ఘభ(೜మ) = ఘభ(೜భ)(ோிభା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜భ)(ோிమା௥థమ)ఘభ(೜మ)(ோீା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜మ)(௥థమ) (A4.9)
Given the production function ܻ = ܣܭఈܮଵିఈ, factor prices ݓ = (1െ ߙ)ܣܭఈ as the wage
earning or returns to labour and ߩ = ߙܣܭఈିଵ as the marginal product of capital and optimal
savings ݏכ = ఉଵାఉ (1 െ ߙ)ܣܭఈ in addition to ݊ଶכ < 1, it follows from the law of decreasing
marginal returns to capital (DMRC) that there exists such a nontrivial relation (otherwise
contradiction arises); ߩଵ(௤మ) < ߩଵ(௤భ) = ߩଶ(௤భ) ؠ ߩ(௤భ), hence ܩכ > ܨଵכ, which is also the case
due to higher minimum size requirement (Asmp. iii). Observing now that ݎ߶ଶ < ܴܨଶ +ݎ߶ଶ = ܴܨଵ + ݎ߶ଵ, decreasing marginal productivity once again implies that ߩଶ(௤మ) > ߩଵ(௤భ) =ߩଶ(௤భ) ؠ ߩ(௤భ) > ߩଵ(௤మ). Finally, subtracting (A4.7) from (A4.6)
(௡భି௡మ)ఘభ(೜మ)(ோீା௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜మ)(௥థమ) ቀߩଵ(௤మ) െ ߩଶ(௤మ)ቁ = (ଵି௡భ)ఘభ(೜య)(௥థభ)ାఘమ(೜య)(௥థమ) ቀߩଶ(௤య) െ ߩଵ(௤య)ቁ (A4.10)
From ߩଵ(௤మ) < ߩଶ(௤మ) it follows that ߩଶ(௤య) < ߩଵ(௤య) which, in turn, implies by DMRC that߶ଶכ > ߶ଵכ (A4.11)
Since the optimal condition was ܴܨଵ + ݎ߶ଵ = ܴܨଶ + ݎ߶ଶ, it finally provesܩכ > ܨଵכ > ܨଶכ (A4.12)
Equation (A4.8) shows that the marginal product of capital or return on financial
investments is equal across countries (no matter whether they are rich or poor) for the
equilibrium subset of states ݍଵכ ؠ [0,݊ଶכ], where the size of open sectors and the level of
associated investments are lower. The eleventh equation implies that the insurance role of the
safe asset is more important in Country 2 than in Country 1, so the risk free investments are
higher in the poorer country. Ultimately, the inequality in Equation (A4.12) means that larger
scale and risky financial investments (ܩכand ܨଵכ) are higher in the richer country. Because the
return on risky assets is greater than the return on safe assets (i.e. ܴ > ݎ) and risky asset
purchases increase with the size and number of open sectors within the countries, risky
financial investments are more significant than safe ones. In other words, what is meant by
international capital flows are essentially those risky financial investments that are promoted
by return and diversification motives and take place across countries. Figure A4.1 sketches
the resulting aggregate equilibrium capital flows in this two-country world. Both equilibrium
solutions at time ݐ (recall that the time subscripts were dropped) and their aggregate images
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in the figure (areas within the solid lines) demonstrate that more capital flows to the richer
country in the short-run.
Figure A4.1: International Capital Flows in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)
ܨଵ௝௪ Country 1 ܨଶ௝௪ Country 2ܯ௝ ܯ௝ܦ ܦܩכ௪ܨଵכ௪ ܨଶכ௪
ߛ ݊ଶכ ݊ଵכ 1 ݆,݊ ߛ ݊ଶכ 1 ݆,݊
This open economy model of optimal portfolio choice provides an alternative approach to
the direction and allocation of international capital, which is different than the approaches
previously considered. The model offers a time-dependent explanation and implies that the
neoclassical view, that the new financial investments will accrue to poorer economies, can
only be achieved in the long-run. In the short-run and under the governing assumptions of
micro-level nonconvexities (or indivisibilities) and uncertainty, it expects the foreign capital
to be destined to richer economies. Hence, there would be no paradox in such circumstances.
In this chapter, where we extend the analysis of the preceding chapter with a different data
and methodology, we find it relevant and appropriate to additionally consider the model of
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). Using five-year panel data for 47 developing countries
(including the richer emerging market economies) over 1980-2006, we test if including a
measure for institutional quality resolves the Lucas paradox or is it their prediction that holds
in the short-run.
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APPENDIX 4.2: DIFFERENCE GMM ESTIMATIONS
Table A4.1: Difference GMM Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average per capita
equity flows, ݐ െ 1 0.638**(0.268) 0.537**(0.259) 0.492**(0.244) 0.624**(0.248) 0.501**(0.227) 0.493**(0.206)
Average per capita
equity flows, ݐ െ 2 -0.312(0.202) -0.260(0.192) -0.219(0.182) -0.272(0.196) -0.226(0.171) -0.205(0.171)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.151
(0.251)
-0.0050
(0.256)
-0.0331
(0.347)
-0.149
(0.341)
Average institutional
quality
0.214***
(0.056)
0.172***
(0.062)
0.179***
(0.057)
0.159***
(0.055)
Log average per capita
GDP (PPP$)
0.261
(0.275)
Log average years
of schooling
0.426
(0.439)
0.262
(0.409)
0.226
(0.295)
Log average
distance
– –
Log average
remoteness
0.0397
(1.591)
1.374
(1.905)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.298
(0.296)
-0.262
(0.315)
Log per capita initial
GDP (2005 US$)
0.172
(0.145)
Observations 184 182 182 184 182 182
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47࢓૚ (࢖-value) 0.028 0.040 0.042 0.027 0.036 0.036࢓૛ (࢖-value) 0.810 0.689 0.515 0.678 0.632 0.569ࡴࢇ࢔࢙ࢋ࢔ ࡶ (࢖-value) 0.624 0.542 0.587 0.654 0.591 0.587
Notes: See notes to 4.10 and 4.11.
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Table A4.2: Difference GMM Regressions of Capital Inflows per Capita, 5-Year Panel Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average per capita
equity flows, ݐ െ 1 0.523*(0.262) 0.570**(0.256) 0.236(0.639) 0.483***(0.170) 0.476(0.341) 0.327(0.347)
Average per capita
equity flows, ݐ െ 2 -0.261(0.193) -0.224(0.193) -0.0827(0.273) -0.279(0.168) -0.348(0.309) -0.397(0.293)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.0615
(0.249)
0.110
(0.260)
0.314
(0.562)
0.0654
(0.544)
-0.0448
(0.680)
Average institutional
quality
0.224***
(0.059)
0.240***
(0.064)
0.166**
(0.070)
0.214***
(0.055)
0.237***
(0.073)
0.226***
(0.077)
Log average trade
openness
-0.270
(0.231)
Log average deposit
money bank assets
-0.164
(0.135)
Log average
TFP growth
0.0182
(0.020)
Log per capita initial
GCF (2005 $US)
-0.0054
(0.096)
Malaria contagion
risk
–
Log average Int'l
voice traffic
0.165
(0.103)
Observations 182 166 139 181 139 112
Countries 47 46 39 47 47 45࢓૚ (࢖-value) 0.042 0.040 0.325 0.017 0.120 0.146࢓૛ (࢖-value) 0.757 0.441 0.668 0.703 0.561 0.904ࡴࢇ࢔࢙ࢋ࢔ ࡶ (࢖-value) 0.512 0.604 0.561 0.613 0.516 0.549
Notes: See notes to 4.10 and 4.11.
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APPENDIX 4.3: STATIC AND DYNAMIC PANEL ESTIMATIONS FOR THE MAIN
CAPITAL FLOW COMPONENTS
Table A4.3: Static Panel Regressions of Capital Flow Components, 5-Year Panel Data
A. Equity Components
FDI FPEI
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.622***
(0.165)
0.423***
(0.130)
0.558***
(0.181)
0.0556***
(0.018)
0.0469***
(0.014)
0.0486***
(0.012)
Average institutional
quality
0.160**
(0.060)
0.0663
(0.077)
0.0142
(0.009)
0.0190*
(0.010)
Log average years of
schooling
-0.364
(0.262)
0.00111
(0.021)
Log average
distance
—
-0.237
(0.429)
Log average
remoteness
4.803***
(1.569)
0.365
(0.422)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.494*
(0.268)
0.114**
(0.049)
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47
R
2
_Overall 0.336 0.395 0.129 0.0838 0.0903 0.134
Sargan-Hansen OIR
Test (࢖-value) & Model 0.000FEM 0.005FEM 0.000FEM 0.260REM 0.125REM 0.434REM
B. Debt Components
LTDEBT STDEBT
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.515**
(0.222)
0.524**
(0.220)
0.376
(0.281)
0.128
(0.093)
0.128
(0.091)
0.181*
(0.100)
Average institutional
quality
0.0562
(0.070)
0.0461
(0.073)
-0.00511
(0.033)
-0.0236
(0.034)
Log average years of
schooling
-0.758*
(0.391)
0.0537
(0.181)
Log average
distance
— —
Log average
remoteness
-3.776
(2.858)
0.122
(1.085)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.163
(0.206)
-0.239*
(0.135)
Observations 229 229 229 229 229 229
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47
R
2
_Overall 0.328 0.332 0.00143 0.0827 0.0813 0.0993
Sargan-Hansen OIR
Test (࢖-value) & Model 0.235FEM 0.000FEM 0.000FEM —FEM —FEM —FEM
Notes: Unlike Table A3.1, dependent variables are averaged over 5-year windows here. Unreported constant
and time dummies included in all estimations. The dash “—” signifies unavailability of either the relevant
regressor due to perfect collinearity or the Sargan-Hansen over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test.
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Table A4.4: System GMM Regressions of Equity Flow Components, 5-Year Panel Data
FDI FPEI
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Average per capita
FDI | FPEI, ݐ െ 1 0.563***(0.144) 0.519***(0.163) 0.486**(0.182) 0.424***(0.098) 0.422***(0.093) 0.402***(0.096)
Average per capita
FDI | FPEI, ݐ െ 2 -0.247(0.182) -0.236(0.167) -0.209(0.150) 0.391(0.414) 0.346(0.366) 0.374(0.323)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.326***
(0.070)
0.188***
(0.059)
0.173**
(0.081)
0.00313
(0.026)
0.00257
(0.018)
-0.00737
(0.026)
Average institutional
quality
0.161***
(0.030)
0.120***
(0.027)
0.00381
(0.010)
0.0124
(0.009)
Log average years of
schooling
0.0189
(0.087)
0.0189
(0.022)
Log average
distance
-1.252
(1.603)
-0.708*
(0.416)
Log average
remoteness
1.136
(1.648)
0.775*
(0.422)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.321
(0.266)
0.122*
(0.061)
Observations 229 229 229 229 229 229
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47࢓૚ (࢖-value) 0.0253 0.0320 0.0334 0.144 0.135 0.123࢓૛ (࢖-value) 0.782 0.774 0.739 0.406 0.443 0.381ࡴࢇ࢔࢙ࢋ࢔ ࡶ (࢖-value) 0.765 0.569 0.579 0.598 0.707 0.663
Notes: All specifications comprise finite-sample adjustment, two-step estimator optimization, and collapsed
GMM-style instruments. Unreported constant and time dummies included in all estimations. ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ are the
Arellano-Bond tests for first order and second order autocorrelations in the residuals while ܪܽ݊ݏ݁݊ ܬ is the test
of over-identifying restrictions for all the model instruments. Because sample size is not an entirely well-defined
concept in system GMM which effectively runs on two samples (in levels and in first-differences)
simultaneously, we report the size of the untransformed (level) sample. Windmeijer’s finite-sample corrected
cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively. The first two explanatory variables are first and second lags of the corresponding
dependent variable. See also notes to Table A4.3.
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Table A4.5: System GMM Regressions of Debt Flow Components, 5-Year Panel Data
LTDEBT STDEBT
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Average per capita
LTDEBT | STDEBT, ݐ െ 1 0.0582(0.080) 0.0610(0.091) 0.0650(0.096) -0.0990(0.066) -0.0885(0.065) -0.125(0.080)
Average per capita
LTDEBT | STDEBT, ݐ െ 2 -0.108(0.078) -0.117(0.086) -0.132(0.084) -0.0693*(0.039) -0.0670(0.044) -0.0714(0.044)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.371***
(0.083)
0.335***
(0.082)
0.372***
(0.099)
0.142***
(0.026)
0.118***
(0.027)
0.0909***
(0.031)
Average institutional
quality
0.0562
(0.066)
0.0505
(0.063)
0.0388
(0.024)
0.0285
(0.022)
Log average years of
schooling
-0.103
(0.102)
0.0490
(0.054)
Log average
distance
0.935
(1.647)
-0.142
(0.794)
Log average
remoteness
-0.995
(1.632)
0.0995
(0.829)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.160
(0.269)
-0.210***
(0.069)
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 225
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47࢓૚ (࢖-value) 0.0442 0.0386 0.0324 0.0148 0.0140 0.0167࢓૛ (࢖-value) 0.0548 0.0579 0.0746 0.855 0.851 0.864ࡴࢇ࢔࢙ࢋ࢔ ࡶ (࢖-value) 0.0593 0.0505 0.0556 0.408 0.498 0.557
Notes: See notes to Table A4.4.
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Table A4.6: Difference GMM Regressions of Equity Components, 5-Year Panel Data
FDI FPEI
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Average per capita
FDI | FPEI, ݐ െ 1 0.567**(0.255) 0.469*(0.251) 0.424*(0.238) -0.309*(0.171) -0.289(0.265) -0.178(0.424)
Average per capita
FDI | FPEI, ݐ െ 2 -0.259(0.203) -0.222(0.193) -0.239(0.172) -0.430(0.322) -0.391(0.463) -0.299(0.524)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.232
(0.211)
0.104
(0.205)
0.167
(0.276)
-0.0355
(0.108)
-0.0556
(0.117)
-0.0422
(0.114)
Average institutional
quality
0.180***
(0.042)
0.149***
(0.048)
0.0200
(0.026)
0.0101
(0.017)
Log average years of
schooling
-0.321
(0.292)
0.149
(0.452)
Log average
distance
— —
Log average
remoteness
-0.667
(1.642)
1.023*
(0.534)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.492
(0.317)
0.0178
(0.094)
Observations 184 182 182 184 182 182
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47࢓૚ (࢖-value) 0.0485 0.0660 0.0567 0.223 0.341 0.397࢓૛ (࢖-value) 0.796 0.704 0.830 0.673 0.775 0.801ࡴࢇ࢔࢙ࢋ࢔ ࡶ (࢖-value) 0.604 0.508 0.488 0.587 0.399 0.518
Notes: See notes to Table A4.4.
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Table A4.7: Difference GMM Regressions of Debt Components, 5-Year Panel Data
LTDEBT STDEBT
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Average per capita
LTDEBT | STDEBT, ݐ െ 1 0.198**(0.083) 0.204**(0.094) 0.179*(0.091) -0.134***(0.046) -0.112**(0.048) -0.145**(0.063)
Average per capita
LTDEBT | STDEBT, ݐ െ 2 -0.141*(0.074) -0.139*(0.081) -0.162*(0.081) -0.0344(0.042) -0.0308(0.050) -0.0593(0.063)
Log per capita initial
GDP (PPP$)
0.708**
(0.328)
0.713**
(0.331)
0.723*
(0.416)
0.252
(0.168)
0.247
(0.168)
0.296*
(0.170)
Average institutional
quality
0.0753
(0.095)
0.0728
(0.104)
0.0520
(0.035)
0.0428
(0.034)
Log average years of
schooling
-0.405
(0.602)
0.277
(0.273)
Log average
distance
— —
Log average
remoteness
-1.411
(3.074)
0.605
(1.281)
Average restrictions
to capital mobility
-0.0882
(0.450)
-0.337***
(0.120)
Observations 180 178 178 180 178 178
Countries 46 46 46 46 46 46࢓૚ (࢖-value) 0.0167 0.0164 0.0118 0.0105 0.0113 0.00837࢓૛ (࢖-value) 0.106 0.105 0.120 0.696 0.713 0.860ࡴࢇ࢔࢙ࢋ࢔ ࡶ (࢖-value) 0.218 0.158 0.134 0.537 0.621 0.464
Notes: See notes to Table A4.4.
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APPENDIX 4.4: THE INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY (POLITICAL RISK) INDEX
AND ITS COMPONENTS
The ICRG political risk rating which enters under the guise of institutional quality variable
into both investigations has been generated through summing up the individual weights of the
components below.
(1) Government Stability: The sum of ratings assigned to three subcomponents of
government unity, legislative strength, and popular support; each with a maximum score of 4
points and a minimum score of 0 points. It is an overall evaluation of a government’s ability
to stay in the office, and its ability to execute its declared programs.
(2) Socioeconomic Conditions: The sum of ratings assigned to three subcomponents of
unemployment, consumer confidence, and poverty; each with a maximum score of 4 points
and a minimum score of 0 points. It is an overall evaluation of the socioeconomic pressures at
work in a society that could restrain government action or ferment social dissatisfaction.
(3) Investment Profile: The sum of ratings assigned to three subcomponents of contract
viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays; each with a maximum score
of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points. It is an overall evaluation of the factors putting
investment in a country at risk that are not contained by other political, economic, and
financial risk components.
(4) Internal Conflict: The sum of ratings assigned to three subcomponents of civil
war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence, and civil disorder; each with a maximum score
of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points. It is an overall evaluation of the actual or
potential impact of political violence on governance in a country.
(5) External Conflict: The sum of ratings assigned to three subcomponents of war, cross-
border conflict, and foreign pressures; each with a maximum score of 4 points and a
minimum score of 0 points. It is an overall evaluation both of the risk to incumbent
government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic
pressures, aid withholdings, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, embargos etc.) to
violent external force (cross-border conflicts to all out war).
(6) Corruption: Evaluation of actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favour-for-favours, secret party funding, and
suspiciously close ties between politics and business such as demands for special payments
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and bribes connected with import and export licences, exchange controls, tax assessments,
police protection, or loans. The assigned rating array is 0-6.
(7) Military in Politics: Evaluation of actual or potential military involvement in the
politics and governance of a country from de facto influence to full-fledged regime. The
assigned rating array is 0-6.
(8) Religious Tensions: Evaluation of the risk of dominating society and governance by a
single religious group that aims to replace civil law by religious law and to keep out other
religions from the political and social affairs. The assigned rating array is 0-6.
(9) Law and Order: The sum of ratings assigned separately to law, and order; each with a
maximum score of 3 points and a minimum score of 0 points. The Order subcomponent is an
evaluation of popular observance of the law whereas the Law subcomponent is an assessment
of the strength and impartiality of the legal system.
(10) Ethnic Tensions: Evaluation of the extent of racial, national, or linguistic tensions
within a country . The assigned rating array is 0-6.
(11) Democratic Accountability: Evaluation of the degree of governmental responsiveness
to public citizens through either alternating democracy, dominating democracy, de facto one-
party state, de jure one-party state, or autarchy. The assigned rating array is 0-6.
(12) Bureaucratic Quality: Evaluation of the risk level of policy revisions in daily
administrative functions when governments change. The assigned rating array is 0-4.
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APPENDIX 4.5: COMMON DATA AND SAMPLES IN CHAPTERS 3 AND 4
Figure A4.2: Total Equity Inflows by Sub-periods, 1970-2006
Notes: Partial equivalent of Figure 1 in Alfaro et al. (2008) to illustrate that the data for developing countries
therein are very similar to ours, albeit some source and manipulation differences like using different base years
etc. Data are for 47 developing countries and cross country summed per capita totals averaged over the
corresponding time periods only. Total equity inflows are the sum of net annual liability balances for foreign
portfolio equity and direct investments across all sample countries.
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Table A4.8: Country Samples
Baseline Sample IV Regressions Sample
Algeria Kenya Algeria Mexico
Argentina Malawi Argentina Nicaragua
Bangladesh Malaysia Bangladesh Niger
Bolivia Mali Bolivia Pakistan
Botswana Mexico Brazil Panama
Brazil Nicaragua Cameroon Papua New Guinea
Bulgaria Niger Chile Paraguay
Cameroon Pakistan China Peru
Chile Panama Colombia Senegal
China Papua New Guinea Costa Rica South Africa
Colombia Paraguay Dominican Republic Sri Lanka
Costa Rica Peru Ecuador Thailand
Dominican Republic Philippines Egypt Tunisia
Ecuador Senegal El Salvador Uruguay
Egypt South Africa Ghana Venezuela
El Salvador Sri Lanka Guatemala
Ghana Thailand Guyana
Guatemala Tunisia Honduras
Guyana Turkey India
Honduras Uruguay Indonesia
India Venezuela Jamaica
Indonesia Zambia Kenya
Jamaica Zimbabwe Malaysia
Jordan Mali
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CHAPTER 5
TAXI, TAKEOFF AND LANDING: BEHAVIOURAL
PATTERNS OF CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING
MARKET ECONOMIES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
“The loans from creditor countries . . . begin with modest amounts, then increase
and proceed crescendo. They are likely to be made in exceptionally larger
amounts toward the culminating stage of a period of activity and speculative
upswing, and during that stage become larger from month to month so long as the
upswing continues. With the advent of crises, they are at once cut down sharply,
even cease entirely.”—Taussig (1927, quoted in Dornbusch, 2002, p. 745).
International capital mobility is a crucial theme in open economy macroeconomics. It has
been treated within different theoretical and empirical frameworks under monetary, fiscal,
financial, trade, growth and development economics with a global outlook. Foreign capital
flows to emerging market economies, despite being underweighted (a lower share than
expected) in international portfolios (Tesar, 1999, Sarno and Taylor, 1999a), constitute an
integral part of that broad topic of economic research.
Starting from the late 1950s and increasing in subsequent decades, convertibility-led
monetary interdependence and the emergence of international banking consortia through
formation of multinational syndicates facilitated the vast expansion of international financial
transactions predominantly across the developed country markets. These developments in the
core (i.e. the advanced world) have enabled the cross-border financial investments to
materialize in the periphery (i.e. the developing and emerging world). After the dissolution of
the Bretton Woods system onwards, according to the observed realizations, external funding
to emerging markets have followed three recurring phases: crawling initially (the taxi phase)
then having surges (the takeoff phase) and finally ending up with either soft or hard declines
(the landing phase).
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In conjunction with the controversies on financial liberalization, deregulation, opening-up,
globalization and integration, it is argued that there are pros and cons of capital flows to
emerging economies. Besides their direct function in financing current account imbalances,
potential benefits include investment inducement, growth acceleration, consumption
smoothing, competitiveness gain, macroeconomic discipline reinforcement, financial system
efficiency and stability enhancement, risk sharing and diversification (see Agénor, 2003,
Stulz, 1999, Tesar, 1999). In contrast, rather than financing and reconciling current account
imbalances, capital inflows are blamed for enlarging the deficits even further and making
them unsustainable by aggravating economic overheating (WEO, 2007). Among others,
Obstfeld (1985, 2009) views capital inflows as a ‘problem’ claiming that stabilization
programmes based on fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes give rise to excess capital
inflows which magnify real exchange rate appreciations as well as macroeconomic instability
and add to deterioration of economic fundamentals through inflationary pressures.40
These problems are closely related to the first generation financial crisis models
(Krugman, 1979, Flood and Garber, 1984). They propose that macro-structural rudiments that
are weakened by external and internal over-expansions, due to risen foreign financing, trigger
a deterministic process of speculative attacks against international reserves. This process
ultimately leads to reserve depletions and currency collapses. Building on an explanation of
this type, Sachs et al. (1996) show that excessive capital inflows make a financial crisis more
likely. Other negative side-effects attributed to capital flows are asset price bubbles (Sarno
and Taylor, 1999b), contagion and spillovers (Obstfeld, 1996, Calvo and Mendoza, 2000),
transmission of foreign shocks and monetary instability under the compromised policy mix of
the central bank (Hermalin and Rose, 1999). Some argue that the size and liquidity of
international capital markets create the potential for self-fulfilling speculative attacks and that
financial movements across those markets are subject to animal spirits and investor
sentiments which characterize surges of panics and manias or euphoria and despair.41
Frankel and Wei (2005) and Kose et al. (2009) conclude that the evidence on advantages
and disadvantages of international financial liberalization, capital market integration and
40 Not just in case of emerging and developing countries but also for advanced nations capital flows are, at
times, regarded as troublesome. The following excerpt (from a speech of the former US president, Bill Clinton)
in Karolyi (2004) exemplifies this: “...it is now time for the world to take the next steps of implementing a new
financial architecture and long-term reform of the global financial system. This should include steps to reduce
the entire financial system’s vulnerability to rapid capital flows...”
41 See McKinnon and Pill (1998), Kindleberger and Aliber (2005).
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capital flows is mixed and inconclusive. This inconclusiveness arises from a kind of ‘one size
fits all’ conduct, which entails the use of total (gross or net) capital flows in studying these
issues (as well as the issue of Lucas paradox). Hence, total capital flows should be
disentangled into appropriate components to ensure an accurate, convincing and conclusive
analysis. Furthermore, behavioural patterns of those components should be illuminated for
better understanding and effective management.
In the literature, there are theoretical and applied treatments that consider compositional
and behavioural aspects of international financial movements. Modelling financial
development and instability in open economies, Aghion et al. (2004) suggest that unrestricted
and infinitely elastic foreign direct investment (FDI, as a substitute for domestic investment),
acts countercyclically and stabilizes the economy. Foreign credit, on the contrary, is a highly
procyclical funding source that—by having knock-on effects on the domestic credit
expansion—destabilizes the economy. Envisaged as a part of or an addition to the equity of
domestic firms, restricted and finitely elastic FDI (which may well be interpreted as portfolio
equity-like FDI or directly as foreign portfolio equity investment that complements the
domestic investment) may also cause aggregate instability. Agénor and Aizenman (1998) and
Aizenman and Powell (2003) conjecture that amplified volatility in cross-border lending (i.e.
random shifts in external factors acting as aggregate contagious ‘shocks’ to productivity)
increases financial spreads and the producer cost of capital, resulting in higher incidence of
default, lower employment and welfare losses. Empirically, transitory and volatile portfolio
inflows are detected to have negative impacts on future returns (Froot et al., 2001) and new
investment spending of private firms (Demir, 2009). The volatility of FDI is predicted to
decrease economic growth (Lensink and Morrissey, 2006).42
On the other hand, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) take a holistic approach while
focusing on the behavioural side of capital flows. They show that excessive capital flow
volatility leads to real and financial asset price bubbles which expose the emerging country to
bubble-bursts and funding reversals. Financial crises are preceded by volatile capital flows
resulting from information frictions and default problems in Chari and Kehoe (2003).
42 There are also policy prescriptions to contain and control volatility and speculative activity in international
financial markets and capital flows. In his presidential address at the conference of the Eastern Economic
Association in 1978, Washington DC; James Tobin proposed a tax (credited to him as ‘Tobin tax’) on capital
market transactions to mitigate excess fluctuations and stampedes across the markets and thus to serve as ‘sand
in the wheels’ of international finance. Tobin (1978) and Eichengreen et al. (1995) formalize the idea, while
Uppal (2011) reviews its costs and benefits. Recently, José Manuel Barroso, European Commission president,
has called for a tax for similar purposes on financial transactions throughout the European Union or at least for
the Euro Zone (Financial Times, September 28, 2011).
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Besides, the notion of ‘capital flow volatility’ is interchangeably used with the term ‘sudden
stops in capital flows’ by Jeanne and Ranciére (2011), and likewise, with the concept
‘financial crises’—both of which are linked to investor herding—by Chari and Kehoe (2004).
From this perspective, any comment on sudden stops, reversals and financial (banking and
currency) crises could be ascribed to capital flow volatility and contagion.
Mendoza (2010) hypothesizes that hampered access to working capital financing, due to
sudden stops in capital inflows, induces contractions in factor allocations (e.g. heightens
unemployment) and production. Popularizing the term ‘sudden stop’, Calvo (1998) argues
that sudden stops cause insolvency, lower the productivity of physical and human capital and
engender across-the-board bankruptcies after sharp and unexpected changes in relative prices.
Forbes and Warnock (2011) demonstrate that the depressed capital flow episodes (i.e. sudden
stops and retrenchments) are more prone to contagion than the normal episodes of surges and
flights. Employment and output costs of sudden stops and financial crises are documented in
Hutchison and Noy (2005, 2006) and Bordo (2008).
Some applied works have adopted direct approaches to compositional and behavioural
dynamics of international capital flows. Employing univariate time series data on five
industrial and five developing countries, Claessens et al. (1995) discover that long-term
funding components are at least as volatile and unpredictable as short-term components.
Hence, the data labels ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ do not signal any information about the
time series properties of the component in question. Sarno and Taylor (1999a) find relatively
low permanent components in portfolio and official flows and high permanent components in
commercial bank lending, while FDI flows are detected to be almost entirely permanent. For
nine emerging East Asian economies plus Japan and Australia, Sarno and Taylor (1999b)
report similar findings. Using group medians and means instead of individual time series for
the countries from all income levels, Levchenko and Mauro (2007) show that there are
limited differences across types of flow with respect to volatility, persistence, cross-country
comovement and correlation with growth. Nevertheless, striking differences are explored
around the sudden stop episodes: FDI is the most stable, portfolio flows undergo quickly
recovering reversals whereas bank loans and trade credits tumble severely and stay depressed
for some time. Albeit providing useful insights about the characteristics of various forms of
capital movements, these studies have some shortcomings. There are inconsistencies and lack
of clarity in sampling (often whether the data are monthly, quarterly or annual is unclear),
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definition (distinguishing the series as net or gross is arbitrary), measurement and scaling of
the data used.
Our goal in this investigation is to draw on the literature to elucidate the behavioural
features of the main capital flow components by testing directly the conventional wisdom and
the predictions from information-based trade-off model. Summarized in Claessens et al.
(1995), conventional wisdom implies that short-term, as labelled on some balance of
payments accounts, capital flows (short-term debt and portfolio equity) that are influenced by
market sentiment are inherently speculative ‘hot’ money sources. Conversely, long-term
flows (FDI and long-term debt) that are determined by structural factors are considered stable
‘cold’ money sources. According to the information-based trade-off model of Goldstein and
Razin (2006), equity flows are expected to see lower reversals (FDI least and portfolio equity
less) and hence they are more persistent and predictable. Liquid debt flows, however, are
predicted to go through higher incidence of sudden stops. In order to analyze these maturity
(short-term—long-term) and structure (debt—equity) distinctions and thus to provide cogent
evidence from the case studies we identify four capital flow types: foreign direct investment,
foreign portfolio equity investment, long-term debt and short-term debt. Since this is
projected as an event study, each annual time series of those components for twelve emerging
market countries from five regions over 1970-2006 constitutes a different sample.
Extending earlier papers and systematically testing the hypotheses that distinguish external
funding components according to maturity vs. structure, we will also be answering the
following questions: (i) Is the increase in identified forms of capital flows part of a long-run
trend toward greater international diversification and risk sharing or is it simply a short-run
phenomenon that could reverse suddenly? (ii) Do foreign investors take a long horizon in
making their investments or are they in pursuit of short-run capital gains? (iii) Are there
systematic differences across the funding components, countries and regions within the
answers to (i) and (ii)?
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 sets out the hypotheses to be
tested and Section 5.3 devises the methodology. Data and measurement issues are discussed
in Section 5.4, while Section 5.5 delves into realized fluctuations of the basic external
financing components. Section 5.6 deals with the process modelling and forecasting, as
correlations and comovements are considered in Section 5.7. Volume, volatility and sudden
stop linkages are probed in Section 5.8 and Section 5.9 assembles final remarks.
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5.2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Claessens et al. (1995) argue that there is a conventional wisdom shaped by common
beliefs about the behavioural patterns of different forms of international capital flows. Some
accounting labels in the balance of payments and some time series tags in other databases
(e.g. WDI and GDF of the World Bank) also reflect this understanding. The approach is that
there is a distinction between foreign financing components as short-term and long-term.
Short-term capital flows which include debt bearing money market securities and loans with
a maturity of one year or less and foreign portfolio equity investment (FPEI) are regarded as
inherently volatile and speculative hot money (i.e. funding sources that react to changes in
expected risk and return, investor psychology and exchange rate differentials) that are also
highly reversible and susceptible to sudden stops.43 On the contrary, long-term capital flows
including bonds and loans with a maturity of more than one year and foreign direct
investment (FDI) are construed as intrinsically stable and predictable cold money (i.e.
funding sources that respond to slow-moving structural factors and economic fundamentals)
which are rather irreversible and immune to sudden stops. Therefore, the hypotheses pertinent
to the so called conventional wisdom can be stipulated as:ܪ1 ׷= Short-term debt flows (STDEBT) and FPEI are more volatile than long-term debt
flows (LTDEBT) and FDI.ܪ2 ׷= FDI and LTDEBT are more persistent and predictable than FPEI and STDEBT.ܪ3 ׷= FPEI and STDEBT are less strongly correlated and comoving than FDI and
LTDEBT.ܪ4 ׷= FDI and LTDEBT are less prone to sudden stops than FPEI and STDEBT.
In their comprehensive model of information-based trade-off among foreign financing
components Goldstein and Razin (2006) show that if FDI and FPEI coexist in the equilibrium
then, on average, the expected liquidity needs of FPEI investors are higher than the expected
liquidity needs of FDI investors.44 This implies that the withdrawal rate of FPEI is higher
43 The view that FPEI is reckoned as a kind of short term capital flow could be traced in Stulz (1999) who states
that in a positive feedback trading prevalent stock market environment highly liquid short-term financial
instruments are open to volatility spawning speculative trading. Also see Sachs et al. (1996) as well as ‘hot
money’ on Wikipedia.
44 Information asymmetries in the model are envisaged to take place at two stages. At first stage there is a
principal-agent kind of information asymmetry that exists between entrepreneurs and managers where the level
of ownership reduces the costs and improves efficiency by mitigating the effects of information failures. The
second stage information asymmetry arises between the current owner and the potential buyer when the former
happens to sell prior to the maturity. The investor liquidity needs and preferences, instead of market conditions,
determine the ‘liquidity shocks’ definition of the paper.
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than that of FDI, resulting in greater volatility of the former relative to the latter. It is also
proposed that as the investor heterogeneity in terms of the degree of being sensitive to
liquidity shocks increases, a separating equilibrium—with a large difference between the
withdrawal rates and volatilities of FDI and FPEI—becomes more likely. They finally
suggest that, albeit not explicitly formulated but deduced from the model, debt instruments
are anticipated to attract investors with even higher liquidity needs so such capital
movements face the highest withdrawal frequencies and severest fluctuations. This is because
the return on debt is expected to be less sensitive to liquidity shocks as asymmetric
information problems do not depress the secondary market price of debt. Thus, a pecking
order among the capital flow components is established in the sense that there is an equity-
debt distinction following the subordinate differentiation within equity flows.45 Then, the
information-based trade-off hypotheses are:ܪ5 ׷= STDEBT and LTDEBT are more volatile than FPEI and FDI.ܪ6 ׷= FDI and FPEI are more persistent and predictable than LTDEBT and STDEBT.ܪ7 ׷= LTDEBT and STDEBT are less strongly correlated and comoving than FDI and
FPEI.ܪ8 ׷= FDI and FPEI are less prone to sudden stops than LTDEBT an STDEBT.
It is straightforward to notice that in both explanations (ܪ1െܪ4 vs. ܪ5െ ܪ8) short-term
debt flows and FDI always lie at the opposite sides, whilst FPEI and long-term debt flows
shift their positions. The hypotheses above will be tested with respect to volatility,
persistence, predictability, correlation, comovement (or contagion risk) and incidence of
sudden stop in turn.
Under the Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) model of overshooting effects of
deterministic liberalization, it is also expected that all funding types indicate some degree of
permanence as the market reforms and liberalizations giving rise to these flows are
themselves predominantly permanent events.
5.3 METHODOLOGY
It is widely accepted that a consistent measure for the true volatility of a time series is not
readily available yet. This might partly be due to varying definitions and use of the concept of
45 Under the assumptions of financial frictions and partial inalienability, Albuquerque (2003) offers an FDI–non-
FDI dichotomy for capital flow volatility profiles.
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volatility and partly because of the contingent or context-dependent nature of the current
measures of volatility.46 Hence, we consider feasible alternatives to identify consistent
regularities in the realized volatility patterns of univariate time series of capital flow
components and to assess ܪ1 and ܪ5. For the original series we calculate standard deviations
and coefficients of variation as a preliminary exercise. The latter is used only as a
complementary measure to the former because we are interested in absolute volatility more
than the relative one.47 The other reason for considering standard deviation as the favourite
volatility measure is that comparing flow components pairwise within each country is
prioritised to comparing them across countries and regions which are not collectively
exhaustive.
Following the practice in World Bank (2005) we further decompose the series into trend
and cyclical components by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, taking the penalty parameter asɉ = 6.25 in accordance with the frequency power rule of Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Realized
fluctuations are measured through standard deviations of the cyclical components of these
filtered series. The last method is preferred as it is sort of a Bayesian approach, similar to the
one that Aizenman and Pinto (2005) mention, whereby the relatively more predictable and
persistent trend component of the underlying variable is abstracted from the unanticipated
cyclical (stochastic or random) component whose volatility is deemed to capture pure risk or
uncertainty and to constitute a shock as conceived in Agénor and Aizenman (1998).48 This is
tantamount to a quasi detrended fluctuation analysis (Peng et al., 1994) by which we seek to
eliminate the effects of potential nonstationarities and long-range dependence in the data—
due to high volume, magnitude or scaling—so as to gauge true volatility without necessarily
modelling it.
We formally test the difference between realized volatilities (i.e. standard deviations) of
the actual and detrended capital flow series using Brown-Forsythe variance equality test
(Brown and Forsythe, 1974) where the sample sizes are taken into account too. This test is
chosen among the alternatives since it is found to be superior in terms of robustness and
power even when the population means are unknown (Conover et al., 1981). Various line
46 For instance, Liu et al. (1999) quantify volatility by logarithmic growth rates of the series.
47 Cox and Sadiraj (2010) argue that the coefficient of variation has poor normative and descriptive performance
in risk appraisal and Polly (1998) shows that there is size-related bias in the coefficient of variation. See also
Sørensen (2002).
48 Volatility of the cyclical component obtained from the partitioning through HP filter could also be seen
analogous to the random component in Chari and Kehoe (2003) and stochastic component in Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997).
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plots and bar charts are also depicted to show the evolution of volatilities through time, over
sub-periods and across countries and regions.
We carry forward the behavioural analysis by undertaking process modelling to explore
stationarity and persistence properties of capital flow series in question. ADF (Dickey and
Fuller, 1979), PP (Phillips and Perron, 1988) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) unit root
tests are performed to determine the order of integration and hence to decide whether a series
is stationary. The limitation is that possible outliers or breaks in the series (especially if early
or late in the sample period) could engender low power in these tests. Following this, an
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model is fitted to the data along with a
general-to-specific specification search strategy. Impulse response function diagnostics from
these data generating processes (DGPs) are derived to provide secondary line of evidence on
the degree of permanence of the time series. Furthermore, a standard ARIMA(1,0,0) model is
regressed over 1970-2003 and 3-year ahead (2004-2006) dynamic out-of-sample forecasts are
obtained from this estimation. Predictability conditions of capital flow components are, then,
assessed with an explicit recourse to mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and Theil
inequality coefficient (TIC); the favoured statistics as they are scale-independent absolute
measures. These statistical practices are to test the second and the sixth hypothesis.
By employing pooled data and individual country samples we compute simple pairwise
correlations and percentage proportions of the total variances explained by the first principal
components to evaluate Hypotheses 3 and 7. Following Levchenko and Mauro (2007), we
use first principal components to measure comovement among funding types within a specific
country and risk of contagion across countries for an individual or a group of funding type.
The principal component method is used for factor analysis because, as Rigobon (2002)
argues, estimates are consistent even if the data would have simultaneous equations or
omitted variable biases.49
The last hypotheses of conventional theory and information-based trade-off model (ܪ4
and ܪ8, respectively) are assessed through identifying and comparing sudden stops or
reversibility incidences. A reduction of at least 25% from the previous year is defined as a
sudden stop in the inflow of a capital flow component.
49 Boyson et al. (2010), Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009), Bekaert et al. (2009), Bordo and Murshid (2006),
Mauro et al. (2002) also employ principal component analysis to gauge comovement and contagion.
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Finally, as a robustness exercise we carry out pooled ordinary probability unit (probit; à la
Bliss, 1934) estimations for the potential links between sudden stop, volume and volatility of
capital flows. The population regression function takes the form of conditional probit
representation of an index model of binary response
Pr( ௜ܵ௧ = 1|ܠ௜௧) = ઴(ܠ௜௧ࢼ) ݅ = 1, ,ܰ; ݐ = 1, ,ܶ (1)
where, ௜ܵ௧ denotes the dependent variable of sudden stop which is essentially a categorical
factor variable taking on the dichotomous values of either 0 (failure, no sudden stop) or 1
(success, or sudden stop). ܠ௜௧ is a 1 × ܭ (ܭ ൒ 2 being the number of covariates) row vector
of observed explanatory variables containing volumes, volatilities and time dummies. ࢼ is aܭ × 1 column vector of parameters to be estimated, and ઴ is the standard cumulative normal
distribution function.50 As the pooled ordinary probit specification with
Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors performed better from an efficiency point of
view and equally satisfied asymptotic conditions, it is the model of choice rather than the
logit or random-effects probit.
5.4 DATA ANDMEASUREMENT
To analyze volatility, persistence and univariate time series properties of international
capital flow composition in twelve emerging countries we identify four basic categories as
foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity investment (FPEI), long term debt
(LTDEBT) and short term debt (STDEBT). For a fair representation of emerging world, at
least two countries are picked from each of the five emerging market regions. Data
availability (particularly portfolio equity) is another determining factor in choosing individual
countries since this study involves univariate time series analysis which requires sample sizes
to be as lengthy as possible. Developing Asian (DA) countries are India (IND), Pakistan
(PAK) and Thailand (THA) whilst countries from Europe and Central Asia (ECA) are
Bulgaria (BGR) and Turkey (TUR). Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) is represented by
Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL) and Mexico (MEX). Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
comprises Morocco (MAR) and Tunisia (TUN) whereas Mauritius (MUS) and Senegal
(SEN) represent Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Each country-component pair constitutes a
different sample so that, in total, there are 48 (= 12 × 4) yearly observed samples under
50 As stated in Wooldridge (2002), achieving a ξܰ-consistent estimator of ȕ is possible by maximizing the
partial (sometimes quasi, pseudo or only probit) log-likelihood functionσ σ { ௜ܵ௧ log઴(ܠ௜௧ࢼ) + (1 െ ௜ܵ௧) log[1 െ௧்ୀଵே௜ୀଵ ઴(ܠ௜௧ࢼ)]}.
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consideration. Time dimension of these annual samples may vary due to data availability; e.g.
in case of FDI, Bulgarian data span is 1990-2006; for FPEI, the data start between 1974 and
1996; for LTDEBT, again Bulgarian data covers limited period of 1981-2006; for STDEBT,
data run from 1971 for most countries except Bulgaria (1986), and Mauritius and Senegal
(1978). Table 5.1 summarizes the sample periods.
FDI refers to net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.
It is the sum of equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other such long-term and short-term
capital as shown in the balance of payments of the reporting economy.
FPEI represents non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows which are the sum of country
funds, depository receipts, and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors.
LTDEBT is composed of publicly guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt from bonds that are
either publicly issued or privately placed, publicly guaranteed and nonguaranteed long-term
commercial bank loans and non-concessional credits (with an original or extended maturity
of more than one year and owed to non-residents and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or
services) from private banks, other private financial institutions, official creditors
(international organizations like the World Bank, regional development banks, other
multilateral and intergovernmental agencies, and other sovereign governments),
manufacturers, exporters, and export credit agencies.
STDEBT consists of publicly guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt arising from
underwriting such as notes, repos and other money market instruments like treasury bills,
commercial papers, bankers' acceptances and certificates of deposit and all the other loans
with an original maturity of one year or less.
To construct FDI and FPEI series annual liability balances of the relevant balance of
payments accounts reported by the World Development Indicators (WDI) are considered only
whereas LTDEBT and STDEBT are generated from the sub-accounts calculated as
disbursements minus principal repayments in the Global Development Finance (GDF).51 All
four variables of fundamental capital flow components (FDI, FPEI, LTDEBT and STDEBT)
are expressed in real (constant 2005 US dollars) per capita terms that are believed to be more
51 We opt to use the net liability balances as they constitute the data of interest. The idea is that, as Dornbusch
(2002) argues, when foreign financing to a particular sector is withdrawn (i.e. a sudden stop or reversal occurs)
that means a capital outflow and not a substitution into other assets currently held by that sector.
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compatible with the theoretical formulations such as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2011), Kraay
et al. (2005), Boyd and Smith (1997). By normalizing with population we also take the
destination country size into account keeping the original currency representation of the data
that we would lose should we use GDP as numéraire.52 Besides, conversion of the nominal
values into real terms (using the US consumer price index as deflator) eliminates potential
inflationary and exchange rate valuation effects.
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics. The size of pooled FPEI sample is below 400 as
most developing countries liberalized their capital accounts and set up domestic exchange
markets for stock and share trading much later (late 1980s) than the beginning of the overall
sampling time (1970). For a typical emerging country the yearly average of each capital flow
type might seem quite low but the mean per capita total capital flows (not reported) are about
$141 per year. Although the long-term debt seems to have the highest share, FDI flows are
catching up. As structured markets were established relatively late, portfolio equity financing
has the lowest share (less than a quarter of direct equity financing). High standard deviations
reinforce the widely accepted conviction that capital flows to emerging market economies are
extremely volatile.53 According to scale dependent standard deviations, FDI is the most
volatile whereas FPEI is the most resilient. Once relative variations are considered, however,
STDEBT has the largest coefficient of variation; followed by FPEI. Therefore, scale invariant
relative figures confirm the conventional view that short-term borrowing and portfolio equity
flows are more volatile sources subject to speculation, sudden stops and reversals whilst FDI
and long-term borrowing are rather persistent sources that are not driven by quickly changing
investor and market sentiments but more related to sluggish economic fundamentals. We will
treat the volatility issue exclusively in section five focusing on ‘realized fluctuations’ to see
what is actually happening.
52 Binici et al. (2010), Aykut et al. (2010), Neumann et al. (2009), Alfaro et al. (2008), Schularick (2006),
UNCTAD (2000) adopt similar practice.
53 See Martin and Rey (2006), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Aizenman and Pinto (2005), Aghion et al.
(2004), Chari and Kehoe (2003), Sarno and Taylor (1999a), McKinnon and Pill (1998).
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics (1970-2006, per capita 2005 $US)
County Component Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pooled
FDI 424 49.85 96.88 -25.44 964.76
FPEI 251 11.79 24.76 -31.44 164.71
LTDEBT 433 50.76 89.78 -259.76 649.08
STDEBT 403 19.53 82.44 -266.74 789.86
Brazil
FDI 37 (1970) 60.08 57.33 4.42 226.02
FPEI 28 (1979) 14.29 18.90 -12.52 60.22
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 69.79 81.36 -74.64 247.26
STDEBT 36 (1971) 12.75 28.55 -48.84 95.33
Bulgaria
FDI 17 (1990) 172.49 255.88 0.69 964.76
FPEI 11 (1996) 5.99 14.30 -3.16 46.91
LTDEBT 26 (1981) 86.06 98.02 -39.61 309.46
STDEBT 21 (1986) 51.31 111.68 -119.44 452.68
Chile
FDI 37 (1970) 162.86 177.15 -9.39 674.74
FPEI 18 (1989) 34.20 50.62 -31.44 141.16
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 151.79 139.59 -28.13 649.08
STDEBT 36 (1971) 35.05 87.26 -126.42 307.84
India
FDI 37 (1970) 1.91 3.02 -0.18 15.23
FPEI 16 (1991) 4.13 3.62 -0.73 11.09
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 3.11 4.39 -3.37 17.97
STDEBT 36 (1971) 0.94 2.86 -4.08 15.35
Mauritius
FDI 37 (1970) 27.85 43.51 -25.44 253.83
FPEI 13 (1994) 11.91 17.20 -15.26 40.41
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 25.10 97.70 -259.76 293.72
STDEBT 29 (1978) 63.93 194.51 -266.74 789.86
Mexico
FDI 37 (1970) 95.90 76.22 15.45 327.90
FPEI 18 (1989) 34.21 46.17 -25.55 164.71
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 92.34 109.21 -116.64 387.24
STDEBT 36 (1971) 21.39 97.61 -250.38 285.48
Morocco
FDI 37 (1970) 12.54 20.47 -4.86 85.73
FPEI 14 (1993) 2.66 6.93 -9.82 20.68
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 36.77 61.98 -33.60 223.97
STDEBT 36 (1971) 5.49 19.91 -37.21 59.69
Pakistan
FDI 37 (1970) 3.92 4.73 -0.26 26.03
FPEI 23 (1984) 1.63 3.19 -1.01 13.84
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 3.85 6.41 -9.55 16.70
STDEBT 36 (1971) 1.31 6.81 -28.42 13.58
Senegal
FDI 37 (1970) 6.91 7.48 -11.07 24.44
FPEI 33 (1974) 0.59 1.65 -2.61 7.70
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 10.84 22.95 -24.04 69.88
STDEBT 29 (1978) 1.80 13.61 -20.79 33.20
Thailand
FDI 37 (1970) 41.75 40.70 3.22 142.73
FPEI 32 (1975) 17.87 25.34 -8.60 85.91
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 19.77 66.73 -136.04 198.63
STDEBT 36 (1971) 16.94 90.85 -196.97 317.86
Tunisia
FDI 37 (1970) 55.57 51.39 12.74 312.80
FPEI 27 (1980) 6.35 7.77 -2.08 27.49
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 54.14 59.00 -29.50 268.70
STDEBT 36 (1971) 14.23 34.44 -69.60 120.06
(continued on next page)
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Table 5.1 (continued)
County Component Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Turkey
FDI 37 (1970) 22.75 47.86 0.81 269.71
FPEI 18 (1989) 11.28 19.33 -9.64 79.66
LTDEBT 37 (1970) 66.02 90.71 -29.35 460.16
STDEBT 36 (1971) 27.65 94.19 -213.87 326.68
Notes: FDI denotes foreign direct investment, FPEI stands for foreign portfolio equity investment, LTDEBT
refers to long term debt, and STDEBT represents short term debt. Each univariate time series per country
constitutes a different sample. All samples end in 2006; varying initial years are in parentheses.
It may not be so meaningful to discuss the individual country inflows by merely taking the
face values as these figures are in per capita real terms and reflect the normalization with
respect to population.54 Nonetheless, focusing on relative variations over time we notice that,
on average, Senegal has the highest variability (particularly STDEBT and FPEI) whereas
Tunisia has the lowest. The most unstable FDI inflows per capita are those to Turkey and the
highest stability can be observed in FDI to Mexico. Regionally, capital flows (portfolio
equity, short-term and long-term debt) to Sub Saharan Africa are the least stable.
Figure 5.1 encompasses four panels of bar charts illustrating the average realizations and
fluctuation patterns of the capital flow components by country, region and sub-periods. In all
panels of the figure, the order of the component bars within each category is the same as the
order of the components in the legends. In terms of capital flow types, the précis given by
Table 5.1 can broadly be traced throughout this figure as well.
Panel (a) shows that the profile of allocations varies not only across countries and regions
but also within each of them. The lumpy nature of FDI, the primary significance of long term
borrowing, and the roles of FPEI and short term borrowing as low in volume (averages) but
high in volatility (standard deviations) are visible. Looking at the remaining panels, (c) and
(d), periodic distributions of capital flows indicate the changing structure of external
financing in emerging markets.
The dominance of debt financing (long-term especially) has been curbed due most
probably to dramatic and contagious Latin American debt crisis in early 1980s when short
term debt net flows turned out to be net outflows. Although capital inflows have weakly
recovered following that distress, considerable resumptions have taken place rather later.
54 As an alternative presentation of the raw data two-way line plots of the time series are illustrated county by
country in the appendix.
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Figure 5.1: Data Panorama by Country-Region and 3-Year Sub-periods, 1970-2006
Notes: In panels (a) and (b) averages and standard deviations are calculated over the full sample periods for
each country-region. In (c) and (d), the same statistics are calculated over the years within each sub-period. 3-
year moving windows corresponding to the numbers on the horizontal axes are 1970-72, 1973-75, 1976-78,
1979-81, 1982-84, 1985-87, 1988-90, 1991-93, 1994-96, 1997-99, 2000-02, 2003-06 respectively. In all panels,
the order of the component bars within each category is the same as the order of the components in the legends.
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Following extensive current and capital account liberalizations (removal of trade
restrictions and capital controls, liberalization of the domestic financial systems,
macroeconomic stabilization and privatization) of the late 1980s and early 1990s (periods
correspond also to economic and financial slowdown in the industrialized world) portfolio
equity inflows materialized and FDI has taken the lead all the way through. Sub-periods
including the renowned financial and currency deterioration episodes of 1994-95 Mexican
crisis, 1997 East Asian crisis, 1998 Russian crisis, 1999 Brazilian crisis, 1994 and 2001
Turkish crises, and 2002 Argentine crisis show the critical role of short term debt and its
volatility in aggravating (if not triggering) the aggregate volatility associated with crises.55
5.5 REALIZED FLUCTUATIONS
Using alternative procedures we measure how basic capital flow components fluctuate
over time (and across countries) to evaluate the first and fifth hypotheses. The results are
sensitive to the choice of measurement, scaling and magnitude of the series, cross section
units (i.e. countries), and the length of time. There may be variations across countries or over
time even under the same technique. Regarding the pairs of capital flow components,
however, we can still observe important regularities throughout so as to reach conclusions on
the volatility hypotheses (i.e. ܪ1 and ܪ5). The conventional approach specified in ܪ1, that
the pair of short-term capital flows (STDEBT and FPEI) fluctuates more than the long-term
capital flows pair (LTDEBT and FDI), does not come out unambiguously from the data.
However, again on the basis of pairwise evaluations, the information-based trade-off model
prediction in ܪ5 is confirmed in that equity flows (FDI and FPEI) are observed almost
always to be more stable than debt flows (LTDEBT and STDEBT). This finding
implicationally supports the premise that debt flows (including long-term maturity structured
public and publicly guaranteed private external borrowings) pose the main policy challenges
for and require more effective management by emerging economies.56
In relation to the individual series, for which the results may not always be insensitive,
FPEI is the least volatile and short term debt is the most volatile component. We could also
rank the individual series of capital flow components from the most volatile to the least as
short-term debt flows, long-term debt flows, foreign direct investment (occasionally the most
55 On the vulnerability generating impact of short-term external borrowing see Kose et al. (2009), Dornbusch
(2002), Chang and Velasco (2001), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Calvo (1998).
56 The surmise has been developed and discussed around the concept of ‘debt intolerance’ in Reinhart et al.
(2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Eichengreen et al. (2007).
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stable) and foreign portfolio equity investment. By and large, erratic oscillations in all forms
of financing increase over time.
5.5.1 Fluctuations of Unfiltered Series
Realized volatilities of country capital flow series calculated via standard deviations and
coefficients of variation, as well as the associated results from the nonparametric Brown-
Forsythe variance equality test, are presented in Table 5.2.
Standard deviations of these unfiltered series show that long-term debt is the most volatile
whilst portfolio equity is the least. According to the coefficients of variation, however, short-
term debt has the highest relative volatility. A pairwise evaluation of the results from both
measures along with the tests for equality of volatilities between the pertinent pairs indicates
that equity flows are more stable than debt flows, supporting the fifth hypothesis. Some
individual country cases differ: Bulgarian figures are ambiguous while Chilean and Indian
results provide little evidence in favour of that hypothesis. The results for the first hypothesis
are not clear. Although coefficients of variation support ܪ1, standard deviations do not. This
also emerges when we compare specific countries like Mauritius and Turkey; ܪ1 is rejected
for the former but supported for the latter. The Middle East and North Africa is the only
region in which sample countries (Morocco and Tunisia) share the same volatility pattern, in
terms of standard deviations, which is exactly opposite to the conventional view in ܪ1.
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Table 5.2: Overall Volatility of Unfiltered Capital Flow Components, 1970-2006
Counties
Unfiltered
Capital
Flow
Series
Std.
Dev.
Coef.
of
Var.
Brown-Forsythe Variance Equality Tests
FDI FPEI LTDEBT
Stat. ࢖-Val. Stat. ࢖-Val. Stat. ࢖-Val.
Pooled
FDI 96.88 1.94
FPEI 24.76 2.10 29.24 0.00
LTDEBT 89.78 1.77 5.13 0.02 85.15 0.00
STDEBT 82.44 4.22 0.54 0.46 34.47 0.00 11.31 0.00
Brazil
FDI 57.33 0.95
FPEI 18.90 1.32 6.92 0.01
LTDEBT 81.36 1.17 7.68 0.01 36.11 0.00
STDEBT 28.55 2.24 3.93 0.05 3.14 0.08 31.79 0.00
Bulgaria
FDI 255.88 1.48
FPEI 14.30 2.39 4.42 0.05
LTDEBT 98.02 1.14 2.30 0.14 12.81 0.00
STDEBT 111.68 2.18 2.39 0.13 5.22 0.03 0.27 0.61
Chile
FDI 177.15 1.09
FPEI 50.62 1.48 8.17 0.01
LTDEBT 139.59 0.92 1.52 0.22 5.73 0.02
STDEBT 87.26 2.49 8.31 0.01 2.08 0.16 3.54 0.06
India
FDI 3.02 1.58
FPEI 3.62 0.88 1.73 0.19
LTDEBT 4.39 1.41 4.97 0.03 0.25 0.62
STDEBT 2.86 3.04 0.20 0.65 3.45 0.07 7.99 0.01
Mauritius
FDI 43.51 1.56
FPEI 17.20 1.44 0.37 0.55
LTDEBT 97.70 3.89 11.89 0.00 7.02 0.01
STDEBT 194.51 3.04 7.66 0.01 3.32 0.08 1.17 0.28
Mexico
FDI 76.22 0.79
FPEI 46.17 1.35 2.69 0.11
LTDEBT 109.21 1.18 3.54 0.06 9.46 0.00
STDEBT 97.61 4.56 0.16 0.69 2.99 0.09 1.77 0.19
Morocco
FDI 20.47 1.63
FPEI 6.93 2.61 1.76 0.19
LTDEBT 61.98 1.69 16.90 0.00 10.55 0.00
STDEBT 19.91 3.63 0.42 0.52 5.19 0.03 14.83 0.00
Pakistan
FDI 4.73 1.21
FPEI 3.19 1.95 0.92 0.34
LTDEBT 6.41 1.67 6.48 0.01 11.99 0.00
STDEBT 6.81 5.18 1.80 0.18 3.95 0.05 0.64 0.43
Senegal
FDI 7.48 1.08
FPEI 1.65 2.78 26.25 0.00
LTDEBT 22.95 2.12 12.90 0.00 25.28 0.00
STDEBT 13.61 7.57 9.56 0.00 43.43 0.00 2.53 0.12
Thailand
FDI 40.70 0.97
FPEI 25.34 1.42 6.95 0.01
LTDEBT 66.73 3.38 2.39 0.13 10.41 0.00
STDEBT 90.85 5.36 3.28 0.07 8.44 0.01 0.40 0.53
(continued on next page)
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Table 5.2 (continued)
Counties
Unfiltered
Capital
Flow
Series
Std.
Dev.
Coef.
of
Var.
Brown-Forsythe Variance Equality Tests
FDI FPEI LTDEBT
Stat. ࢖-Val. Stat. ࢖-Val. Stat. ࢖-Val.
Tunisia
FDI 51.39 0.92
FPEI 7.77 1.22 8.82 0.00
LTDEBT 59.00 1.09 0.95 0.33 15.85 0.00
STDEBT 34.44 2.42 0.67 0.41 12.05 0.00 3.79 0.06
Turkey
FDI 47.86 2.10
FPEI 19.33 1.71 0.42 0.52
LTDEBT 90.71 1.37 6.19 0.02 5.72 0.02
STDEBT 94.19 3.41 9.49 0.00 8.70 0.00 0.15 0.70
Notes: Coefficient of variation (Coef. of Var.) is the ratio of the standard deviation (Std. Dev.) of a variable to
its mean and it is used as an alternative and scale-free measure for the degree of variability in the data. Brown-
Forsythe variance equality test evaluates the null hypothesis that the variances of paired capital flow
components are equal against the alternative of different variances. It is based on an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) of the absolute difference from the median. The test statistic (Stat.) has an approximateܨேିଶீ െdistribution with ܩ = 1 numerator degrees of freedom and ܰ െ 2 denominator degrees of freedom (ܰ
being the total number of observations in the pair). Degrees of freedom and pair sizes can be identified from the
sample information in Table 5.1. See notes to Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 as well.
5.5.2 Fluctuations of Filtered Series
Table 5.3 provides the Brown-Forsythe variance homogeneity tests and results related to
the volatilities that are measured as standard deviations of the cyclical components of HP-
filtered series. As the table documents, the previous characterization that debt flows are less
stable than equity flows (i.e. ܪ5) is corroborated. Indian and Tunisian statistics lend weak
support to this hypothesis while Bulgarian data are inconclusive. This could be attributed to
the short time series as well as to the European Union effects in case of Bulgaria and to the
late liberalization (1991) in the case of India. It is also demonstrated that the long-term
financial flows (FDI and LTDEBT) are at least as volatile as the short-term financial flows
(FPEI and LTDEBT), providing mixed support for the conventional volatility hypothesis.
121
Table 5.3: Cyclical Component Volatility of HP-Filtered Capital Flow Series, 1970-2006
Counties
Filtered
Capital
Flow
Series
Std.
Dev.
Brown-Forsythe Variance Equality Tests
FDI FPEI LTDEBT
Stat. ࢖-Val. Stat. ࢖-Val. Stat. ࢖-Val.
Pooled
FDI 26.60
FPEI 15.35 7.68 0.01
LTDEBT 42.71 52.48 0.00 73.13 0.00
STDEBT 64.32 33.48 0.00 35.87 0.00 0.90 0.34
Brazil
FDI 17.84
FPEI 10.39 2.69 0.11
LTDEBT 39.01 12.24 0.00 17.70 0.00
STDEBT 19.11 1.18 0.28 9.22 0.00 8.21 0.01
Bulgaria
FDI 54.40
FPEI 10.71 3.92 0.06
LTDEBT 38.15 0.10 0.75 9.56 0.00
STDEBT 54.15 0.60 0.44 11.81 0.00 2.34 0.13
Chile
FDI 58.80
FPEI 40.98 0.27 0.61
LTDEBT 78.52 2.86 0.10 3.56 0.06
STDEBT 78.52 2.27 0.14 2.95 0.09 0.02 0.89
India
FDI 0.95
FPEI 2.00 13.15 0.00
LTDEBT 2.20 7.57 0.01 0.12 0.73
STDEBT 1.62 3.73 0.06 2.05 0.16 1.13 0.29
Mauritius
FDI 35.72
FPEI 10.44 0.70 0.41
LTDEBT 65.28 10.28 0.00 8.22 0.01
STDEBT 173.26 8.95 0.00 3.98 0.05 3.01 0.09
Mexico
FDI 24.37
FPEI 28.39 0.66 0.42
LTDEBT 60.30 21.60 0.00 8.50 0.01
STDEBT 66.61 6.05 0.02 2.00 0.16 0.64 0.43
Morocco
FDI 10.11
FPEI 5.92 0.47 0.50
LTDEBT 28.02 14.99 0.00 8.12 0.01
STDEBT 15.72 9.27 0.00 8.68 0.01 3.75 0.06
Pakistan
FDI 1.33
FPEI 2.29 0.69 0.41
LTDEBT 4.05 24.05 0.00 9.41 0.00
STDEBT 5.78 6.49 0.01 2.74 0.10 0.03 0.87
Senegal
FDI 5.73
FPEI 1.09 36.30 0.00
LTDEBT 11.44 3.44 0.07 19.09 0.00
STDEBT 11.67 13.06 0.00 48.46 0.00 0.94 0.34
Thailand
FDI 13.46
FPEI 15.70 0.19 0.66
LTDEBT 25.92 7.50 0.01 4.75 0.03
STDEBT 52.34 8.13 0.01 6.16 0.02 2.06 0.16
(continued on next page)
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Table 5.3 (continued)
Counties
Filtered
Capital
Flow
Series
Std.
Dev.
Brown-Forsythe Variance Equality Tests
FDI FPEI LTDEBT
Stat. ࢖-Val. Stat. ࢖-Val. Stat. ࢖-Val.
Tunisia
FDI 28.42
FPEI 3.76 15.65 0.00
LTDEBT 36.62 2.24 0.14 26.81 0.00
STDEBT 28.51 0.00 1.00 16.23 0.00 2.24 0.14
Turkey
FDI 14.99
FPEI 12.42 0.03 0.86
LTDEBT 48.38 16.56 0.00 8.33 0.01
STDEBT 83.11 19.13 0.00 9.27 0.00 2.94 0.09
Notes: The cyclical component of a capital flow time series refers to its part that has regular or periodic
fluctuations around the trend of the series. It is derived through Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with ɉ = 6.25 as
the penalty parameter. Consult also notes to Table 5.2.
In addition to overall volatilities, Figure 5.2 shows twelve panels of time varying volatility
plots measured as 3-year moving standard deviations of the cyclical components of the
smoothed capital flow series. Ironically, volatilities themselves are observed to be quite
volatile and they increase over time for most country cases. In line with the above finding,
debt flows record higher fluctuations than equity flows. Although long-term debt shows
slightly dampened oscillations at later times in some countries, short term debt remains
highly volatile most of the time. Shaded vertical lines for the periods including 1982 Latin
American debt crisis (fifth period), 1994 Mexican peso and Turkish lira crises (ninth period),
1997 East Asian currency crisis (tenth period), 1999 Brazilian real crisis (tenth period), 2001
Turkish and 2002 Argentine financial crises (eleventh period) highlight that debt flows—
particularly short-term—fluctuate wildly either right before or during the turmoil. This
indicates a country level (partially sovereign) debt overhang problem precipitated by highly
leveraged balance of payments positions which might have added to outbreak of the crises
(Krugman, 1999, Frankel and Wei, 2005). Broadly resilient equity flows reveal increasing
volatilities around the mayhem—portfolio equity in particular as in Thai, Mexican, Chilean
and Brazilian cases—and later in the overall sample time as they gain bigger shares in terms
of volume and magnitude.
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Figure 5.2: 3-Year Rolling Standard Deviation Plots of HP-Filtered Series, 1970-2006
Notes: Vertical lines correspond to the crisis periods mentioned in the text. See notes to Table and Figure 5.1.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Brazil
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Bulgaria
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Chile
0
1
2
3
4
5
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
India
0
100
200
300
400
500
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Mauritius
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Mexico
0
16
32
48
64
80
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Morocco
0
4
8
12
16
20
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Pakistan
0
5
10
15
20
25
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Senegal
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Thailand
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Tunisia
0
32
64
96
128
160
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3-Year Intervals
FDI FPEI LTDEBT STDEBT
Turkey
124
Figure 5.3: Volatility Shifts in Capital Flows across Countries and Regions, 1970-2006
Notes: Standard deviations are rescaled as ln (ݏݐ݀.݀݁ݒ. +1) so as to give log standard deviations on the vertical
axis. Calculations are carried out separately for two successive sub-periods; 1970-1989 and 1990-2006 that are
distinguished by the numbers at the end of each component label. Also see notes to Figure 5.1 and Table 5.3.
Figure 5.3 finally illustrates how the profile of fluctuations in capital flow components
changes from one sub-period (1970-1989) to the other (1990-2006) across countries and
regions. Both panels of filtered and unfiltered series manifest that, in general, almost all
forms of the capital flows become more unstable in the aftermath of the massive financial
liberalizations that have taken place during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Recommencement
of international capital investment in and lending to emerging economies around that time
could also have contributed to this instability, as standard deviations reflect inherent scaling,
frequency and magnitude of the variables. Long term debt seems to be the most volatile mode
of financing in the first decades and it devolves this role to short term debt in the last decades
when direct and portfolio equity flows (the most resilient throughout) also become more
volatile than before. Due most probably to volume effects, FDI flows had the strongest
amplification in their fluctuation patterns. Countries from LAC and SSA show some
differences between each other; volatilities of Chilean debt flows shift in the opposite
directions with respect to those of Brazilian and Mexican debt flows, and Senegal sees
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considerable fluctuation reductions in its capital flows unlike Mauritius. It seems that the
restrictive capital market policies and regulations in Chile—where a certain proportion of
portfolio inflows were mandated to be deposited with the central bank for a year without
interest and a 3% fine was set for the early withdrawals, the policy or regulation called encaje
which was in effect during 1991-1998—have been counterproductive at least in curbing
volatility. This observation is in line with the evidence that the capital controls could not
protect Chile from external shocks (Forbes, 2008).
5.6 PROCESS MODELLING AND FORECASTING
In addition to volatility, we provide more direct evidence on the persistence and
predictability characteristics of the capital flow components under consideration (re ܪ2 andܪ6). To capture the degree of persistence or permanence we identify appropriate data
generating processes (DGP) by fitting autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
models to the data series and derive the impulse responses from those models. To evaluate
the degree of predictability for the same series, we estimate a standard ARIMA(1,0,0) model
for each of them throughout 1970-2003 and perform 3-year ahead (2004-2006) out-of-sample
dynamic forecasts using the estimated equation where the time trend is allowed for in each
case.
Table 5.4 reports the specified ARIMA models (explicitly indicating the orders of auto-
regression, integration and moving average only), periods (the number of years during which
impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock in the estimated model (i.e.
corresponding DGP in the table) innovation remain above 0.50 threshold), and scale
independent forecasting measures of mean absolute percentage errors (MAPE; to capture
forecast accuracy and precision) and Theil inequality coefficients (TIC; to account for the
goodness of fit and forecast quality).57
Inspection of the presented ARIMA models show that not all series are the realization of
difference stationary or ܫ(1) processes unlike the case in Sarno and Taylor (1999a) where all
the series contain unit roots. About a quarter of the series appear non-stationary and some
FDI series are integrated of order 2.
57 Three alternative unit root tests, ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), PP (Phillips and Perron, 1988) and KPSS
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), are employed to determine the order of integration of a series. The decision is made
for a particular outcome (i.e. the order of integration) if the results from at least two tests are statistically
equivalent. This is consistent with the account of Stock (1994) that interpretation of the unit root tests is a matter
of judgement.
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Table 5.4: Data Generating Processes (DGP) and Forecasting
County Component
DGPs and Model Diagnostics Forecast Evaluation
DGP Period LM Test MAPE TIC
Brazil
FDI ARIMA(1,0,2) 14 0.15 24.02 0.16
FPEI ARIMA(0,1,2) 3 0.74 50.02 0.18
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 6 0.27 202.53 0.75
STDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 3 0.77 82.43 0.46
Bulgaria
FDI ARIMA(1,2,1) 21 0.78 57.14 0.48
FPEI ARIMA(1,0,1) 4 0.36 199.20 0.95
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,1,0) 4 0.67 107.54 0.96
STDEBT ARIMA(1,1,2) 7 0.69 56.37 0.71
Chile
FDI ARIMA(1,0,0) 8 0.59 19.97 0.12
FPEI ARIMA(1,0,1) 8 0.45 473.38 0.94
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 11 0.58 200.26 0.42
STDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 5 0.73 127.92 0.79
India
FDI ARIMA(1,2,1) 2 0.98 36.94 0.42
FPEI ARIMA(1,0,0) 2 0.85 60.53 0.44
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,0,2) 5 0.90 77.75 0.89
STDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 3 0.18 97.20 0.99
Mauritius
FDI ARIMA(1,0,1) 7 0.80 176.60 0.31
FPEI ARIMA(1,0,1) 6 0.39 167.08 0.99
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,0,2) 16 0.51 94.85 0.92
STDEBT ARIMA(0,0,5) 6 0.19 55.59 0.40
Mexico
FDI ARIMA(1,1,2) 6 0.67 12.15 0.08
FPEI ARIMA(1,0,0) 3 0.60 150.26 0.89
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 7 0.22 369.98 0.87
STDEBT ARIMA(0,0,1) 2 0.62 892.34 0.61
Morocco
FDI ARIMA(1,0,3) 17 0.42 57.36 0.37
FPEI ARIMA(0,0,2) 3 0.24 129.05 0.86
LTDEBT ARIMA(0,0,2) 3 0.95 182.09 0.57
STDEBT ARIMA(1,0,1) 9 0.92 102.38 0.97
Pakistan
FDI ARIMA(1,2,0) 2 0.51 58.43 0.55
FPEI ARIMA(1,0,0) 1 0.77 131.78 0.61
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 3 0.85 79.85 0.71
STDEBT ARIMA(0,0,2) 3 0.93 414.09 0.94
Senegal
FDI ARIMA(1,0,0) 2 0.75 13.92 0.11
FPEI ARIMA(0,0,2) 3 0.97 27.18 0.63
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 6 0.45 3179.83 0.94
STDEBT ARIMA(0,0,1) 2 0.66 98.73 0.73
Thailand
FDI ARIMA(1,1,0) 2 0.63 19.16 0.13
FPEI ARIMA(1,0,0) 2 0.73 54.81 0.42
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,0,2) 10 0.76 520.95 0.90
STDEBT ARIMA(1,0,0) 11 0.53 190.35 0.96
Tunisia
FDI ARIMA(1,1,1) 6 0.98 33.32 0.58
FPEI ARIMA(1,1,1) 3 0.59 305.63 0.98
LTDEBT ARIMA(0,0,3) 4 0.63 1381.75 0.66
STDEBT ARIMA(0,0,3) 4 0.53 88.44 0.76
Turkey
FDI ARIMA(1,2,0) 3 0.50 70.82 0.77
FPEI ARIMA(1,1,1) 4 0.42 84.13 0.85
LTDEBT ARIMA(1,1,0) 5 0.79 72.37 0.69
STDEBT ARIMA(0,0,2) 3 0.78 81.32 0.74
(continued on next page)
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Table 5.4 (continued)
County Component
DGPs and Model Diagnostics Forecast Evaluation
DGP Period LM Test MAPE TIC
Averages
FDI 7.50 48.32 0.34
FPEI 3.50 152.75 0.73
LTDEBT 6.67 539.15 0.77
STDEBT 4.83 190.60 0.76
Notes: Each autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model is estimated via nonlinear least squares
(NLS) by applying a Marquardt NLS algorithm to the transformed equation. Note that the NLS estimates are
asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood (ML) estimates and are asymptotically efficient. Numbers in
parentheses respectively show the order of auto-regression (AR), integration (I), and moving average (MA).
Period indicates the number of years during which impulse responses to a one-time shock in the innovation (a
one standard deviation shock using the standard error of the regression for the estimated equation and taking
account of innovation uncertainty) stand above 0.50 in absolute values. Although it is a common measure for
residual persistence in the series, the ‘period’ statistic has a different meaning for stationary and unit root
processes. For stationary processes, it shows the number of periods that the level remains above 0.50; whereas
for unit root processes, it shows the number of periods that the growth rate remains above 0.50 following a unit
shock. Under LM test given are p-values from the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier serial correlation test
for the model errors with two lags. A p-value greater than 0.10 validates the specification fitted in the sense that
there is no serial correlation left uncontrolled in the residuals. Mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and
Theil inequality coefficient (TIC) are scale invariant indicators employed to evaluate out-of-sample dynamic
forecasts from an ARIMA(1,0,0) model fitted for all the time series of capital flow components, controlling for
their trends over time. The estimation period is 1970-2003 and the three-year-ahead forecasting period is 2004-
2006.
Considering the DGPs (the actual models and primarily the order of integration counts of
each type) in the first place and average periods of the capital flow components secondarily,
we see that FDI has the longest memory and hence is the most persistent whereas short-term
debt is the least permanent. Besides the structural distinction (that debt flows are less
persistent than equity flows), there is now also a maturity distinction in that long-term capital
flows have higher persistence than short-term ones. These findings corroborate part of the
second and sixth hypotheses. International creditors and investors seem to have a rather long-
term commitment to Europe and Central Asia (i.e. to Turkey and Bulgaria) for which a
potential European Union effect should not be overlooked. Sudden stops in lending and
reversals of portfolio and direct equity investments might be regarded as more endemic to
Sub Saharan Africa (Senegal and Mauritius). The mean values of MAPE and TIC
demonstrate that forecast accuracy, quality and goodness of fit properties of FDI are the best.
By and large, individual country scores also confirm that FDI is the most predictable form of
cross border flows. Specific to this section of the investigation, rather than short-term, long-
term debt flows reveal poorest predictability as they generally record highest MAPE and TIC
levels. Again, equity flows better fit to actual data and are predictable more precisely than
debt flows. Assessing the pairs as FDI and LTDEBT versus FPEI and STDEBT, forecasting
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improves with the maturity and longevity of financial investments. The other part of the
second and sixth hypotheses is thus corroborated.
5.7 CORRELATIONS AND COMOVEMENTS
Pairwise correlation and first principal component variance proportion matrices are given
in Table 5.5 both on an overall basis and for each country separately. Correlations between
capital flow components support Hypotheses 3 and 7 that not only long-term flows are more
strongly correlated than short-term flows but also are equity flows more so than debt flows.
Regarding the nature of correlations as whether the financing components are substitutes (if
negatively correlated) or complements (if positively correlated) within emerging markets,
they are found to be complements (FDI may be a substitute for a few countries, e.g. Mexico).
Generally, our findings contradict those of Claessens et al. (1995) and Levchenko and Mauro
(2007) who show that for countries from all income levels capital flow types are substitutes.
Variance proportions of the fist principal components indicate modest contagion risk across
countries for a specific (group of) component(s) and mild comovement among components
within a country or region.58 Nevertheless, maturity and structure dualities also appear here as
factors common to all countries account for more of the total variation in FDI-LTDEBT and
FDI-FPEI pairs than in FPEI-STDEBT and LTDEBT-STDEBT pairs (as in ܪ3 and ܪ7).
Higher risk of contagion in long-term and equity-like financial investments implies that
determining factors behind them might be correlated across emerging countries. Short-run
and debt-like financing seem to be influenced by rather destination-specific factors and policy
choices which make them to be less prone to contagion. Concerning the regional groupings,
capital flows to Europe and Central Asia bear stronger commonality and better
synchronization in terms of their composition but, as a downside, they are more susceptible to
contagion. For the rest of the emerging regions (Developing Asia, Latina America and
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub Saharan Africa), more heterogeneity is
observed across capital flow components. As a last point to note on the issue of cross-border
interdependence, in contrast to Bae et al. (2003), we discover that the risk of contagion is
slightly less pronounced in Latin America than in Asia.59
58 What Levchenko and Mauro (2007) come up with as the first principal component (being 0.30) for the
advanced economies’ financial account is exactly the same as what we uncover for all private financial flows to
emerging economies. Similar observation qualitatively noted for portfolio equity flows in Stulz (1999).
59 Percentage variance proportions of the fist principal components of the regionally grouped series are 0.36 for
Developing Asia, 0.64 for Europe and Central Asia, 0.33 for Latin America and Caribbean, 0.35 for Middle East
and North Africa, and 0.29 for Sub Saharan Africa.
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Table 5.5: Pairwise Correlations and Principal Components, 1970-2006
Counties Series
Pairwise Correlations First Principal Components
FDI FPEI LTDEBT FDI FPEI LTDEBT ALL
Overall
FDI 0.48
0.30FPEI 0.27
* 0.38 0.46
LTDEBT 0.24
* 0.30* 0.37 0.33 0.27
STDEBT 0.17
* 0.10 0.19* 0.32 0.31 0.19 0.21a
Brazil
FPEI 0.09 0.55
0.33LTDEBT -0.07 -0.07 0.53 0.53
STDEBT -0.32* 0.17 0.29* 0.66 0.59 0.64
Bulgaria
FPEI 0.47 0.73
0.72LTDEBT 0.93* 0.32 0.96 0.66
STDEBT 0.86* 0.36 0.35 0.93 0.68 0.67
Chile
FPEI 0.12 0.56
0.45LTDEBT -0.05 0.58* 0.52 0.79
STDEBT -0.02 -0.15 0.16 0.51 0.58 0.58
India
FPEI 0.49* 0.75
0.68LTDEBT 0.27 0.22 0.64 0.61
STDEBT 0.63* 0.51* 0.57* 0.82 0.75 0.79
Mauritius
FPEI -0.10 0.55
0.41LTDEBT -0.45* 0.29 0.72 0.64
STDEBT 0.13 0.07 -0.13 0.57 0.53 0.56
Mexico
FPEI -0.56* 0.78
0.57LTDEBT -0.29* 0.01 0.65 0.51
STDEBT -0.25 0.71* 0.47* 0.63 0.86 0.73
Morocco
FPEI -0.23 0.61
0.39LTDEBT -0.31* -0.30 0.65 0.65
STDEBT -0.01 -0.41 0.29* 0.50 0.71 0.64
Pakistan
FPEI 0.42* 0.71
0.41LTDEBT 0.07 0.23 0.54 0.61
STDEBT -0.09 -0.19 -0.19 0.55 0.59 0.60
Senegal
FPEI 0.39* 0.70
0.41LTDEBT -0.08 0.42* 0.54 0.71
STDEBT 0.13 0.31 0.23 0.57 0.65 0.61
Thailand
FPEI 0.57* 0.79
0.45LTDEBT -0.30* 0.13 0.65 0.57
STDEBT -0.26 0.07 0.46* 0.63 0.54 0.73
Tunisia
FPEI 0.08 0.54
0.41LTDEBT -0.19 0.02 0.60 0.51
STDEBT -0.01 -0.31 0.33* 0.51 0.66 0.66
Turkey
FPEI 0.56* 0.78
0.59LTDEBT 0.79* 0.51* 0.89 0.76
STDEBT 0.07 0.17 0.12 0.54 0.59 0.56
Notes: Overall means over time and across countries (pooled) in case of correlations; and over time (only) in
case of principal components. All refers to the groups of the entire (country-components for overall and
components for each country) series. Superscript asterisk (*) indicates statistical difference from zero at 10%
level. First principal components are the percentage proportions of total variance explained by the first principal
components (i.e. factors common to all variables in a set of time series) which are the unit-length linear
combinations of the original variables with maximum variance. 0.21a is the first principal component variance
proportion across country STDEBT series. Included observations are automatically adjusted for missing values.
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5.8 VOLUME, VOLATILITY AND SUDDEN STOP NEXUS
Broadly defined as swift decline, reversal or crunch in capital flows; sudden stop is a
crucial phenomenon in several research efforts for understanding the mechanism of financial
crises, evaluating the benefits and harms of economic integration and liberalization and
assessing pros and cons of capital controls. Sudden stop is also intimately linked to the
concept of capital flow volatility. Indeed, Jeanne and Rancière (2011) use these terms
interchangeably. By quantifying the subject matter of sudden stop we test the final
hypotheses of conventional wisdom and trade-off model (ܪ4 and ܪ8, respectively). We also
investigate if there is a close association between capital flow volatility and sudden stop.
The sudden stop frequencies are provided in Table 5.6. In the context of this investigation,
a decrease in a certain type of foreign financing of at least 25% from the previous year is
identified as an incidence of sudden stop.60 Frequency, then, becomes the number of such
measured sudden stops in the capital flow component under consideration during the
corresponding time period.61
In general conformity with the analytical cases of volatility, persistence, predictability and
comovement above, it is possible to make an ordinal ranking among the funding series upon
the inspection of the relative frequencies in the table. This ranking runs from FDI, FPEI and
LTDEBT to STDEBT in terms of being less to more prone to sudden stops. For all the
periods, a debt-equity differentiation is distinguishable, as expected by the eighth hypothesis,
that sudden stop occurrences of debt flows surpass those of equity investments. These results
are largely similar to Levchenko and Mauro (2007) and Sarno and Taylor (1999a, 1999b):
FDI is least reversible while some debt flows (bond and official flows) appear quite
reversible. Being greater than 0.85 in all cases of totals, the ratio of sudden stops in long-
term debt to sudden stops in short-term debt shows that the former could hardly be labelled as
stable cold money. However, FDI and LTDEBT exhibit fewer sudden stops than STDEBT
and FPEI, confirming the last conventional hypothesis (i.e. ܪ4).
60 Similar and alternative definitions could be found in Bordo et al. (2010), Cavallo and Frankel (2008), Honig
(2008), Hutchinson and Noy (2006).
61 Of the similar nature, frequency of sign changes in capital flows are given in Table 6.4 in Lipsey (1999) and
the number of sudden stops presented in the first tables in Honig (2008), Hutchinson and Noy (2006) and in
Figure 1 of Cavallo and Frankel (2008).
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Table 5.6: Frequency of Sudden Stops
Country Series
1975-2006 1975-1995 1996-2006 1994-2002
Obs. Freq. Obs. Freq. Obs. Freq. Obs. Freq.
Totals
FDI 247 68 115 34 132 34 106 31
FPEI 247 108 115 44 132 64 106 57
LTDEBT 247 135 115 61 132 74 106 58
STDEBT 247 150 115 70 132 80 106 65
Brazil
FDI 28 8 17 5 11 3 9 2
FPEI 28 9 17 6 11 3 9 3
LTDEBT 28 17 17 11 11 6 9 5
STDEBT 28 14 17 7 11 7 9 5
Bulgaria
FDI 11 0 n/a n/a 11 0 7 0
FPEI 11 5 n/a n/a 11 5 7 3
LTDEBT 11 6 n/a n/a 11 6 7 5
STDEBT 11 5 n/a n/a 11 5 7 4
Chile
FDI 18 3 7 1 11 2 9 2
FPEI 18 9 7 2 11 7 9 5
LTDEBT 18 7 7 3 11 4 9 3
STDEBT 18 14 7 5 11 9 9 7
India
FDI 16 3 5 1 11 2 9 1
FPEI 16 5 5 1 11 4 9 5
LTDEBT 16 10 5 3 11 7 9 6
STDEBT 16 9 5 3 11 6 9 5
Mauritius
FDI 13 4 2 0 11 4 9 3
FPEI 13 5 2 0 11 5 9 4
LTDEBT 13 6 2 0 11 6 9 6
STDEBT 13 7 2 1 11 6 9 4
Mexico
FDI 18 2 7 0 11 2 9 1
FPEI 18 9 7 3 11 6 9 7
LTDEBT 18 12 7 4 11 8 9 5
STDEBT 18 9 7 5 11 4 9 3
Morocco
FDI 14 6 3 1 11 5 9 5
FPEI 14 8 3 1 11 7 9 5
LTDEBT 14 9 3 3 11 6 9 5
STDEBT 14 11 3 2 11 9 9 8
Pakistan
FDI 23 4 12 0 11 4 9 3
FPEI 23 12 12 5 11 7 9 6
LTDEBT 23 8 12 4 11 4 9 4
STDEBT 23 13 12 6 11 7 9 6
Senegal
FDI 29 20 18 14 11 6 9 6
FPEI 29 16 18 10 11 6 9 5
LTDEBT 29 21 18 10 11 11 9 8
STDEBT 29 20 18 13 11 7 9 6
Thailand
FDI 32 7 21 5 11 2 9 3
FPEI 32 13 21 9 11 4 9 5
LTDEBT 32 13 21 8 11 5 9 2
STDEBT 32 17 21 10 11 7 9 4
Tunisia
FDI 27 9 16 6 11 3 9 4
FPEI 27 9 16 6 11 3 9 3
LTDEBT 27 16 16 10 11 6 9 4
STDEBT 27 19 16 12 11 7 9 6
(continued on next page)
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Table 5.6 (continued)
Country Series
1975-2006 1975-1995 1996-2006 1994-2002
Obs. Freq. Obs. Freq. Obs. Freq. Obs. Freq.
Turkey
FDI 18 2 7 1 11 1 9 1
FPEI 18 8 7 1 11 7 9 6
LTDEBT 18 10 7 5 11 5 9 5
STDEBT 18 12 7 6 11 6 9 7
Notes: Sudden stop is defined as abrupt cessation, drop or reversal of capital flows. Quantitatively, a decrease in
a certain type of foreign financing of at least 25% from the previous year is identified as an incidence of sudden
stop. Frequency (Freq.) is the number of sudden stops in the capital flow component under consideration during
the corresponding time period. Individual country observations (obs.) are adjusted to ensure comparability
across components and within countries.
The most striking feature of the exclusive sub-period 1994-2002 (which is supposed to be
the depression covering period as it includes 1994-95 Mexican crisis, 1997 East Asian crisis,
1998 Russian crisis, 1999 Brazilian crisis, 1994 and 2001 Turkish crises, and 2002 Argentine
crisis) is that equity capital investments, particularly portfolio equity, deteriorates during such
distressed episodes. Bearing in mind that country level and regional implications should be
taken with caution as the sampling coverage is not spatially exhaustive, we notice that as an
individual country Senegal suffers most from the sudden stops whereas Bulgaria scores
lowest. Regionally speaking, Developing Asia, Latin America and Caribbean and Middle
East and North Africa lie in the middle, while Sub Saharan Africa and Europe and Central
Asia are the opposite extremes.
As noted, many writers treat capital flow volatility and sudden stop as synonymous, e.g.
Jeanne and Rancière (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Calvo et al. (2008), Caballero
(2003). Via pooled ordinary probit regressions we analyze the interrelationship between
sudden stop probabilities and capital flow volatilities given the volumes of capital flows (i.e.
controlling for the per capita real levels). It is hypothesized that the probability of sudden stop
in an external funding component is positively (negatively) related to the volatility (volume)
of that component.
The results from estimations of the variants of Equation (1) are in Table 5.7.62 Under each
specification, dependent variable is a binary indicator for the corresponding capital flow
component designating whether the outcome is a sudden stop in that component during the
matching year. Volume refers to per capita real unfiltered forms of the series and volatility
stands for 3-year rolling standard deviations of the cyclical components of HP-filtered series.
62 Related marginal effects and elasticities are relegated to the appendix.
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Table 5.7: Pooled Ordinary Probit Estimations of Sudden Stops (Annual Panel Data, 1976-2006)
FDI (1) FDI (2) FPEI (1) FPEI (2) LTDEBT (1) LTDEBT (2) STDEBT (1) STDEBT (2)
FDI
Volume
-0.00842***
(0.0029)
-0.00636**
(0.0029)
0.00147
(0.0013)
-0.00145
(0.0019)
-0.00173
(0.0015)
FDI
Volatility
0.01369**
(0.0065)
0.01599**
(0.0075)
-0.00795
(0.0056)
0.01353*
(0.0070)
0.00572
(0.0050)
FPEI
Volume
-0.01021
(0.0107)
-0.03571***
(0.0086)
-0.03701***
(0.0092)
0.00216
(0.0055)
-0.00508
(0.0052)
FPEI
Volatility
-0.03093*
(0.0185)
0.03512***
(0.0113)
0.03221**
(0.0140)
0.00325
(0.0131)
0.01028
(0.0133)
LTDEBT
Volume
-0.00087
(0.0022)
-0.00024
(0.0015)
-0.00825***
(0.0020)
-0.01077***
(0.0025)
0.00050
(0.0014)
LTDEBT
Volatility
0.00025
(0.0051)
0.00305
(0.0040)
0.00987***
(0.0037)
0.01224***
(0.0047)
-0.00676*
(0.0039)
STDEBT
Volume
-0.00082
(0.0015)
0.00103
(0.0009)
-0.00021
(0.0013)
-0.00463***
(0.0015)
-0.00461***
(0.0016)
STDEBT
Volatility
-0.00003
(0.0020)
-0.00093
(0.0013)
-0.00534***
(0.0014)
0.00554**
(0.0024)
0.00609**
(0.0027)
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Pseudo R
2 0.232 0.269 0.180 0.192 0.191 0.242 0.118 0.133
Notes: Under each specification, dependent variable is a binary indicator for the corresponding capital flow component designating whether the outcome is a sudden stop in
that component during the matching year. Volume refers to original (unfiltered) per capita real capital flow series and volatility refers to 3-year rolling standard deviations of
the cyclical components of HP-filtered series. Unreported constant and time dummies (period fixed effects) are included in all regressions. Heteroscedasticity robust
Huber/White/sandwich type standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See notes to
Table 5.6 as well.
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There are two columns per component reporting the estimates derived from two different
model specifications. The first controls for own volume and volatility and the second includes
volumes and volatilities of the other components as well to allow for potential cross linkages.
The results under all these specifications suggest that, for any type of international financing,
volatility exacerbates the likelihood of a sudden stop whereas volume mitigates it. The
inverse relationship implies that the more uncertainty muffles the realization and prospect of
a flow component the more likely is that the inflow of that component will experience an
abrupt cessation. Conversely, sudden stop probability reducing impact of the volume reveals
the fact that as the investors and creditors enlarge their exposure by increasing asset
purchases and lending they become automatically more committed to a certain market
destination which makes them more unlikely to retreat from that market all of a sudden.
These robust findings attest to the critical role played by stably increased inflow of foreign
funding in avoiding or at least alleviating financial crashes. Some cross linkages manifested
by respective significant parameters (FPEI volatility under FDI (2), STDEBT volatility under
LTDEBT (2) and vice versa) indicate the prevalence of a sort of checks and balances
mechanism across capital flow components.
5.9 CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom and the predictions of the information-based trade-off model of
Goldstein and Razin (2006) are comparatively investigated with reference to behavioural
aspects of four major components of capital flows. Using annual time series data for the
period 1970-2006 for twelve emerging market economies from five regions, we analyze
volatility, persistence, predictability, correlation, comovement (or contagion risk) and sudden
stop (reversibility) patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity
investment (FPEI), long-term debt flows (LTDEBT) and short-term debt flows (STDEBT)
through appropriate statistical and econometric techniques.
We show that, besides a maturity oriented (i.e. long-term–short-term) polarity, a structural
(i.e. equity–debt) dichotomy is noticeable in that equity flows (FDI and FPEI) are less
volatile, more persistent, more predictable and less susceptible to sudden stops than debt
flows (LTDEBT and STDEBT). Conventional perception that short-term financial flows
(STDEBT and FPEI) are more volatile than long-term financial flows (LTDEBT and FDI) is
not supported in our data. Nonetheless, there is evidence that correlations and risks of
contagion are stronger within the pairs of long-term capital flows (FDI and LTDEBT) and
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equity flows (FDI and FPEI) than within the short-term capital flows (FPEI and STDEBT)
and debt flows (LTDEBT and STDEBT) pairs.63 Thus, our findings lend support to all of the
hypotheses from the information-based trade-off model. They are also consistent with the
majority of the hypotheses from the conventional theory. Finally, we confirm that all funding
components reveal some permanence, as conjectured by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000).
Considering the results for the individual hypotheses, it is concluded that the conventional
claim in the first hypothesis—that the long-term capital flows are less volatile than the short-
term capital flows—is empirically vague. The information-based trade-off model version of
this hypothesis (i.e. the fifth hypothesis)—arguing that equity flows have lower volatility than
debt flows—is plainly verified. Process modelling and forecasting results demonstrate that
there is both maturity and structure distinction among the flow components in terms of
persistence and predictability, backing the second and the sixth hypothesis. Furthermore, the
correlation and comovement hypotheses (that long-term flows are more strongly correlated
and comoving than short-term flows, ܪ3, and that debt (equity) flows are weakly (strongly)
correlated and comoving, ܪ7) are broadly confirmed. We provide the last, but not least,
evidence on the reversibility profiles of global fund flows. The finding is that not only short-
term funds are more susceptible to sudden stops than long-term funds (Hypothesis 4) but also
is foreign lending more reversible than foreign equity (Hypothesis 8).
We return to comment on the questions posed in the introduction starting with the last one.
It is shown that there are indeed systematic differences across funding components, countries
and regions. The increase in equity-type of inflows is characterized to be part of a long-run
trend (given that FDI and FPEI are detected to be more stable, persistent, predictable,
comoving and less reversible) that offer greater diversification and better risk sharing
opportunities not only for foreign financiers but also for domestic borrowers. Being less
promising on these terms, debt flows seem to be rather short run phenomena that could
reverse suddenly. These findings are in line with the continuous-time stochastic model of
Obstfeld (1994) who proposes that an ever-increasing (i.e. strongly trended) international
portfolio allocation is associated with the greater diversification—pooling portfolios
intertemporally with global assets—which in turn leads to substantial risk reduction.
63 A pecking order among individual components is also established (less strongly though) as FDI, FPEI,
LTDEBT and STDEBT; where the order runs from the most persistent, comoving and irreversible to the least.
Keeping the same equity-to-debt order: for predictability, components within the last pair, for volatility (ranking
from least to most), those within the first pair interchange. The empirical observation that FPEI is less volatile
than FDI contradicts the prediction of Goldstein and Razin (2006) for those particular components.
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Sørensen et al. (2007) provide similar evidence. Our results also suggest that international
investors are more likely to chase short-run capital gains and immediate yields on lending,
whereas they take long horizon and show commitment in making portfolio equity and direct
investments.
As empirically found, it is possible to see a ‘debt versus equity’ approach in the recent
literature where (from an emerging market economy perspective) equity-like financing is
viewed as more favourable than debt financing. Aghion et al. (2004) posit that debt flows are
largely procyclical and, when excessive, they can magnify the adverse impacts of shocks on
economic growth. Under the presence of default risk and financial constraints, high external
leverage may lead to appreciations and fluctuations in the real exchange rate (i.e. the transfer
problem) which in turn propel fluctuations in the price of the country-specific factor.
Considerable liquidation and restructuring costs from large-scale bankruptcies that resulted
from amplified volatility of firms’ cash flows could destabilize the aggregate economy and
eventually engender prolonged periods of slumps. They contend, on the other hand, that FDI
(and equity capital that has informational advantages) characterized as a substitute for
domestic investment (i.e. perfectly free and infinitely elastic) may well be regarded as a
countercyclical source that ultimately stabilizes the economy. Moreover, in the absence of
restrictions, foreign portfolio and direct equity financing provide a less costly alternative
(Neumann, 2003) and offer better risk sharing opportunities (Stulz, 1999) by reducing the
cost of capital (Henry, 2003) and the size of distortionary effects of the transfer problem
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004).
Foreign over-borrowing is more likely to give rise to a debt overhang problem both at firm
(Myers, 1977) and country level (Krugman, 1988), either directly or indirectly through
facilitating domestic over-lending. Firm level debt overhang that entails risk shifting reduces
efficiency and results in underinvestment.64 At the country level, Aguiar et al. (2009) show
that, under the limited commitment and impatience of the government, sovereign debt
overhang amplifies investment cycles and leads to instability of the aggregate income.65 On
the other hand, over-indebtedness is an integral element of a Fisherian debt-deflation cycle
which is held responsible for generating financial and economic crises.66 Among the three
64 Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Manso (2008), Moyen (2007), Aivazian et al. (2005), Hennessy (2004).
65 Although investment effect of the country level debt overhang is documented to be ambiguous, the actual
service of the debt is found to crowd out investment. See Bulow and Rogoff (1990), Warner (1992), in
particular, Cohen (1993).
66 See Fisher (1933), McKinnon and Pill (1998), Schneider and Tornell (2004), Mendoza (2010).
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factors that can make financial collapse possible, as Krugman (1999) highlights, two (high
leverage and large foreign currency debt relative to exports) are obviously related to debt
funding. Empirically supporting this critique, Frankel and Wei (2005) indicate that while the
ratio of short-term debt to international reserves increases the probability of a crash,
combined with inflation within their regression tree analysis, a high ratio of external debt to
GDP would also place a country in jeopardy.
From the equity funding side, however, again Frankel and Wei (2005) show that the ratio
of FDI and portfolio equity to gross foreign liabilities decreases the chance of a crisis.
Besides bringing positive externalities of financial globalization such as managerial and
technological expertise, foreign equity investments are estimated to induce investment and
boost economic growth (Kose et al., 2009). Finally, Allen (2001) argues that the buffer role
of equity capital might mitigate the detrimental effects of possible future debt overhang and
agency problems and attenuate the probability of deadweight costs creating bankruptcies.
In the light of these arguments and mindful of some negative features (identified above) of
global equity flows, as being inclined to contagion and speculation, we suggest that emerging
market countries—while wisely and vigilantly managing debt financing—should prioritize
equity financing.67
67 For identical recommendations please refer to Eichengreen (2000), Cardoso and Dornbusch (1989).
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APPENDIX 5.1: UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS
Table A5.1: Unit Root Tests for Country FDI Series
Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat.
Brazil Bulgaria Chile Indiaܣܦܨ௅ఛ(2) -3.23# ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(2) 3.78 ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -3.27# ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(8) 2.84ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (2) -3.54Ƈ ܣܦܨௌ஽ఛ (1) -4.99* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -7.74* ܣܦܨௌ஽ఓ (9) -3.51Ƈܲ ௅ܲఛ(2) -2.11 ܲ ௅ܲఛ(11) 10.69 ܲ ௅ܲఛ(0) -3.27# ܲ ௅ܲఛ(10) 4.10ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -4.93* ܲ ௌܲ஽ఛ (13) -5.12* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (5) -8.36* ܲ ௌܲ஽ఓ (7) -4.48*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(4) 0.10 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.16Ƈ ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(3) 0.12 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(4) 0.22*ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (0) 0.09 ܭܲܵ ௌܵ஽ఓ (8) 0.38# ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (6) 0.14 ܭܲܵ ௌܵ஽ఓ (3) 0.29
Mauritius Mexico Morocco Pakistanܣܦܨ௅ఛ(9) -2.31 ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -3.16 ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(7) -7.39* ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(1) 0.21ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (8) -6.46* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -7.05* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (7) -5.89* ܣܦܨௌ஽ఓ (0) -6.96*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(0) -6.88* ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -3.12 ܲ ௅ܲఛ(4) -3.27# ܲ ௅ܲఛ(2) 0.37ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -13.32* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -7.81* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (4) -9.36* ܲ ௌܲ஽ఓ (1) -6.96*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(0) 0.03 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(4) 0.15Ƈ ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(4) 0.11 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(1) 0.13#ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (2) 0.06 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (1) 0.05 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.29 ܭܲܵ ௌܵ஽ఓ (1) 0.24
Senegal Thailand Tunisia Turkeyܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -4.82* ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -2.92 ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -1.52 ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) 5.04ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -9.53* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -6.16* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -3.80* ܣܦܨௌ஽ఓ (0) -6.61*ܲ ௅ܲఓ(1) -4.81* ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -2.94 ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -1.39 ܲ ௅ܲఛ(9) 7.19ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (1) -9.83* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (6) -7.42* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (6) -3.17Ƈ ܲ ௌܲ஽ఓ (1) -6.59*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(2) 0.17 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.15Ƈ ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(1) 0.15Ƈ ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.17Ƈܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (2) 0.04 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (6) 0.30 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (7) 0.31 ܭܲܵ ௌܵ஽ఓ (2) 0.31
Notes: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, 1979), Phillips-Perron (PP, 1988), Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and
Shin (KPSS, 1992) are the alternative tools for testing a series (or the first or second difference of the series) for
the presence of a unit root. Superscripts ߬ and ߤ indicate whether a time trend as well as a constant term or just a
constant term are included in the test specification. Subscripts ܮ, ܨܦ, and ܵܦ denote level, first difference, and
second difference respectively. Numbers in parentheses are either lags automatically selected according to
Schwarz information criterion (SIC) under ADF or default Newey-West bandwidths along with Bartlett kernel
as spectral estimation method under PP and KPSS. Symbols on the top right of some test statistics #, Ƈ, and *
signify rejection of the relevant null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table A5.2: Unit Root Tests for Country FPEI Series
Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat.
Brazil Bulgaria Chile Indiaܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -3.01 ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -2.35 ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -3.56Ƈ ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -2.61ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -5.56* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -4.08Ƈ ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -5.69* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -5.51*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(2) -2.97 ܲ ௅ܲఓ(1) -2.36 ܲ ௅ܲఓ(1) -3.57Ƈ ܲ ௅ܲఛ(1) -2.60ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (12) -9.95* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (1) -4.09Ƈ ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (1) -5.82* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -5.66*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(3) 0.08 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(1) 0.25 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(1) 0.14 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.11ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.07 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (1) 0.09 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (1) 0.07 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.11
Mauritius Mexico Morocco Pakistanܣܦܨ௅ఓ(1) -2.87# ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -3.50# ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(1) -3.27Ƈ ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -3.69Ƈܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -2.32 ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -3.80Ƈ ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -2.91# ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -7.76*ܲ ௅ܲఓ(1) -1.70 ܲ ௅ܲఛ(1) -3.49# ܲ ௅ܲఓ(9) -3.35Ƈ ܲ ௅ܲఓ(1) -3.67Ƈܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (1) -2.34 ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -5.78* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (10) -7.08* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (3) -8.29*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(1) 0.13 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(0) 0.09 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(1) 0.09 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(2) 0.12ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (0) 0.15 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (4) 0.14 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (1) 0.13 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (5) 0.15
Senegal Thailand Tunisia Turkeyܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -5.17* ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -5.21* ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(1) -1.87 ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -2.90ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -7.41* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -10.99* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -7.97* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -5.60*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(2) -5.24* ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -5.21* ܲ ௅ܲఛ(2) -3.46# ܲ ௅ܲఛ(0) -2.90ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (5) -15.11* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (3) -11.78* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (0) -7.97* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (0) -5.60*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(3) 0.12# ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(4) 0.06 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.13# ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(1) 0.14#ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.07 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (4) 0.12 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.08 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (6) 0.16
Notes: See notes to Table A5.1.
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Table A5.3: Unit Root Tests for Country LTDEBT Series
Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat.
Brazil Bulgaria Chile Indiaܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -3.93Ƈ ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -1.17 ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -2.84# ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -2.14ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -9.55* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -5.57* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -6.80* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -7.00*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -3.98Ƈ ܲ ௅ܲఛ(2) -1.22 ܲ ௅ܲఓ(0) -2.84# ܲ ௅ܲఓ(2) -2.00ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (0) -9.55* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -5.56* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (4) -6.96* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -7.02*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(4) 0.07 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(3) 0.14# ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(3) 0.13 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(4) 0.19ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.08 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (2) 0.21 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (7) 0.09 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (2) 0.18
Mauritius Mexico Morocco Pakistanܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -3.96Ƈ ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -3.60Ƈ ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(3) -5.45* ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -3.76*ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -9.01* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -6.13* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -10.7* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -8.19*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -3.95Ƈ ܲ ௅ܲఛ(1) -3.57Ƈ ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -3.61Ƈ ܲ ௅ܲఓ(1) -3.72*ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (11) -12.39* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (9) -8.06* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (0) -10.7* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (10) -10.1*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.13# ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(3) 0.08 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(3) 0.10 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(3) 0.16ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (2) 0.07 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.18 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (6) 0.14 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.09
Senegal Thailand Tunisia Turkeyܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -3.39# ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(1) -3.09Ƈ ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -3.20Ƈ ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -2.07ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -5.93* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -3.72* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -7.42* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -6.84*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(1) -3.40# ܲ ௅ܲఓ(0) -1.81 ܲ ௅ܲఓ(4) -3.11Ƈ ܲ ௅ܲఛ(2) -2.26ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (1) -7.00* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (5) -3.54Ƈ ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (10) -8.78* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (3) -6.84*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(3) 0.11 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(4) 0.15 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(2) 0.11 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.12#ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.11 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (1) 0.06 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (2) 0.08 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (4) 0.26
Notes: See notes to Table A5.1.
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Table A5.4: Unit Root Tests for Country STDEBT Series
Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat. Test Type Stat.
Brazil Bulgaria Chile Indiaܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -4.54* ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -0.71 ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -7.54* ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -1.61ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -9.30* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -3.13Ƈ ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (2) -6.65* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -5.71*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(1) -4.52* ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -0.39 ܲ ௅ܲఓ(5) -8.02* ܲ ௅ܲఓ(0) -1.61ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (6) -11.96* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (3) -3.05Ƈ ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (5) -19.7* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -5.81*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.06 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(1) 0.15Ƈ ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(13) 0.21 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(2) 0.18ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (8) 0.14 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.31 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (12) 0.18 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (5) 0.32
Mauritius Mexico Morocco Pakistanܣܦܨ௅ఛ(0) -14.26* ܣܦܨ௅ఛ(1) -4.28* ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -4.95* ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(1) -5.40*ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -8.09* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (2) -5.11* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -5.74* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (3) -6.02*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(3) -12.03* ܲ ௅ܲఛ(1) -3.52Ƈ ܲ ௅ܲఓ(2) -4.93* ܲ ௅ܲఓ(6) -4.85*ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -33.86* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (1) -5.43* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (2) -9.37* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (6) -10.3*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(1) 0.08 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(3) 0.05 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(1) 0.12 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(4) 0.27ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (1) 0.11 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.05 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (1) 0.05 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (4) 0.09
Senegal Thailand Tunisia Turkeyܣܦܨ௅ఛ(1) -6.14* ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -2.81# ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -5.54* ܣܦܨ௅ఓ(0) -5.70*ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (2) -5.24* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (0) -5.95* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (5) -4.92* ܣܦܨி஽ఓ (1) -7.23*ܲ ௅ܲఛ(4) -7.55* ܲ ௅ܲఓ(0) -2.81# ܲ ௅ܲఓ(5) -5.56* ܲ ௅ܲఓ(1) -5.70*ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (11) -17.62* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (4) -6.05* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (5) -13.6* ܲ ிܲ஽ఓ (1) -8.41*ܭܲܵܵ௅ఛ(2) 0.09 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(3) 0.08 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(5) 0.24 ܭܲܵܵ௅ఓ(3) 0.08ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (2) 0.11 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (5) 0.07 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (5) 0.08 ܭܲܵܵி஽ఓ (3) 0.05
Notes: See notes to Table A5.1.
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APPENDIX 5.2: MARGINAL EFFECTS AND ELASTICITIES FOR POOLED ORDINARY PROBIT ESTIMATIONS
Table A5.5: Marginal Effects for Pooled Ordinary Probit Estimations of Sudden Stops (Annual Panel Data, 1976-2006)
FDI (1) FDI (2) FPEI (1) FPEI (2) LTDEBT (1) LTDEBT (2) STDEBT (1) STDEBT (2)
FDI
Volume
-0.00171***
(0.000489)
-0.00112**
(0.000481)
0.000584
(0.000527)
-0.000579
(0.000771)
-0.000654
(0.000561)
FDI
Volatility
0.00278**
(0.00124)
0.00280**
(0.00141)
-0.00315
(0.00221)
0.00539*
(0.00278)
0.00216
(0.00190)
FPEI
Volume
-0.00179
(0.00187)
-0.0142***
(0.00341)
-0.0147***
(0.00364)
0.000860
(0.00218)
-0.00192
(0.00198)
FPEI
Volatility
-0.00542*
(0.00320)
0.0139***
(0.00449)
0.0128**
(0.00557)
0.00129
(0.00523)
0.00388
(0.00504)
LTDEBT
Volume
-0.000153
(0.000375)
-0.0000948
(0.000594)
-0.00329***
(0.000812)
-0.00429***
(0.000993)
0.000190
(0.000544)
LTDEBT
Volatility
0.0000437
(0.000891)
0.00121
(0.00159)
0.00393***
(0.00146)
0.00488***
(0.00187)
-0.00255*
(0.00147)
STDEBT
Volume
-0.000143
(0.000260)
0.000409
(0.000375)
-0.0000833
(0.000516)
-0.00175***
(0.000565)
-0.00174***
(0.000593)
STDEBT
Volatility
-0.00000553
(0.000351)
-0.000369
(0.000530)
-0.00213***
(0.000577)
0.00209**
(0.000891)
0.00230**
(0.000989)
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Notes: Marginal effect refers to instantaneous average partial response of the dependent variable to a unit change in the continuous explanatory variable in question. Standard
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Consult also notes to Tables 5.6 and 5.7.
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Table A5.6: Elasticities for Pooled Ordinary Probit Estimations of Sudden Stops (Annual Panel Data, 1976-2006)
FDI (1) FDI (2) FPEI (1) FPEI (2) LTDEBT (1) LTDEBT (2) STDEBT (1) STDEBT (2)
FDI
Volume
-1.064***
(0.410)
-0.851**
(0.403)
0.0973
(0.0883)
-0.0845
(0.112)
-0.0791
(0.0688)
FDI
Volatility
0.481**
(0.239)
0.595**
(0.282)
-0.146
(0.103)
0.218*
(0.112)
0.0726
(0.0644)
FPEI
Volume
-0.229
(0.243)
-0.394***
(0.104)
-0.410***
(0.111)
0.0210
(0.0530)
-0.0389
(0.0402)
FPEI
Volatility
-0.551
(0.337)
0.309***
(0.0994)
0.284**
(0.122)
0.0252
(0.102)
0.0626
(0.0815)
LTDEBT
Volume
-0.0543
(0.135)
-0.00734
(0.0459)
-0.225***
(0.0562)
-0.291***
(0.0659)
0.0107
(0.0306)
LTDEBT
Volatility
0.0139
(0.284)
0.0840
(0.111)
0.242***
(0.0894)
0.297***
(0.112)
-0.129*
(0.0741)
STDEBT
Volume
-0.0301
(0.0552)
0.0188
(0.0174)
-0.00335
(0.0208)
-0.0584***
(0.0187)
-0.0582***
(0.0197)
STDEBT
Volatility
-0.00243
(0.154)
-0.0354
(0.0509)
-0.179***
(0.0505)
0.146**
(0.0614)
0.160**
(0.0680)
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Notes: Elasticity refers to instantaneous average proportional (percentage) response of the dependent variable to a 1 percent change in the continuous explanatory variable in
question. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01 denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Also see notes to Table A5.5.
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APPENDIX 5.3: TIME SERIES PLOTS OF CAPITAL FLOW COMPONENTS
Figure A5.1: Foreign Direct Investment Time Series by Country (2005 $US, 1970-2006)
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Figure A5.2: Portfolio Equity Flow Time Series by Country (2005 $US, 1970-2006)
0
12
24
36
48
60
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Brazil
0
10
20
30
40
50
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Bulgaria
0
28
56
84
112
140
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Chile
0
2
4
6
8
10
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
India
0
8
16
24
32
40
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Mauritius
0
33
66
99
132
165
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Mexico
0
4
8
12
16
20
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Morocco
0
3
6
9
12
15
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Pakistan
0
2
4
6
8
10
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Senegal
0
17
34
51
68
85
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Thailand
0
6
12
18
24
30
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Tunisia
0
16
32
48
64
80
F
P
E
I
p
er
C
ap
it
a
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
Turkey
146
Figure A5.3: Long-term Debt Financing Time Series by Country (2005 $US, 1970-2006)
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Figure A5.4: Short-term Debt Financing Time Series by Country (2005 $US, 1970-2006)
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Figure A5.5: All Flow Components by Country (2005 $US per Capita, 1970-2006)
Notes: Vertical lines correspond to Latin American, Mexican, East Asian, Brazilian and Turkish financial crises.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 RECAP
The prime objective of the research in the thesis is to investigate the evidence for the
Lucas Paradox. Standard economic theory suggests that international capital should flow in
search of the highest returns. On the basis that developed countries are capital rich with
considerable accrued investment, marginal returns should be relatively low. In contrast,
returns should be relatively high in developing countries that are capital scarce with
significant investment needs. This implies that international capital flows should favour
developing, or lower income, countries relative to developed, high income, countries.
However, observed flows are in the reverse direction, hence the Lucas paradox: why is it that
capital tends to flow to richer rather than poorer countries?
Many reasons have been suggested to explain the paradox, but the prevailing broad
hypothesis is that for considerations of security and reducing risk, capital is attracted to
countries with better institutions, and higher income is associated with higher quality
institutions. While this does help to explain why capital flows to high income developed
countries, we show in Chapter 3 that within the set of developing countries the paradox
persists: even when allowing for differences in the quality of institutions, capital flows to
relatively richer developing countries. The determinants of flows within developing countries
are explored in more depth in Chapter 4 but the paradox persists: certain institutions do
appear especially important for certain types of capital, but in general differences in the
quality of institutions do not explain why capital tends to flow to relatively higher income
developing countries.
Another part of the explanation may lie in differences between types of capital. As
detailed in Chapter 2, the thesis considers data on four major types of flow—foreign direct
investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity investment (FPEI), long-term debt flows
(LTDEBT) and short-term debt flows (STDEBT)—for developing countries over the period
1970-2006. It is not unreasonable to expect that the determinants may differ for the different
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types of flow. Most obviously, some such as FDI and LTDEBT are long-term whereas others,
such as FPEI and STDEBT, are more transient. These issues are analyzed in Chapter 5 by
categorising patterns of each type of flow in terms of trends over time and volatility.
The first section of this concluding chapter summarises the main findings to try and
identify the factors that are likely to explain why poorer developing countries receive lower
capital inflows, relative to less poor developing countries, than one be expected given
potential returns. Section 6.2 addresses some of the limitations in the research, in particular
constraints imposed by the limited availability of good data. Section 6.3 considers
possibilities for future research building on the findings from the thesis.
6.2 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The thesis begins the study of international capital flows to developing countries over the
period 1970-2006 by reviewing the different measures and types of flow and discussing
trends in levels, composition and direction over the period (Chapter 2). Chapters 3 and 4
investigate the problem of lower-than-expected capital flows to poorer countries (the Lucas
paradox) in the long-run and in the short-run. In these chapters, total capital is measured as
the sum of foreign direct investment and portfolio equity flows. Chapter 5 analyzes the
patterns of four types of capital flow and tests hypotheses derived from conventional theory
and the information-based trade-off model of Goldstein and Razin (2006).
Aggregating the data according to geographical regions and income groups of developing
countries, it is shown that total net capital flows denominated in nominal US dollars, although
exhibiting cyclical patterns, have increased dramatically during the last four decades. The
first episode of this surge was during the 1970s when total debt inflows were the dominant
aggregate component. After a decade of depression due to the Latin American debt crisis
(that, as the name hints, severely reduced debt inflows), capital inflows, dominated this time
by equity flows, resumed their expansion. This second surge was interrupted in 1997 for
about 5 years as a result of the East Asian financial crisis and thereafter the third surge took
place. Throughout this period, capital inflows expressed as a share of GDP have been even
more cyclical and increased very little. The most remarkable observation is that lower income
countries have always received less international capital than higher income countries in
relative terms (i.e. less than predicted given their incomes). Having observed a potentially
persistent wealth bias in foreign capital allocation even within developing economies,
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Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the analysis of this anomaly—at least insofar as it is
inconsistent with neoclassical predictions.
Chapter 3 examines if the findings of Alfaro et al. (2008) hold up if one restricts attention
to only developing countries. Using cross-section data for the period 1970-2006 for up to 47
developing countries, we test if the Lucas paradox is resolved by including a measure for
institutional quality when the sample excludes developed countries (that have consistently
higher measures of institutional quality). As in Houthakker (1965), Baltagi and Griffin
(1984), Pesaran and Smith (1995), we interpret the estimation results from cross-section OLS
as capturing ‘long-run’ relationships. Our cross section estimates imply that the paradox
remains in the long-run. Hence, the convergence-promoting role of capital flows in
international consumption, wealth and development does not seem to be effective; over a
period of almost four decades we observe divergence within developing countries.
Chapter 4 uses panel data of 5-year moving averages over 1980-2006 for the same set of
countries, and we interpret the estimates as ‘short-run’ parameters. Employing a variety of
static (including within-group fixed effects) and dynamic (system GMM) panel estimators we
find that controlling for the quality of institutions still does not remove the Lucas paradox.
Thus, the puzzle of rich-to-poor capital flows persists within our sample of developing
economies also in the short-run. The explanation may be that returns are not actually higher
in poor countries, or that there is little evidence to convince investors that they are higher.
Nevertheless, our intertemporal (panel) estimations confirm the short-run divergence, with
capital flowing to richer countries, prediction of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).
Chapter 5 takes a component-based approach to capital flows and narrows the focus to a
sample of 12 emerging market economies that receive the majority of the inflows destined to
developing economies. We test hypotheses derived from both conventional theory, that
predicts a maturity-related (short-term vs. long-term) differentiation among the characteristics
of capital flow components, and the information-based trade-off model of Goldstein and
Razin (2006), that predicts a structure-related (debt vs. equity) differentiation. The analysis
distinguishes behavioural aspects of foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio equity
investment (FPEI), long-term debt flows (LTDEBT) and short-term debt flows (STDEBT).
Volatility, persistence, predictability, correlation, comovement (or contagion risk) and sudden
stop (reversibility) profiles of these components are assessed using annual time series data.
The assessments are mainly based on components that are paired according to maturity (i.e.
long-term–short-term, under the conventional wisdom) and structure (i.e. equity–debt, under
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the information-based trade-off model). It is shown that a structural distinction between
capital flow components exists in addition to a maturity oriented distinction. More
specifically, equity flows (FDI and FPEI) are found to be less volatile, more persistent, more
predictable, more correlated, more contagious and less susceptible to sudden stops than debt
flows (LTDEBT and STDEBT). The conventional view that long-term financial flows
(LTDEBT and FDI) are more stable than short-term financial flows (STDEBT and FPEI) is
not supported by the data; the former are at least as volatile as the latter. Consistent with the
prognosis in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), all funding components are detected to have
some persistence.
One implication is that emerging markets should not only borrow at long maturities (or
negotiate to rollover the existing short-term obligations) but also promote the inflow of
foreign direct and portfolio equity investments, which are generally well-behaved in terms of
patterns over time.
6.3 LIMITATIONS
A number of problems are associated with the quality and coverage of the data used. The
basic concern is that data on international capital flows to developing countries have limited
frequency, period and country coverage that precludes the formation of larger samples.
Increased number of observations with high frequency data, monthly or quarterly for
instance, would enable the use of multivariate cointegration and vector error correction
models (Johansen, 1988, 1991) in our long-run and short-run analyses.
Measurement errors reduce the quality (accuracy and consistency) of the data. As notified
in the statistical manuals of the IMF and World Bank, individual country reporting, currency
conversion, valuation and time of recording may cause discrepancies in the data they report.68
We acknowledge that our variables used as the proxies for the theoretical conceptions could
inevitably be subject to measurement error.69 The quandary is that there is no readily
available measure for the measurement error itself. Considering the inquiries on the Lucas
paradox, however, we recognize that the risk-return trade-off would be better captured in our
specifications through more appropriate measures for country risk and return differentials,
should they truly and accessibly exist. Measurement of the marginal product of capital,
68 See IMF (1993).
69 Cameron and Trivedi (2005) note that no econometric models (discussed in their book) are protected from the
problem of measurement errors.
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human capital, labour productivity and total factor productivity at the country-level is still
evolving. In particular, first, the data on the quality of institutions is not itself high quality, is
often missing and has limited variation over time or even across developing countries; and
second, there are no good data on rates of return on capital across countries over time (so one
cannot assess the assumption that returns are higher in poorer countries).
The caveat for the behavioural evaluations is that studying multiple attributes within a
single framework has led us to choose relatively simple techniques. A thorough analysis of
each attribute in separate research projects would have been more reassuring. The finite
samples due to short time series of some capital flow components may have given rise to size
and power distortions in the unit root tests performed, making the interpretation of their
results a matter of judgement (Stock, 1994). Moreover, possible outliers or breaks in the
series (especially if early or late in the sample period) could have engendered low power unit
root tests.
6.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
It is asserted that developing and emerging market economies fall victim to volatility,
fickle market sentiments and stampedes more frequently and severely than their
industrialized counterparts due to their inability to execute countercyclical fiscal policies,
financial sector underdevelopment (incomplete capital markets, improper or missing
insurance markets and sovereign default risk) and weak institutions (fragile political,
regulatory, supervisory and legal atmosphere). The persistence in the Lucas paradox and
implied non-convergence of real incomes could, therefore, be ascribed to the detrimental
impacts of negative shocks that breed excessive volatility in global financial markets. It may
also be explained in part by the Linder hypothesis, home market effects in international trade
and home bias in international finance. In particular, it should be investigated whether, as a
result of poor institutional quality and capital market imperfections, positive shocks are
unable to remove the adverse effects of negative shocks (i.e. implicit distortions arising from
financing instability and asymmetric swings that are partly treated in the thesis). One possible
way to address this would be incorporating volatility measures for both aggregates and
components of capital flows within a multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) specification
as these additional covariates are atheoretical. Such findings could help explain economic
non-convergence (in growth, income, consumption and development) for emerging and
developing countries.
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Studying the effects of monopoly power and rights on international capital allocation and
their role in the Lucas paradox is outside the scope of this work as it may require firm and
industry level data. Further research would shed light on that matter of potential
interrelationships.
The regularities and reflections set out in the event study of univariate annual country time
series could be extended to multivariate and multi-spatial frameworks. Within such a
complex environment, an inquiry focusing on the stochastic volatility determination,
cyclicality and causal dynamics of the capital flow components (particularly debt flows)
seems to be promising future research avenues. Furthermore, investigating the role of volume
and volatility of foreign borrowing in sudden stops, currency and banking crises, contagion
and economic recessions may provide clarifying comparative evidence across the three
generations of financial crises models. Estimating associated probabilities of sudden stops,
currency and banking crises through parsimoniously identified seemingly unrelated bivariate
probit models would enable such a comparative assessment.
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